Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 April 2013
The debate on the recognition of Indigenous Australians in the Australian Constitution is more about how, than whether, this should occur. The two main proposals involve the use of a preamble. One proposes symbolic recognition in a new constitutional preamble with a clause prohibiting use of the preamble in constitutional interpretation. The other would give Parliament power to make laws with respect to Indigenous Australians, but qualify it in a preamble so that it could only be exercised for their ‘advancement’. This article draws on comparative experience of the use of preambles in other common law countries to challenge the assumptions underlying each proposal.
1 Expert Panel on the Constitutional Recognition of Indigenous Australians, Recognising Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples in the Constitution (2012) 144–53Google Scholar.
2 These countries have been chosen because of their similar common law legal heritage. They adopt the same theories and rely on many of the same precedents regarding the interpretation of statutory preambles but differ significantly with regard to the interpretation of preambles to written Constitutions. For analysis of other constitutional preambles, see: Orgad, L, ‘The Preamble in Constitutional Interpretation’ (2010) 8 ICON 714Google Scholar; Granger, M-P, ‘The Preamble(s) of the French Constitution: Content, Status, Uses and Amendment’ (2011) 52 Acta Juridica Hungarica 1CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kudrna, J, ‘Two Preambles in the Czech Constitutional System’ (2011) 52 Acta Juridica Hungarica 25CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Piotrowski, R, ‘The Importance of Preamble in Constitutional Court Jurisprudence’ (2011) 52 Acta Juridica Hungarica 29CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Poplawska, E, ‘Preamble to the Constitution as an Expression of the New Axiology of the Republic of Poland’ (2011) 52 Acta Juridica Hungarica 40CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Silagi, M, ‘The Preamble of the German Grundgesetz: Constitutional Status and Importance of Preambles in German Law’, (2011) 52 Acta Juridica Hungarica 54CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
3 See the Statute of Westminster Adoption Act 1942 (Cth) and the Australia Acts 1986 (Cth) and (UK).
4 Australian Constitution, section 128.
5 The word indissoluble was included in response to the horrors of the American Civil War: Quick, J and Garran, R, The Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth (Legal Books 1995Google Scholar (1901 reprint)) 293; and Irving, Helen (ed), The Centenary Companion to Australian Federation (CUP 1999) 410Google Scholar.
6 Forty-nine petitions for the inclusion of a reference to God in the Constitution were presented to the Constitutional Conventions of the 1890s, comprising 36,434 signatures: Winckel, A, ‘Almighty God in the Preamble’, (1999) 4 The New Federalist 78Google Scholar, 79–80; and Bennett, S, The Making of the Commonwealth (Cassell Australia 1971) 106Google Scholar.
7 Australian Constitution, section 116.
8 This appears to be in part due to uncertainty as to how many Aboriginal people lived in the remote parts of Australia. This provision did not, as is sometimes popularly believed, exclude Aboriginal people from citizenship or voting. Voting rights depended upon electoral laws and were not expressly guaranteed by the Constitution, otherwise than in section 41. See further: Twomey, A, ‘The Federal Constitutional Right to Vote in Australia’ (2000) 28 FLRev 125Google Scholar, 127–130; and Chesterman, J and Galligan, B, Citizens without Rights: Aborigines and Australian Citizenship (CUP 1997) 72CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Note also section 25 of the Constitution, which following the example of the 14th Amendment to the United State Constitution, attempted to discourage the exclusion of persons from voting in the States on racial grounds. For a discussion of its relationship with section 127, see Twomey, A, ‘An Obituary for Section 25 of the Constitution’ (2012) 23 Public Law Review 125Google Scholar.
9 This term is used in this article to describe the different Aboriginal peoples of Australia and Torres Strait Islanders, who come from a different racial background.
10 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, Recognition, Rights and Reform: A Report to Government on Native Title Social Justice Measures (1995) 4.1–4.18Google Scholar; Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, Going Forward: Social Justice for the First Australians (1995)Google Scholar Recommendation 7; Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Indigenous Social Justice Strategies and Recommendations (1995)Google Scholar Recommendation 1.
11 Report of the Constitutional Convention (CanPrint Communications 1998) Vol 1, 46–7.
12 Recommendation of the ‘Resolutions Group’ of the Convention, Report of the Constitutional Convention, (CanPrint Communications, 1998) Vol 4, Transcript of Proceedings, 791.
13 Resolution of the Convention, Report of the Constitutional Convention (CanPrint Communications 1998) Vol 4, Transcript of Proceedings, 805.
14 Report of the Constitutional Convention (CanPrint Communications 1998) Vol 4, Transcript of Proceedings, 803–5.
15 Murray, L, ‘Mates Lost and Saved: Drafting the Constitutional Preamble’ in Warhurst, J and Mackerras, M, Constitutional Politics: The Republican Referendum and the Future (UQP 2002) 81Google Scholar.
16 McKenna, M, Simpson, A and Williams, G, ‘With Hope in God, the Prime Minister and the Poet: Lessons from the 1999 Referendum on the Preamble’ (2001) 24 UNSWLJ 382, 407Google Scholar, Winckel, A, ‘A 21st Century Constitutional Preamble: An Opportunity for Unity Rather than Partisan Politics’ (2001) 24 UNSWLJ 636, 642Google Scholar; Dodson, P, ‘Until the Chains Are Broken: 1999 Vincent Lingiari Memorial Lecture’ (2000) 5 Australian Indigenous Law Reporter 73Google Scholar.
17 Stone, B, ‘A Preamble to the Australian Constitution: A Criticism of the Recent Debate’ (2000) 35 Australian Journal of Political Science 291, 291Google Scholar; McKenna, Simpson and Williams (n 16) 382, 414.
18 See the voting statistics in McKenna, Simpson and Williams (n 16) 382, 415. Note that the republic referendum also failed, but by a smaller margin with 54.87% of electors voting ‘No’. The No vote may in part be attributed to a split between republicans over the model for a republic, with those republicans in favour of the direct election of a President voting with the monarchists against the republic in this referendum.
19 Reilly, A, ‘Preparing a Preamble: The Timorous Approach of the Convention to the Inclusion of Civic Values’ (1998) 21 UNSWLJ 903, 904Google Scholar; McKenna, M, Simpson, A and Williams, G, ‘First Words: The Preamble to the Australian Constitution’ (2001) 24 UNSWLJ 382, 396Google Scholar.
20 Davis, M and Lemezina, Z, ‘Indigenous Australians and the Preambles a More Inclusive Constitution or Entrenching Marginalisation?’ (2010) UNSWLJ 239Google Scholar, 261.
21 Winckel (n 16) 636, 646.
22 Winterton, G, ‘A New Constitutional Preamble’ (1997) 8 Public Law Review 186, 187Google Scholar.
23 ibid 186, 188.
24 Winterton, G, ‘The 1998 Constitutional Convention: A Reprise of 1898?’ (1998) 21 UNSWLJ 856, 863Google Scholar.
25 See eg the argument by Dr P Reynolds in Queensland, Legal, Constitutional and Administrative Review Committee, A Preamble for the Queensland Constitution?, Report No 46, November 2004, 11.
26 The following discussion on state Constitutions is drawn from: Twomey, A, ‘The Preamble and Indigenous Recognition’ (2011) 15 Australian Indigenous Law Review 4, 12–13Google Scholar.
27 Constitution Amendment (Recognition of Aboriginal People) Act 2010 (NSW).
28 Constitution (Preamble) Amendment Act 2010 (Qld).
29 Constitution Act 1975 (Vic), section 1A(3); Constitution of Queensland 2001 (Qld), section 3A.
30 Constitution Act 1902 (NSW), section 2(3).
31 Media release, ‘Constitutional Recognition of Indigenous Australians: Tony Abbott’, 19 January 2012 <http://www.tonyabbott.com.au/LatestNews/PressReleases/tabid/86/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/8528/Constitutional-Recognition-of-Indigenous-Australians.aspx> accessed 9 July 2012.
32 Expert Panel on the Constitutional Recognition of Indigenous Australians, Recognising Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples in the Constitution (2012) 116Google Scholar.
33 ibid 112.
34 ibid 115. See further at 130.
35 ibid 119.
36 ibid 153 (bold and italics in original).
37 ibid 130.
38 ibid 150–1.
39 Note that the words ‘peace, order and good government’ do not amount to a limitation on legislative power in Australia. On the contrary, they indicate a plenary power: Union Steamship Co of Australia Pty Ltd v King (1988) 166 CLR 1, 10; Durham Holdings Pty Ltd v New South Wales (2001) 205 CLR 399, [9] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ) and [55] (Kirby J).
40 For an analysis of these contestable assumptions see: Twomey, ‘The Race Power: Its Replacement and Interpretation’ (2012) 40 FLRev 413CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
41 Olivier v Buttigieg [1967] 1 AC 115, 128 (Lord Morris). In many respects the role of a preamble has been supplanted by the ‘Explanatory Memorandum’ and the treatment of a preamble is similar to the treatment of other extrinsic parliamentary material: Greenberg, D (ed), Craies on Legislation, (8th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2004) 658–9Google Scholar.
42 Quick and Garran (n 5) 284; Thring, Lord, Practical Legislation: The Composition and Language of Acts of Parliament and Business Documents (2nd edn, Little, Brown & Co 1902) 92Google Scholar. See also Edgar, SGG, Craies on Statute Law (7th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 1971) 199Google Scholar.
43 Crabbe, V, Understanding Statutes (Cavendish Publishing 1994) 18Google Scholar.
44 Stowel v Lord Zouch (1569) 1 Plowden 352, 369; 75 ER 536, 560 (Dyer CJ).
45 Plato, The Laws (trans T J Saunders, Penguin Books 1970) 185.
46 Orgad (n 2) 714, 722. Note Roach's criticism that preambles usually fail in their educational task because the language used is often archaic and is not accessible to ordinary people: Roach, K, ‘The Uses and Audiences of Preambles in Legislation’ (2001) 47 McGillLJ 129, 141Google Scholar.
47 Thring (n 42) 93. Note Thornton's argument that political justification should be left to the second reading speech and ‘on no account should intrude upon the preamble’: Thornton, GC, Legislative Drafting (Butterworths 1996) 197Google Scholar. See also: Bennion, FAR, Bennion on Statutory Interpretation (5th edn, LexisNexis 2008) 734Google Scholar.
48 Roach (n 46) 129, 150.
49 R v Sutton (1816) 4 M&S 532, 542 and 549; 105 ER 931, 935 and 937; R v Haughton (Inhabitants) (1853) 1 E&B 501, 506; 118 ER 523, 525 (Lord Campbell); Dawson v Commonwealth (1946) 73 CLR 157, 175 (Latham CJ); Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1953) 83 CLR 1, 224 (Williams J); 243–4 (Webb J); 263–4 (Fullagar J); Langan, PStJ, Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes (Sweet & Maxwell 1969) 9Google Scholar; Edgar (n 42) 43; Crabbe (n 43) 18; Bennion (n 47) 733; Pearce, DC and Geddes, R, Statutory Interpretation in Australia (7th edn, LexisNexis 2011) 156Google Scholar.
50 Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation (NSW) v WR Moran Pty Ltd (1939) 61 CLR 735, 754 and 766 (Latham CJ); 796 (Evatt J).
51 Stowel v Lord Zouch (1569) 1 Plowden 352, 369; 75 ER 536, 560. See also Sir Edward Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England, Vol 1, Lib 2, Cap 4, Sect 103, [79a]; Story, J, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (2nd edn, 1851) 326Google Scholar; and Quick and Garran (n 5) 284.
52 Powell v Kempton Park Racecourse Co Ltd [1897] 2 QB 242, 299 (Chitty LJ); Attorney-General v HRH Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover [1957] AC 436, 468 (Lord Normand). See also with respect to the United States: Yazoo & MVR Co v Thomas 132 US 174 (1889), 188 (Fuller CJ); Jellum, L, Mastering Statutory Interpretation (Carolina Academic Press 2008) 124–5Google Scholar; and Singer, N and Singer, JDS, Statutes and Statutory Construction (7th edn, West 2009)Google Scholar Vol 1A, 124–5; with respect to Canada: Sullivan, R, Driedger on the Construction of Statutes (3rd edn, Butterworths 1994) 262Google Scholar; and with respect to India: Tribhuban Parkash Nayyar v Union of India (1970) SCR (2) 732, 737 (Dua J); and Singh, GP, Principles of Statutory Interpretation (5th edn, Wadhwa & Co 1993) 103–9Google Scholar.
53 The Sussex Peerage Case (1844) 11 Cl & Fin 85, 143; 8 ER 1034, 1057 (Lord Tindal CJ). See also Tasmania v Commonwealth and Victoria (1904) 1 CLR 329, 339 (Griffith CJ).
54 Craven, Gregory, Secession: The Ultimate States Right (MUP, 1986) 85–8Google Scholar. See also: Bowtell v Goldsborough, Mort & Co Ltd (1905) 3 CLR 444, 451; Edgar (n 42) 201–2: ‘if the meaning of the enactment is clear and unequivocal without the preamble, the preamble can have no effect whatever’; and Re Tan Boon Liat (1976) 2 Malayan Law Journal 83, 85 (Abdoolcader J): ‘Where the enacting part is explicit and unambiguous the preamble cannot be resorted to, to control, qualify or restrict it.’
55 Powell v The Kempton Park Racecourse Co Ltd [1899] AC 143, 185 (Lord Davey); Dunn, Joseph, ‘Legal Effect of Preambles – Statutes’ (1955) 41 CornellLQ 134Google Scholar, 137 (listing US authorities for this proposition); Re Tan Boon Liat (1976) 2 Malayan Law Journal 83, 85 (Abdoolcader J); Edgar (n 42) 202.
56 Powell v Kempton Park Racecourse Co [1899] AC 143, 157 (Earl of Halsbury). See also: Salkeld v Johnson (1848) 2 Exch 256; 154 ER 487, 499, where it was stated by Pollock CB that while the preamble is undoubtedly part of the Act and may be used to explain it, ‘it cannot control the enacting part, which may, and often does, go beyond the preamble’; Bowtell v Goldsbrough, Mort & Co Ltd (1906) 3 CLR 444, 451 (Griffith CJ); Attorney-General v HRH Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover [1957] AC 436, 467 (Lord Normand); and Yin v Lewin [2006] 10 WWR 337, [30]–[33] (Rooke J).
57 Dunn (n 55) 134, 137.
58 The stated intentions set out in a preamble or a purposes clause may be the signpost which the legislature says it proposes to follow, but the words used in the substantive provisions of the text are the road that the legislature does in fact follow: National Farmers Union v Marketing Council (PEI) (1989) 56 DLR (4th) 753, 756–7 (McQuaid J).
59 This is sometimes made explicit in statute. See, eg, Interpretation Act 1984 (WA), section 31(1) of which provides: ‘The preamble to a written law forms part of the written law and shall be construed as a part thereof intended to assist in explaining its purport and object’. See also section 13 of Interpretation Act RSC 1985 (Canada) and section 5(3) of the Interpretation Act 1999 (NZ) to similar effect. On the Canadian provision, see M v H [1999] 2 SCR 3, [185] (Gonthier J).
60 Crabbe (n 43) 82.
61 Attorney-General v HRH Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover [1957] AC 436, 463 (Viscount Simonds).
62 Wacando v Commonwealth (1981) 148 CLR 1, 23 (Mason J); Handler, M, Leiter, B and Handler, C, ‘A Reconsideration of the Relevance and Materiality of the Preamble in Constitutional Interpretation’ (1990) 12 Cardozo Law Review 117, 128Google Scholar; Winckel, A, ‘The Contextual Role of a Preamble in Statutory Interpretation’ (1999) 23 MULR 184Google Scholar, 187–91; and Driedger, EA, Construction of Statutes, (2nd edn, Butterworths 1983) 146Google Scholar.
63 See the distinction drawn by Anne Winckel between the contextual role of a preamble and its constructive role: Winckel (n 62) 184, 185.
64 (1981) 148 CLR 1. See also: Heydon, J D, ‘Theories of Constitutional Interpretation: A Taxonomy’ Bar News: The Journal of the NSW Bar Association (Winter 2007) 12, 16Google Scholar.
65 Wacando v Commonwealth (1981) 148 CLR 1, 15–16 (Gibbs, CJ)Google Scholar. See also: Southern Centre of Theosophy Inc v South Australia (1979) 145 CLR 246, 258 (Gibbs, J)Google Scholar.
66 Wacando v The Commonwealth (1981) 148 CLR 1, 23 (Mason, J)Google Scholar. See also Pearce and Geddes (n 49) 156.
67 Powell v Kempton Park Racecourse Co [1899] AC 143, 157; Salkeld v Johnson (1848) 2 Exch 256; 154 ER 487, 499; Copland v Davies (1872) LR 5 HL 358, 389 (Lord Chelmsford, )Google Scholar; Bowtell v Goldsbrough, Mort & Co Ltd (1906) 3 CLR 444, 451 (Griffith, CJ)Google Scholar.
68 Attorney-General v HRH Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover [1957] AC 436, 463 (Viscount Simonds). On the need for a ‘compelling reason’, see also The Norwhale [1975] 1 QB 589, 596 (Brandon J); and Thornton (n 47) 197.
69 (1749) 1 Atk. 164, 174; 26 ER 107, 113. See also Siu Yin Kwan v Eastern Insurance Co Ltd [1994] 2 AC 199, 211 (Lord Lloyd); Brett v Brett (1826) 3 Addams 210, 216–9; 162 ER 456, 458–60; and the discussion in Edgar (n 42) 204–5.
70 Winckel (n 62) 184, 187.
71 Prince Ernest of Hanover v Attorney-General [1956] Ch 188, 201 (Evershed MR).
72 Attorney-General v HRH Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover [1957] AC 436, 467 (Lord Normand). Note, however, Sullivan's observation that in Canada, the courts will place as much weight upon the preamble as appears to them appropriate in the circumstances (n 52) 262–3.
73 Attorney-General v HRH Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover [1957] AC 436, 467 (Lord Normand). See also Viscount Simonds at 463 to the same effect. See further: Maritime Electric v City of Summerside 2011 PECA 13, [21] (McQuaid JA) (Prince Edward Island Court of Appeal).
74 Craven, G, ‘The Constitutionality of the Unilateral Secession of an Australian State’ (1984) 15 FLRev 123Google Scholar, 131–5; Winckel (n 16) 636, 640; McKenna, Simpson and Williams (n 19) 382, 387.
75 Matthew v State of Trinidad and Tobago [2005] 1 AC 433, [46].
76 Note Bennion's technical distinction between a recital and a preamble: ‘A recital has the same function as a preamble, but is confined to a single section or other textual unit’ (n 47) 735.
77 Edgar (n 42) 207. Note, however, the use of a preambular provision in the text of the Constitution of Malta as a means of preventing literalism from running riot: Olivier v Buttigieg [1967] 1 AC 115, 139 (Lord Morris).
78 S v Australian Crime Commission (2005) 144 FCR 431, [22] (Mansfield J); Re Yanner (2000) 100 FCR 551. [95]–[97] (Dowsett J); Pearce and Geddes (n 49) 157. Bennion has also observed that a purpose clause ‘is unlikely to be taken to override the clear words of an operative provision of the Act’ (n 47) 734.
80 The primary difference has concerned whether the preamble is taken to be part of the Act or not. In the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada and India, the preamble is regarded as part of the Act: Attorney-General v HRH Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover [1957] AC 436, 467 (Lord Normand); Edgar (n 42) 201; Winckel (n 62) 184, 205; Sullivan (n 52) 259; and Singh (n 52) 103. In the United States there has been a tendency not to regard the preamble as part of the Act: Singer and Singer (n 52) Vol 1A, 125; Jellum (n 52) 125.
81 R (Jackson) v Attorney-General [2006] 1AC 262, [25].
82 ibid [89].
83 ibid [110], referring to the preamble of the Parliament Act 1949 (UK).
84 UK, Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, 26 October 1999, Vol 606, col 274.
85 ibid 275–6.
86 Indeed, the Supreme Court has been subject to criticism for being too restrained in its use of the preamble: Handler, Leiter and Handler (n 62) 117, 122–3; and Axler, E, ‘The Power of the Preamble and the Ninth Amendment: The Restoration of the People's Unenumerated Rights’ (2000) 24 Seton Hall Legislative Journal 431Google Scholar.
87 197 US 11 (1905).
88 197 US 11, 22 (1905)
89 For a list of cases in which the preamble has been used as an interpretative aid, see Handler, Leiter and Handler (n 62) 117, 120–1.
90 Doe v Bolton 410 US 179, 210 (1973) (Douglas J, concurring).
91 Marcin, R, ‘“Posterity” in the Preamble and a Positivist Pro-Life Position’ (1993) 38 American Journal of Jurisprudence 273CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
92 Himmelfarb, D, ‘The Preamble in Constitutional Interpretation’ (1991) 2 Seton Hall Constitutional Law Journal 127Google Scholar, 203.
93 Orgad (n 2) 714, 721.
94 Hogg, PW, Constitutional Law of Canada, (5th edn, Thomson Carswell 2007)Google Scholar Vol 2, para 34.4(c).
95 Previously known as the British North America Act 1867.
96 See further, Hanson, J Carlisle, ‘The Preamble to the British North America Act’, (1952) 5 UNB Law Journal 9Google Scholar.
97 (1949) 1 WWR 586; 4 DLR 199.
98 (1949) 1 WWR 586, 596.
99 [1938] SCR 100, 132–2. See also Switzman v Elbling [1957] SCR 285 where similar views were expressed by Rand J at 306–7 and Abbott J at 327–8; and OPSEU v Ontario [1987] 1 SCR 2, 25 (Dickson CJ) and 57 (Beetz J).
100 [1938] SCR 100, 134. See also Cannon J at 145.
101 [1993] 1 SCR 319; (1993) 100 DLR (4th) 212, 263–5.
102 [1997] 3 SCR 3; 150 DLR (4th) 577.
103 [1997] 3 SCR 3; 150 DLR (4th) 577, [94].
104 [1997] 3 SCR 3; 150 DLR (4th) 577, [95] (excluding references).
105 [1997] 3 SCR 3; 150 DLR (4th) 577, [97]–[99].
106 [1997] 3 SCR 3; 150 DLR (4th) 577, [102]–[103].
107 [1997] 3 SCR 3; 150 DLR (4th) 577, [103].
108 [1997] 3 SCR 3; 150 DLR (4th) 577, [104].
109 See, eg: Corbett, SM, ‘Reading the Preamble to the British North America Act, 1867’ (1998) 9(2) Constitutional Forum 42Google Scholar, Goldsworthy, Jeffrey, ‘The Preamble, Judicial Independence and Judicial Integrity’, (2000) 11 Constitutional Forum 60Google Scholar; Walters, Mark D, ‘The Common Law Constitution in Canada: Return of Lex Non Scripta as Fundamental Law’ (2001) 51 University of Toronto Law Journal 91, 103CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hogg, P, ‘Canada: From Privy Council to Supreme Court’ in Goldsworthy, J (ed), Interpreting Constitutions: A Comparative Study (OUP 2006) 55, 92Google Scholar.
110 Sossin, L, ‘The “Supremacy of God”, Human Dignity and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms’ (2003) 52 UNBLJ 227, 229Google Scholar. Compare the Preamble to the German Basic Law which refers to ‘responsibility before God and Men’: Silagi (n 2) 54, 61.
111 Penney, J W and Danay, R J, ‘The Embarrassing Preamble? Understanding the “Supremacy of God” and the Charter’ (2006) 39 UBCLRev 287, 288–9Google Scholar.
112 Christie v Attorney-General of British Columbia (2005) 262 DLR (4th) 51, where it was held that access to justice formed part of the ‘rule of law’ as set out in the Preamble and that a law that impeded access to justice was therefore invalid. Note that this decision was overturned by the Supreme Court in Attorney-General of British Columbia v Christie [2007] 1 SCR 873, where it was held that the ‘rule of law’ did not include a general right to legal counsel but may do so in particular types of cases.
113 Reference re Manitoba Language Rights [1985] 1 SCR 721, 750; 19 DLR (4th) 1.
114 Burrakur Coal Co Ltd v Union of India 1962 SCR(1) 44, 49 (Mudholkar J) (Supreme Court of India); and Singh (n 52) 106.
115 Shetty, S and Sanyal, T, ‘Fraternity and the Constitution: A Promising Beginning in Nandini Sundar v State of Chattisgarh’ (2011) 4 NUJSL Rev 439Google Scholar, 454.
116 Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala (1973) 4 SCC 225. For a similar argument that the Polish Preamble cannot be amended, see Piotrowski (n 2) 29, 36–7.
117 Minerva Mills Ltd v Union of India (1980) 2 SCC 591; AIR 1980 SC 1789.
118 Lahoti, RC, Preamble: The Spirit and Backbone of the Constitution of India (Eastern Book Co 2004) 108Google Scholar; and Krishnaswamy, S, Democracy and Constitutionalism in India: A Study of the Basic Structure Doctrine (OUP 2009) 136Google Scholar.
119 See the much longer list in Lahoti (n 118) 112.
120 Note the criticism that ‘the preamble is both under and over inclusive of the basic features of the Constitution’: Krishnaswamy (n 118) 154.
121 The preamble was amended in 1977 to add the words ‘socialist secular’ to the description of India as a ‘sovereign democratic republic’.
122 Datar, AP, Datar on Constitution of India (Wadhwa & Co, New Delhi, 1st edn, 2001) p 3Google Scholar.
123 Seervai, HM, Constitutional Law of India: A Critical Commentary (4th edn, NM Tripathi) Vol 1, 277Google Scholar; and Lahoti (n 118) 24.
124 For analysis and criticism of this development, see: Beardsley, J, ‘Constitutional Review in France’ (1975) Supreme Court Review 189, 226CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Troper, M, ‘Judicial Review and International Law’ (2003) 4 San Diego International Law Journal 39, 52Google Scholar; M-Pierre Granger (n 2) 1, 4; and Rogoff, MA, French Constitutional Law (Carolina Academic Press 2011) 7, 9 and 220–1Google Scholar.
125 Orgad (n 2) 714, 715.
126 Goldsworthy (n 109) 60, 62.
127 Leeth v Commonwealth (1992) 174 CLR 455, 486 (Deane and Toohey JJ). See also Brennan J at 475. Toohey J maintained his view in Kruger v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1, 97 (Toohey J).
128 Kruger v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1, 44–5 (Brennan CJ), 67 (Dawson J, McHugh J agreeing), 113 (Gaudron J), 154 (Gummow J).
129 See eg Clarke v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 240 CLR 272, [15] (French CJ).
130 See eg Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106, 210 (Gaudron J).
131 See eg Davis v Commonwealth (1988) 166 CLR 79, 110 (Brennan J).
132 Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106; and Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520.
133 Roach v Electoral Commissioner (2007) 233 CLR 162.