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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 February 2009
Symbols and rituals held high status in East German public life.2 They allowed, as is now stressed, state socialism to bind the people to the ruling system, while also affirming the links between this system and the traditions and programmes of the pre-stalinist and pre-communist labour movement and pointing to a future in which the red banners would no longer be used to conceal dilapidated facades. Moreover, they represented a society which tried to compensate its members for what they lacked materially with non-material gratification; or put another way, it replaced the struggle to distribute economic capital by a struggle for social and thus symbolic capital.
1 This is a reworking of a lecture delivered at a conference on “The Plurality of Workers' Culture”, held on 15–19 September 1992 in Bamberg, Germany and organized by the Workers' Culture Commission of the German Folklore Society. I am particularly grateful to Irene Dölling, Heike Müns, Dietrich Mühlberg, Eggo Müller and Dieter Strützel for criticism and additions to the lecture version of this paper.
2 There is as yet no comprehensive political, socio-historical and cultural reappraisal of the public use of symbols in East German society. Recent specific studies worth mentioning include: Hofmann, Michael, “Vom Schwung der Massenfeste”, pt. 1, Kuhur und Freizeit (11 1986), pp. 22–25Google Scholar, and pt. 2, ibid. (December 1986), p. 27f; Rytlewski, Ralf and Kraa, Detlev, “Politische Rituale in der UdSSR und der DDR”, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschehen, supplement to Das Parlament, 3/87, 17 01 1987, pp. 33–48Google Scholar; Segert, Dieter, “Fahnen, Umzüge, Abzeichen: Die Macht der Rituale und Symbole”, in Blanke, Thomas and Erd, Rainer (eds), DDR: Ein Staat vergeht (Frankfurt am Main, 1990), pp. 25–35Google Scholar; Hutzler, Margot and Schünberger, Klaus, “Demonstrationskultur im Rückblick: Der 1. Mai in Jena,” in Meyer, Gerd, Riege, Gerhard and StrUtzel, Dieter (eds), Lebensweise und gesellschaftlicher Umbruch in Ostdeutschland (Erlangen and Jena, 1992), pp. 145–168Google Scholar.
3 See particularly Korff, Gottfried: “Rote Fahnen und Bananen: Notizen zur politischen Symbolik im Prozess der Vereinigung von DDR und BRD,” Schweizerisches Archiv far Volkskunde, 86 (1990), pp. 130–158Google Scholar.
4 The accentuation of specific symbolic communicative achievements implies a criticism of “substantialist” concepts which interpret the multiple use of symbolic forms, as during the 1989 demonstrations in East Germany, not so much as the choice of a medium appropriate to the situation as the expression of a restricted capacity for speech or argument or of irrational attitudes. See Korff, Gottfried, “Symbolgeschichte als Sozialgeschichte? Zehn vorläufige Notizen zu den Bild- und Zeichensystemen sozialer Bewegungen in Deutschland,” in Warneken, Bernd Jürgen (ed.), Massenmedium Strasse: Zur Kulturgeschichte der Demonstration (Frankfurt am Main and New York, 1991), pp. 17–37Google Scholar, esp. pp. 18–22, and Korff, “Rote Fahnen und Bananen,” p. 131.
5 Sarcinelli, Ulrich, “‘Staatsrepräsentationen’ als Problem politischer Alltagskommunikation: Politische Symbolik und symbolische Politik,” in Gauger, Jörg-Dieter and Stagl, Justin (eds), Staatsrepräsentation (Berlin, 1992), p. 163Google Scholar.
6 The banner texts at the Berlin demonstration of 4 November 1989 are documented in Hahn, Annegret et al. 4.11.89: Protestdemonstration in Berlin DDR (Berlin, 1989)Google Scholar.
7 See Rüddenklau, Wolfgang, Störenfriede: DDR-Opposition 1986–1989 (Berlin, 1992), p. 95Google Scholar.
8 See Voigt, Andreas, “Gespräch mit Wehrpflichtigen der 5. VP-Bereitschaft in Leipzig,” in Oktober 1989: Wider den Schlaf der Vernunft (Leipzig, 1989), p. 77Google Scholar.
9 The first quote is from die tageszeitung, 9 October 1989. The second is attributed to Alexandra, K. from Berlin, in Behr, Vera-Maier (ed.), Wir denken erst seit Gorbatschow: Protokolle von Jugendlichen aus der DDR (Recklinghausen, 1990), p. 60Google Scholar.
10 See epilogue, Lutz Niethammer's to Schüddekoopf, Charles (ed.), “Wir sind das Volk!”: Flugschriften, Aufrufe und Texte einer deutschen Revolution (Reinbek, 1990), p. 269Google Scholar.
11 Tetzner, Rainer, Leipziger Ring: Aufzeichnungen eines Montagsdemonstranten (Frankfurt am Main, 1990), p. 54Google Scholar.
12 See also the banner at the Leipzig Monday demonstration of 27 November 1989 which combined the West German eagle and East German emblem on a black-red-gold background and bore the inscription: “May the sun shine on Germany as never before.” (Bild, 29 November 1989). Here we can only deal in passing with the question to what extent socialist symbolic traditions form part of the transformation of East Germany at a deeper level. The sea of West German flags at the later Leipzig Monday demonstrations – unusual in West Germany itself – was reminiscent of the rallies and unity rituals of the SED era. It does not seem unwarranted to see in banner slogans such as “Helmut, take our hand, show us the way to the economic wonderland,” which appeared in Leipzig on 14 March 1990, an affinity to the same emphatic hopes for the future and the exaggerated confidence in the party leadership familiar in the socialist tradition. (The “Helmut” ( = Kohl) banner is quoted in, among others, Kuhn, Ekkehard, Einigkeit, Recht und Freiheit: Die nationalen Symbole der Deutschen (Berlin, 1991), p. 127)Google Scholar.
13 It is not possible and would not be sensible to provide an overview here of all the developments between 1990 and today. I can only illustrate some of the key patterns of symbolic change during this period.
14 Its downfall also had a prelude for years. Long before the 1989 upheaval the handshake symbol was widely known as “one hand washing the other” in East German slang.
15 Andert, Reinhold and Herzberg, Wolfgang, Der Sturz: Erich Honecker im Kreuzverhb'r (Berlin and Weimar, 1990), p. 39Google Scholar.
16 Kallabis, Heinz, Ade, DDR! Tagebuchbltitter (Berlin, 1990), p. 231Google Scholar.
17 In 1990 there was also a rather curious attempt at a reinterpretation of the East German emblem. When the conservative member of the last GDR parliament, Koch, proposed the removal of the GDR emblem from public buildings in May 1990, he identified the hammer, sickle and corn wreath as symbols of the socialist alliance of workers and peasants, and added – perhaps with the intention of exonerating his own lifetime under this symbol – that “the ears of corn are also, thank God, regarded as a symbol of rebirth, especially Mary's” and that the hammer “had also been used as a symbol of law by Celts and Slavs”. (See Keller, Dietmar and Scholz, Joachim, Volkskammerspiele: Eine Dokumentation aits der Arbeit des letzten Parlaments der DDR (Berlin, 1990), p. 140)Google Scholar.
18 Thtiringer Tageblatt, 2 May 1990.
19 Berliner Zeitung, 2–3 May 1992.
20 This development also set in before 1989. For instance, an East Berliner recounted how her circle of acquaintances had deliberately not used the East German flag on May Day for years, and had instead raised the red flag, which was regarded as less loyal to the authorities. Hutzler and Schdnberger discovered in their research on the history of May Day in Jena that until the mid-1980s the republican flag held pride of place at the ceremonies for apprentices at the Zeiss factory, followed by the FDJ flag and then the red flag; later this order was reversed. (See Hutzler and Schfinberger, “Demonstrationskultur im Riickblick,” p. 155.) It should be added that the display of the East German flag since German unification has taken on a more obvious significance: it now stands not so much for loyalty to a state as to one's own past in the GDR.
21 The irritating effect that this use of red can have was illustrated by Miguel Rodriguez in France, where the police sometimes considered blank red more threatening and attacked it more severely than inscribed red, which indicated the originators and/or their intentions and thus had a less portentous effect. See Miguel Rodriguez, “Ein Zeichen gentigt: Symbole des Ersten Mai in Frankreich 1890 bis 1940,” in Warneken,Massenmediwn Strasse, p. 174.
22 Gothaer Allgemeine, 2 May 1990.
23 A s early as 1986 and 1987 Michael Hofmann (“Vom Schwung der Massenfeste”) and Sauer, Birgit (“Volksfeste in der DDR: Zum Verhältnis von Volkskultur und Arbeiterkultur,” Der Bürger Im Staat, 39/3 (1989), pp. [213–217)Google Scholar found a definite shift in the symbolism of the labour movement towards popular cultural forms o f celebration. Th e central ritual of the march past the party leadership continued but, as eyewitnesses reported, this was increasingly avoided in the years before the change or was transformed: as people passed the platform some of them became consciously more relaxed, chatted with their companions or bent over to their children, instead of attentively waving t o political leaders. Se e also Hutzler and Schdnberger, “Demonstrationskultur im RUckblick,” p. 157.
24 See Tagesspiegel and Berliner Zeitung, 2 May 1992.
25 The speaker went on: “I am glad that, in contrast to many past political things in the GDR ordered from above, the trade union really does have a broad base. I can come in as a colleague, as a Christian, and get together with people of different views and argue about our new paths, ideas and opportunities, as we make progress, and that we can really move things forward despite our different principles and different origins. The mutual tolerance, complementing each other, the coming together of the most varied interests, is incredibly important to me. We are not stereotypes and we have known forced cooperation for long enough.” Thomas Erdmann, speech on May Day 1992, unpublished manuscript.
26 See Korff, “Symbolgeschichte ais Sozialgeschichte?,” p. 19.
27 See Tagesspiegel and Neues Deutschland, 13 January 1992 and 11 January 1993.
28 Those I questioned about the sequence of events and particularly the significance of this commemoration in the GDR era gave different answers. Some remembered the official event as an acclamatory ritual, others saw it as latently critical of the SED, not least because the East German leadership had never really come to terms with Rosa Luxemburg.
29 Berliner Zeitung, 15 January 1990.
30 Neues Deutschland, 13 January 1992.
31 Neues Deutschland, 22 November 1992.
32 Berliner Linke, 47, November 1991.
33 The continuing great popularity o f the youth initiation ceremony would itself b e worth examining. According to the Berliner Zeitung of 31 October 1992, by that date 4,580 youngsters, or almost a third of the 13 and 14 year olds from East Berlin, had registered for the ceremony in 1993; this was 1,500 more than at the same stage the previous year.
34 See Rytlewski and Kraa, “Politische Rituale,” p. 41.
35 In 1989, the Gethsemane church in East Berlin had been a centre of protest activities against the SED government.
36 See the pamphlet, “Bürgerinitiative Lenindenkmal = Demokratie in Aktion” (Berlin, 1992), p. 7Google Scholar.
37 Ibid., p. 21.
38 Neues Dutschland. 14 January 1990.
39 Neue Zen. 20 July 1992.
40 “De rageszenumg”. 14 July 1992.
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