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Recasting Bourgeois Britain?

The British State in the years which followed the First World War

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 December 2008

Christopher J. Nottingham
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In Recasting Bourgeois Europe, his study of the responses of the major States of Western Europe to the conditions created by the First World War, Charles Maier makes only, according to his standards, passing reference to Great Britain. Initially this must appear quite reasonable, for if one compares the post-war situation of Britain with that of most of Continental Europe it must seem that Britain escaped, or at least experienced with a greatly reduced intensity, the disorder which beset other nations. It might therefore be assumed that the efforts of the British political elite to adjust to the post-war world are less worthy of attention than those of their Continental counterparts.

Type
Research Article
Information
International Review of Social History , Volume 31 , Issue 3 , December 1986 , pp. 227 - 247
Copyright
Copyright © Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis 1986

References

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33 Cabinet Papers 23/50. That the argument was very bitter is reflected in the fact that on 30 July 1925 it was recorded in the minutes that the decision was not unanimous. This was most unusual.

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48 While middle- and upper-class representatives of the State could normally be trusted, central government was quite capable of punishing and rebuking those who failed to come up to the mark. Some magistrates were criticised and others removed from the bench because they were insufficiently enthusiastic for the government case in the General Strike. Some were “reported” to the Lord Chancellor by Lords Lieutenant. The Bishop of Exeter was “reported” to the Prime Minister for allowing Margaret Bondfield to speak on church property. Baldwin Papers, Vol. 22.

49 See Cabinet Papers 27/260 for how the government risked the whole supply in London rather than allow unions to supply hospitals and emergency services only.

50 ibid.

51 ibid. 83.

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53 The two largest and most respectable organisations were National Propaganda and Industrial Information. Both went to considerable lengths to keep their existence secret. Chairman of the former was Rear Admiral Sir Reginald Hall MP, a former head of Naval Intelligence. It sought to propagate “the necessity for increased production” and oppose “all acts against constitutional government” by pamphlets, speakers, meetings etc. Industrial Information had the same respectable connections and objectives, but worked through the existing newspapers. See Cabinet Papers 27/84.

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