The origin of the comparative study of Talmudic law lies in the Talmud itself, where we find instances in which the Sages formulated their halakhot in comparative terms, or took cognizance of non-Jewish legal positions.

There are two aspects to comparative legal studies in modern Talmudic research: first, that of pinpointing the influence of one system upon another; and second, that of obtaining a clearer and deeper understanding of each system by emphasizing the common and the unique elements in each. The first aspect is very much a matter of chance, and even when it is applicable, the results often constitute details which are not capable of being formulated in general terms. The second aspect—that of mutual clarification—is, however, generally applicable, and may be employed with profit in numerous instances.

Because of the diminutive size and relatively intense urbanization of the country, noise has always constituted one of the more serious environmental problems with which the Israeli legislature and courts must contend. Indeed, in a recent survey conducted by the Israeli Environmental Protection Service, (E.P.S.) 52.5% of Israelis questioned indicated that the major deficiency of their environment was the prevalence of noise, as opposed to only 3.7% who complained of unpleasant air or odours. Regulations have been enacted specifying the manner in which noise is to be measured and providing standards for the existence of nuisances. Recently, the court has been faced on several occasions with the question of whether violation of such regulations is necessary for an action seeking to establish a given noise as a nuisance. Although no definitive rule has been established, the Supreme Court, in confirming a lower court decision in Israel Electric Co. Ltd. v. Farsht, began what we hope will be a continuing process in determining a clear and optimal judicial policy regarding the measuring of noise and the use of these calculations in nuisance cases.

Modern equality as derived from the Enlightenment has always had problems with difference. Whereas feudalism set inequality as the baseline, modern society sets equality as the baseline, but allows for unequal treatment based on differences. Thus, differences among the sexes have been invoked to treat women as inferiors and racial differences to deprive racial minorities of equal treatment. Liberalism has countered these moves by promoting a conception of equality as identity according to which race or gender-based differences are irrelevant for purposes of political participation or employment. More recent claims for equality based on identity politics which call for a type of equality that accounts for differences pose vexing problems for liberalism. How should liberalism handle this? By creating exceptions to generally applicable laws? By promoting group-based autonomy and self-government at the risk ofbalkanizing the polity? Or, on the contrary, by rejecting demands for recognition of differences and reinforcing equality as identity? After analyzing the dialectic of equality, this Article argues that, based on commitment to the premise that all human beings share an equal status for possessing the same capacity for moral choice, pluralism offers a better framework than liberalism for the best possible reconciliation of identity and difference. This implies a departure from the monolithic nation-state toward multi-layered interconnected centers of collective autonomy and self-government.

Since the conclusion of the two Camp David Frameworks (reproduced in this issue), much has been said about a possible relation between them, namely, whether there is any “linkage” between the Framework which deals with the bilateral relations between Egypt and Israel, and the Framework for Peace in the Middle East (the Comprehensive Framework), in particular its provisions concerning Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District. After the conclusion of the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt, a similar question was raised with regard to a possible link between it and the Comprehensive Framework. This question has in fact been dealt with by several provisions of the Peace Treaty and related documents, i.e., the Preamble and Article VI paragraph 2 of the Treaty, and the Agreed Minutes, all reproduced in this issue.

I am very happy and very honoured to have been invited to give the inaugural lecture in the series under the Sir Hersch Lauterpacht Chair of Public International Law at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. It is a great honour to be connected with the name of Hersch Lauterpacht who was one of the truly great minds in the field of international law in our epoch, great as a scholar, great as an idealist, an innovator and a prophet; and it is a source of happiness to me to bear witness to the fact that he was also a great human being whose wisdom was illuminated with kindness and warmth. His friends and pupils remember him with love and gratitude.

For the purpose of this paper I invite you to accept with me the proposition that we live in an ecological crisis. The extent of the dangers confronting us is in dispute. The degree of urgency is debated. There are still serious gaps in our knowledge. The task of the scientists is enormous. Still, no one can ignore the existence of this crisis.

“The two worlds of man, the biosphere of his inheritance, the technosphere of his creation—are out of balance, indeed potentially in deep conflict. And man is in the middle. This is the hinge of history at which we stand, the door of the future opening on to a crisis more sudden, more global, more inescapable and more bewildering than any ever encountered by the human species and one which will take decisive shape within the life span of children who are already born.”

In 1941, the Banking Ordinance enacted by the High Commissioner of Palestine defined “banking business” as the “business of receiving from the public on current account money which is to be repayable on demand by check, and of making advances to customers”. The most recently enacted Israeli Banking Law (Licensing), 1981 contains a very extensive definition of banking business which includes no less than thirteen types of transactions.

This certainly reflects a new legal approach towards the economic reality of banking which in and of itself has not changed drastically. Moreover, the peculiar dynamics of the banking business also inspired the legal rule that the Governor of the Bank of Israel should have the right to enlarge the legal definition by recognizing the banking character of other transactions.

The sale of property by a non-owner is an important question in many legal systems. The problem is more acute in the case of movables, since with immovable property the existence of a register of title allows the buyer to check with relative ease whether the seller is in fact the owner. There is usually no register of title to movable property, and the buyer will usually identify the holder of goods who is offering them for sale as their owner.

There are three parties involved in the problem: A — the real or original owner, B — the seller, and C — the buyer. B may be a thief, a finder or A's bailee, or he may have obtained the property from A by misrepresentation, and so forth. In many cases it is impossible to obtain satisfaction from B, either because he cannot be traced or because he is insolvent, and the question of who owns the property, A or C, then assumes vital importance.

It is known to lawyers in this country, and no news to those who deal with public law or are concerned with the drafting of legislation, that the legislative and the judicial branches of government are engaged in a continuous dialogue. The role of the courts in the dialogue consists of interpreting statutes to be applied by them, while the legislator at times enters into discussion with the Judiciary by reacting to a court decision through legislative action. It is these phenomena in the field of legislation, occurring as reactions to decisions of the courts, which will be briefly considered in the present article.

The determination of the legislative power to act in reply to a judgment of a court may be based on a number of different reasons. One possible reason is that the court expressed an unfavorable opinion upon the contents of a statute and the legislator, in response to the criticism of the judges, amends the statute in order to do away with the imperfections revealed by the court.

On June 28, 1978, the Israeli Knesset passed a Law which changed the age of criminal responsibility of juveniles, raising the threshold from 9 years of age to 13 years of age. This Law, known as the Penal Law (Amendment no. 3) 1978, is popularly called the “Yitzhaki Law”, after MK Yitzhak Yitzhaki (Likud) who initiated the Law.

From a practical point of view, the Amendment means that police interrogators may not interrogate minors under the age of 13, nor may they open criminal files on such minors or prosecute them. When and if the police are confronted with juveniles suspected of delinquent behaviour the police may take their testimony, and may refer them to the welfare officers, who, operating by virtue of the Youth (Care and Supervision) Law, 1960, are authorized to decide whether the minor requires care, and if so, the kind of care he is to receive.

Continental systems generally permit a possessor to acquire rights against the signatories of a bill or note despite a forged indorsement, it being sufficient that the sequence of indorsement on the instrument leads to the possessor. On general principles, the Anglo-American law differs in this respect. As early as the eighteenth century, it was held, in Mead v. Young (1790) that the possessor of a bill to order containing a forged indorsement has no right to the bill and is not entitled to demand payment from the parties whose signatures preceded the forgery. This approach was followed by the English Act and the N.I.L. The U.C.C. follows this principle in laying down that a forged signature is inoperative as that of the person whose name is signed. A person who acquires a bill to order on which there is a forged indorsement is therefore not a holder of the bill nor in legal possession of it, nor an owner. He consequently has no right under the bill against parties whose signatures preceded the forgery.