The following observations exclude from their scope two questions that are customarily brought into the discussion whenever the problem of self-determination is analyzed, namely:

1) Is self-determination to be equated necessarily with independence or are there any other conceivable models of self-determination?

2) What is a “people” for the purpose of exercising this right and where is the borderline to be drawn between peoples entitled to invoke this right and other entities not so entitled?

It is suggested that for the purposes of these brief observations it be assumed that self-determination is indeed to be equated with political independence and that there exists a way of establishing what group of persons qualifies for the term “people” and which entities do not.

The three papers published hereafter were presented at an International Conference on the Ethics and Responsibilities of the Legal Profession held in Tel Aviv from 17–21 August 1980. As could be expected, the views expressed therein are not identical, but since they are all connected with the manner in which the nature and the function of the profession is conceived, it may be useful to outline the attitude of the law of Israel on the subject.

The Chamber of Advocates Law, enacted in 1961 to supersede the Advocates Ordinance, 1938, declares in sec. 54 that —

The statute apparently places at the same level the lawyer's duties to his client and to the court: the order in which it enumerates them does not indicate any intention of priority—any more than in the Decalogue the respect due to one's father can be said to take preecdence over that to one's mother. The same two fundamental duties are mentioned, in reverse order, in the Rules of Professional Ethics made in 1966 by the National Council of the Chamber of Advocates with the approval of the Minister of Justice.

Is a party who breaks his contract entitled to restitution? This is one of the most difficult problems in the law of contracts. Williston, for instance, remarks:

We shall examine this question in light of the provisions of the Contracts (Remedies for Breach of Contract) Law, 1970.

Sec. 9 of the Law reads as follows:

The process of conversion to Judaism is paralleled to the acceptance of the Torah by the Jewish people at Sinai. In Jewish sources, the Sinaitic experience is viewed as a mass conversion of the Jewish people. The essence of this conversion was the acceptance of the commandments as binding upon the Jewish people. Similarly, the essence of a Gentile's conversion to Judaism in later generations, is his acceptance of the yoke of the commandments as binding upon him. In fact, the Talmudic sources go so far as to state that the Jewish people at Sinai underwent the same process as a proselyte: circumcision, immersion in a mikve and the bringing of a burnt-offering. In short, traditionally, the essence of conversion was the acceptance of the mitzvot.

The case of the Canadian ambassador's residence has been the subject of several court decisions at various instances in Israel. These decisions (as well as others relating to the doctrine of sovereign immunity) have been reviewed in former issues of this section. On June 3, 1997, the Supreme Court, in its appellate jurisdiction, gave its judgment in this case and delineated the application of the international law doctrine of sovereign immunity in Israeli law. In a different case decided on the last day of 1996, the Tel-Aviv District Court was required to rule on the applicability of this doctrine to a civil suit brought against the government of the United States of America. This District Court decision now needs to be examined in light of the recent ruling of the Supreme Court in the Edelson case.

The British strategy to tame the Palestine press was to be implemented through a sophisticated masterplan. The Press Bureau was reorganized and explicitly directed to woo journalists and thereby achieve press cooperation. Simultaneously, the iron fist of the Press Ordinance was cast, to be used in case gentle handling failed to bear the desired cooperation.

The British analyzed the pitfalls on the road to cooperation correctly. As early as 1932 the Press Officer observed that the “deep-seated antipathy of Arabs and Jews as represented by their respective presses” and “the fundamental opposition of all Arab press to the Mandate” might undermine the entire plan. But even this sober analysis could not foresee the dimensions of the coming crisis.

As Jewish immigration to Palestine and the economic prosperity of the country increased, the Arabs anxiety about their political future in Palestine intensified. In 1936, Arab tensions exploded in the Arab rebellion. Widespread terror, arson and general strikes engulfed the country, and this time they were directed not only against the Jews but also against the British Government. Under these circumstances, the British came to the conclusion that they could no longer support the idea of a Jewish National Home in Palestine. In 1939, the White Paper, expressing a shift in policy, was issued. His Majesty's Government rejected the idea that Palestine should become a Jewish State and announced that hereinafter, Jewish immigration to Palestine would be limited and Jewish purchase of Arab lands prohibited.

Issues such as prison overcrowding, a growing realization that prisons cannot rehabilitate, and the belief that many inmates could be adequately managed in less intrusive and costly settings, have led Israeli scholars and practitioners, in the last four decades, to devote efforts to the development of alternative sanctions to imprisonment. Specifically, the focus has been on the development and elaboration of alternative sanctions that match the severity of punishment to the seriousness of the crime.

Intermediate sanctions (also called “alternative sanctions,” “alternatives to imprisonment,” or “community-based sanctions”) have been proposed as “ways to manage the burgeoning numbers of offenders without sacrificing public safety.” These punishment options are considered to fall on a continuum between traditional probation supervision and traditional incarceration.

The origin of the comparative study of Talmudic law lies in the Talmud itself, where we find instances in which the Sages formulated their halakhot in comparative terms, or took cognizance of non-Jewish legal positions.

There are two aspects to comparative legal studies in modern Talmudic research: first, that of pinpointing the influence of one system upon another; and second, that of obtaining a clearer and deeper understanding of each system by emphasizing the common and the unique elements in each. The first aspect is very much a matter of chance, and even when it is applicable, the results often constitute details which are not capable of being formulated in general terms. The second aspect—that of mutual clarification—is, however, generally applicable, and may be employed with profit in numerous instances.

The main aim of Jeff McMahan's manuscript The Morality and Law of War is to answer the question: why and accordingly when, is it justified or permissible, to kill people in war? However, McMahan argues that the same principles apply to individual actions and to war. His main claim is that “a state of war… does not call forth a different set of principles, but merely complicates the application of moral principles that are of universal application.” In other words, “…in war, people have the same rights, immunities, and liabilities that they have in other contexts.” McMahan rejects “all doctrines of collective responsibility” and “liability” according to which “individuals can share in responsibility… or liability simply by virtue of membership in a collective.” His claim is that every individual is liable for what he has done and not for the actions of others—even if both are part of the same collective. Accordingly, McMahan challenges the common view that it is much easier to justify killing in war compared to killing in other contexts. Therefore, the scope of his project exceeds the context of war and extends to interpersonal conflicts between individuals that do not qualify as war. Indeed, McMahan has argued in the past for a similar account of self-defense in the individual context.

One of the main driving forces of man is fear, and its very paralyzing effect has, in the solution of human conflicts, been sought as method for both attack and defence. No wonder then that Montesquieu recognized fear as the principle of the despotic type of government; while organized terror as practised nowadays on a wide scale has become an instrument for undermining the authority of established government.

Its origin can be traced to Anarchism, that frightful episode in “the war between two divisions of society,… the world of privilege and the world of protest…, the last cry of individual man,… the last fist shaken against the encroaching State”. But organization in every form was so repellent to the 19th century anarchists that they were incapable of drawing together, even for the sake of concerted action.

The article examines the approach of leading rabbis toward levirate marriages following the establishment of the State of Israel. Chief Ashkenazi Rabbi Herzog supported the abolishment of levirate marriages and attempted to impose on all ethnic communities the Ashkenazi approach, which since the 13th century favored chalitza. Chief Sephardic Rabbi Uziel supported rabbi Herzog although the levirate commandment takes precedence over chalitza in the Sephardic and oriental traditions and is practiced in these communities. In 1950, the two Chief Rabbis led a council of rabbis that enacted a regulation rejecting levirate marriages and favoring chalitza. Rabbi Uziel believed that two opposing traditions governing an issue as central as family law are not appropriate in a modern state. He perceived the levirate marriage, which binds women in matrimonial relations against their will, to be inconsistent with their status in the modern era. The strong roots of the Ashkenazi Halachic tradition, which has for many generations rejected levirate marriages, allowed him to demand that all ethnic groups adopt it. Rabbi Yossef and other oriental critics regard his actions as submissive to Ashkenazi tradition, a criticism I reject. Rabbi Yossef vigorously opposed the abolition of levirate marriages, and in a decision in 1951 he claimed that it was invalid. It was the beginning of his struggle against what he perceived as Ashkenazi dominance and Sephardic submission, demanding the restoration of the oriental and Sephardic traditions. In time, this became an explicit ideological-political stance under the motto leachzir atara le'yoshna. I suggest that Rabbi Yossef endeavors to restore the golden age of the Bashi sages in Jerusalem, chief among them Rabbi Elyashar, at the twilight of the Ottoman period.

It is known to lawyers in this country, and no news to those who deal with public law or are concerned with the drafting of legislation, that the legislative and the judicial branches of government are engaged in a continuous dialogue. The role of the courts in the dialogue consists of interpreting statutes to be applied by them, while the legislator at times enters into discussion with the Judiciary by reacting to a court decision through legislative action. It is these phenomena in the field of legislation, occurring as reactions to decisions of the courts, which will be briefly considered in the present article.

The determination of the legislative power to act in reply to a judgment of a court may be based on a number of different reasons. One possible reason is that the court expressed an unfavorable opinion upon the contents of a statute and the legislator, in response to the criticism of the judges, amends the statute in order to do away with the imperfections revealed by the court.

I. Historical and Comparative Backround: (1) Early medieval times. (2) The Ottoman Empire and successor States. (3) Personal laws in the colonies. (4) State and Church law as personal laws.

II. The Personal Laws as Autonomous Legal Systems: (1) Notion of legal system. (2) Personal legal systems. (3) Relationships between personal legal systems and between such systems and the State. (4) The dominant position of the State. (5) The personal laws as autonomous legal systems.

III. The Conflict of Personal Laws and the Interpretation of its Rules: (1) State legislation relating to personal laws. (2) The problem of qualification. (3) The renvoi problem. (4) Public policy.

IV. Connecting Principles: (1) Membership of an ethnic or religious group. (2) Influence of the will of the parties. (3) Other connecting principles.

V. Nature and Historical Function of the Conflict of Personal Laws: (1) The legal nature of the Conflict of Personal Laws. (2) The historical function of the conflict of Personal Laws.