The object of this paper is to examine the obligations assumed by Israel, by virtue of its acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (hereinafter: “the Court”), in accordance with Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Court's Statute, which reads as follows:

“The states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning:

• (a) the interpretation of a treaty;

• (b) any question of international law;

• (c) the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation;

• (d) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation.”

An attempt will be made to compare Israel's declaration of acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction with the declarations of other countries, and to analyse the reasons underlying Israel's particular declaration. The paper will not purport to consider the many problems concerned with the Court's compulsory jurisdiction. These problems, and the considerable jurisprudence of the Court dealing with them, are well known to students of international law. Indeed, probably no other aspect of the Court's jurisdiction has been the object of such rich legal literature, some of it quite recent.

The law governing co-operative housing in Israel is an explicit example of legislative response to social and economic pressures, and psychological needs. In this regard it is, however, not unique, since similar pressures and needs with similar solutions are found in other countries. Here, as elsewhere, the same motivating forces have operated—the desire to possess a home of one's own for reasons of personal dignity and assurance, encouraged by calculated need to hedge against inflation; the increase in population leading to larger demands for housing accommodation, which remained for long generally unsatisfied because of pegged rentals under tenant protection legislation; the high cost of land and building, which called for the optimum utilization of land and raw materials; and the preference for apartment dwelling due partly to the closer social life that it affords, and to which the population was from previous experience accustomed, and partly to the widespread employment of women, which put a premium upon living quarters that required less time and effort for housekeeping. Of these forces, the population pressure, due to natural increase but far more to immigration after the establishment of the State in 1948, and the continuous rise in land prices were particularly significant in Israel.

The forgery of works of art, particularly pictures, is a serious evil that besets the art business world, quite apart from its depressive effect generally. The phenomenon is not new, but never before has it been more prejudicial, perhaps because contemporary painting is far easier to imitate than that of the past, and because of the increasing flow of money into the art markets. These two elements encourage the temptation to forgery, whilst the demand for pictures would possibly be even greater were it not for this nightmare that haunts likely purchasers.

How can the world's art markets be restored to health? Clearly this problem can be tackled by a variety of means. It would resolve itself or would not exist were people honest and upright. The situation would be ameliorated if art buyers were more circumspect in their purchases and the experts consulted to confirm the authenticity of pictures were able to express firm opinions and were more of one mind among themselves. The question, however, may well be considered from another angle, to see whether an answer can be found—or at least considerably facilitated—even if the standard of reasonable care and the expertise of the experts remain as they are at present. We do not have in mind here the criminal and civil sanctions that already exist. Nor shall we inquire into the possibilities of the assistance which may be had from increasing the severity of such sanctions. We shall not examine nostrums but means of prevention.

The theoretical difficulty behind questions arising out of age would appear to be the inherent lack of clarity in defining the legal nature of the concept in general, that is, what “age” is from a legal point of view and how it can be categorized for various juridical purposes.

Investigation suggests a distinct traditional tendency both among writers and judges to regard the determination of age, for whatever purpose, as a matter of status, and this despite the fact that “status” itself is not clearly defined or sufficiently described by those who employ the term. Thus, for example, Wolff defines it as “the legal category to which a person belongs owing either to his natural condition…or to his legal condition”, and enumerates age, along with unsoundness of mind, as an example of status arising from a person's natural condition. Likewise, Arminjon features age, along with marriage, celibacy and other well-known instances of status, as a matter concerning “l'état des personnes”, while defining status as “l'ensemble des qualités et des rapports de droit qui constituent la condition juridique d'une personne, qui lui marquent sa place et tracent le rôle qu'elle joue dans la famille et dans a société”.

The scope of income tax is generally determined in the light of two criteria: the personal link of the taxpayer to the country and the link between the income and the territory of the country imposing the tax. The imposition of tax on the basis of the second of these criteria is known as “the source of the income” approach.

A similar term, the doctrine of “source”, was used in the British income tax system to denote a different theory. That theory was based on the idea that all income must have a “source” and that no one ought to be taxed in a given year unless it can be shown that he had a source from which income could be derived during that year. It should be noted, however, that notwithstanding the linguistic resemblance between the terms used for the two theories, in fact they deal with different matters. Hence, though perhaps historically related, the two concepts should not be confused.