The last few decades have seen a substantial growth in what has become known as transnational commercial law, by which I mean that body of commercial law principles and rules, from whatever source, which is common to a number of legal systems. The various types of harmonisation fall broadly into four groups, each possessing its own implementing agency:

The question of reservations was one of the ‘controversial issues’ facing the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in drawing up the final clauses of the Convention. On the one hand it was argued that the integrity of the Convention must be safeguarded and that the ‘package deal’ must be protected from possible disintegration by the making of reservations. On the other hand the view was held that ‘allowance for the possibility of reservations is aimed at accommodating the views of the delegations who have maintained that they cannot become parties to the Convention unless the Convention permits them to exercise a right to enter reservations, in accordance with customary international law and as envisaged under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.’ In short the need to preserve the integrity of the Convention was pitted against the need to secure universal participation in the Convention.

Listing rules have always played a significant role in corporate regulation by controlling the manner in which companies raise capital through the issue of securities and the subsequent trading of those securities between investors. The regulatory role of listing rules can be characterised as the top-tier in a system of regulation for listed companies in which the lower tiers are represented by securities law and general corporate law. Company law represents the bottom tier of regulation as it applies to all companies, albeit with some distinctions made between public and private companies. While company law does contain a substantial body of rules which are subject to change by share-holders (‘default rules’), it also contains a core of mandatory rules (not subject to change by shareholders) which are regulatory in their nature.

This article addresses a currently very controversial issue—the question of environmental regulation of foreign investment and the limits on such national regulation by international law, in particular by recently completed and negotiated multilateral investment Treaties (MITs). It contributes to the emerging discussion on how and where to draw the line between legitimate non-compensable national regulation aimed at protecting the environment, or ‘human, animal or plant life or health’1 on one hand, and regulation which is ‘tantamount’ to expropriation requiring compensation, on the other. It is a question that is largely responsible for the 1998 collapse of the negotiations for a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) within the OECD.2 This experience is currently the main obstacle for negotiating multilateral investment agreements—and it has already become a problem for the proper implementation of the already existing ones—in particular the novel and far-reaching investor-state arbitration under Chapter XI of NAFTA and Art. 26 of the Energy Charter Treaty.3

Section 4 of the [Immigration Ordinance 1971] effectively exiles the Ilois from the territory where they are belongers and forbids their return. But the ‘peace, order, and good government’ of any territory means nothing, surely, save by reference to the territory's population. They are to be governed, not removed. … These people are subjects of the Crown, in right of their British nationality as belongers in the Chagos Archipelago. As Chitty said in 1820, the Queen has an interest in all her subjects, who rightly look to the Crown—today, to the rule of law which is given in the Queen's name—for the security of their homeland within the Queen's dominions. But in this case they have been excluded from it. It has been done for high political reasons: good reasons, certainly, dictated by pressing considerations of military security. But they are not reasons which may reasonably be said to touch the peace, order and good government of [the British Indian Ocean Territory].1

It is generally acknowledged today that comparative law plays a decisive role in the harmonisation of European private law, in particular of European contract law.1 Dölle has emphasised this strong link between comparative law and European integration as early as 1950 in his report on the refoundation of the German Association of Comparative Law:

This essay assesses the significance of the United Kingdom's Human Rights Act (HRA) 1998 on legal theory and practice. Part II considers its constitutional context and significance; Part III deals with whether the European Convention on Human Rights has been ‘incorporated’. Part IV deals with its entry into force. The two principal methods used by the HRA to relate to (1) statutory interpretation and (2) a duty on public authorities or those exercising public functions. We consider these in turn. Part V analyses the interpretative obligation contained in the Act, the power for higher courts to make a ‘declaration of incompatibility’, and effects of such a declaration. Part VI explores the new statutory duty imposed by the Act. Part VII assesses the Act's remedial provisions. Part VIII notes the particular provision made for freedom of expression and freedom of religion. Part IX discusses the issues of ‘horizontal effect’ and the ‘margin of appreciation’. Part X concludes with an assessment of the significance of the HRA on legal theory and practice—just how big a difference has it made and will it make?

Various recent developments within and without the United Kingdom have strengthened the arguments in favour of the adoption of general nationality based criminal jurisdiction. These arise from problems in the application of territorial jurisdiction, increasingly frequent crime-specific reference to nationality based jurisdiction, the development of European Union law, the ever-greater mobility of nationals, the ability to commit crimes remotely, the incorporation of the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms into United Kingdom law, an evolution in the citizen-state relationship, and the increasing internationalisation of criminal law. It is not suggested that territory should no longer find a central place in the criminal law rather that the original and present arguments in its favour have been greatly weakened and, at the same time, the arguments in favour of nationality based jurisdiction have been strengthened. This article details the present nature of criminal jurisdiction, highlights the deficiencies with territorial jurisdiction and outlines the case in favour of a general nationality based criminal jurisdiction.

Literature on the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS), particularly that written by citizens of States that are Consultative Parties to the Antarctic Treaty, has often been celebratory in character. The ATS, we have been told, is a model of international co-operation. The regime has prided itself on addressing issues ahead of crisis situations; and, since the conclusion, and subsequent entry into force, of the Environmental Protocol, with its protection of the Antarctic environment. This acclaim of the system that manages Antarctic affairs may be to a large extent warranted. Antarctica has remained peaceful and its value as a scientific laboratory has in recent years been enhanced through the contribution of Antarctic science to understanding environmental issues of global concern. But the environmental credentials of the Treaty System will be immeasurably weakened if it continues to display such a huge anomaly between its treatment of mining and that of tourism. Tourism is covered by only a very weak application of the precautionary principle while the application of the precautionary principle to the issue of mining has been ‘extreme’. The principal factor behind this anomaly appears to be political opportunism.

The human and environmental consequences of big development projects such as large dams have been a focus of increasing attention in many countries. Large-scale involuntary resettlement caused by such projects has become particularly contentious in a number of situations. In India where many large dams have been and are being built, the Sardar Sarovar dam on the Narmada river has been at the centre of a storm for over a decade. The latest development in the history of this project is the judgment given by the Supreme Court of India on 18 October 2000 adjudicating a public interest litigation petition filed by the Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA—Save the Narmada Movement). This decision is of great significance not only for the project itself but also from a broader perspective.