Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-2brh9 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-30T15:29:29.012Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Letter From Poland

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 March 2014

Antoni Z. Kaminski  and
Joanna Kurczewska
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

WE STARTED WRITING THIS LETTER ON 22 DECEMBER 1990, the day that Lech Walesa was sworn in before the Polish Sejm as the first President of Poland ever elected in national elections. Even during this memorable ceremony, some MPs could not hide their deep dissatisfaction. They shared with a large portion of intellectuals of the world the conviction that Mazowiecki, a journalist, would be a far better president for Poland than Walesa the shipyard - worker.

Having followed with some curiosity the Western coverage of the Polish elections, and of the political struggles that preceded it, we have the impression that the coverage was biased, and often misleading. Commentators repeated misleading stereotypes, identifying themselves with one side in the political conflict in Poland. They presented a black-and-white picture of the conflict. Tadeusz Mazoweicki symbolized stability, democracy, tolerance, open-mindedness, ‘true’ pluralism, etc.; while the ‘terrible Lech Walesa’ represented dictatorship, obscurantism, anti-Semitism, populism, and chaos. Subtle references were made to Walesa's working-class background, to his lack of poise and education. We find such journalistic bad manners outrageous.

Type
Articles
Information
Government and Opposition , Volume 26 , Issue 2 , 01 April 1991 , pp. 215 - 228
Copyright
Copyright © Government and Opposition Ltd 1991

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 One of the leading supporters of Tadeusz Mazowiecki reacted to his electoral defeat by saying that the Polish electorate proved itself unworthy of a democratic regime. Another respected commentator stated that Polish society was mentally sick and needed a psychiatrist. Such statements were duly repeated by the most important European newspapers. Can one imagine a better example of a complete misunderstanding by the speakers and by those who quoted them of the essence of democracy?

2 Informally, this group of people had already functioned since spring 1988 as a sort of political discussion group.

3 This explains in our view the bitterness of the clash. While attempting to reconstruct such conflict-loaded events, an analyst walks on slippery ground. Stakes are so big and emotions run high, so that actors use lies and distortions without even being aware of it.

4 Such an informal, well-knit group, once it succeeds in winning strategic positions of power in an established structure of public institutions, can exert enormous political influence. On the other hand, because its membership is so well-defined, and because it is so tightly integrated, it faces problems in developing a mass following. It draws decisive advantage from informal agreements, secret deals, and behind-the-scenes manipulations. Consisting of journalists and writers, it adroitly uses symbols of mass propaganda. Its high visibility and the aura of an heroic past attract the well-known figures of the artistic and intellectual world willing to bask in the glory and heroism. This additionally has enhanced its public presence.

5 See Schopflin, G., ‘The Prospects for Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe’, in Volten, Peter (ed.), Uncertain Futures: Eastern Europe and Democarcy, New York, Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1990, p. 30 Google Scholar.

6 He also succeeded, during the Second Congress of the NSZZ Solidarnosc in avoiding the choice between the purely trade-unionist role for the organization and the role of the political movement. There is no doubt that now, once Walesa’s ambitions are fulfilled, the NSZZ Solidarnosc will transform itself into a normal trade union.

7 To cut a long story short, Walesa responded in March at a meeting of the Committee by asking its secretary, Mr Henryk Wujek, to give account of the Committee’s finances. A debate started during which the majority of speakers, the Prime Minister, Mazowiecki, included, pronounced themselves against Walesa’s demand. Subsequently, Walesa asked Wujec to resign. At the same time, he wrote to Michnik, the editor-in-chief of the Gazeta Wyborcza, suggesting that the GW stop using Solidarity’s label. The war entered a new stage. Wujec declined insisting that he was elected to his post and Walesa had no right to fire him. In fact, the Committee had no statute, and who had the right to do what was largely undefined? Michnik also refused to stop using Solidarity’s vignette. Henryk Wujec, on his own initiative, called a meeting of representatives of territorial committees for 1 July: a move clearly intended as part of the strategy to create the party-movement. The GC hurriedly tried to strenghen the bridge linking it directly to regional and local committees. That effort was not very successful.

8 The GC overestimated Walesa’s control over the partly new Committee, and neglected to do what was feasible: to vote for the dissolution of the Committee. They had left before the vote on the motion for the dissolution was taken.

9 The meeting called by Wujec for 1 July, preceded by another one called by Walesa, was a failure. Walesa’s gambit worked once more.