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Politics in Brazil: Cardoso’s Government and the 1998 Re‐election

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 March 2014

Simone Rodrigues da Silva  and
Maria D'Alva Kinzo
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Extract

LAST YEAR, FOR THE FIRST TIME IN BRAZILIAN POLITICAL HISTORY, an election for the presidency of the Republic took place which permitted the current president to run for a second term. Although a practice widely adopted in the democratic world, re-election of a head of government was not authorized by the constitutions of all Latin American countries. This was due largely to its being perceived negatively, as a means of perpetuation in power – as a synonym for dictatorship. Only recently was it established in Peru, in Argentina and, last year, in Brazil, giving Messrs Fujimori, Menem and Cardoso a chance to run for and win a second term in office in their respective countries. In Brazil, the opposition accused the president in office of trying to maintain himself in power. However, the change resulted from congressional approval, in accordance with the constitution. Moreover, after having passed its first test last year, the re-election is already part of the established framework and taken as a fact of reality.

Type
Articles
Information
Government and Opposition , Volume 34 , Issue 2 , April 1999 , pp. 243 - 262
Copyright
Copyright © Government and Opposition Ltd 1999

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References

1 Cf. Nelson, Joan, ‘A política de transformaçäo econômica: a experiÔncia do Terceiro Mundo é relevante para a Europa Oriental?’, in Sola, L. (ed.), Estado, Mercado e Democracia, Rio de Janeiro, Paz e Terra, 1993 Google Scholar.

2 See Salum, Jr and E. Kugelmas B., ‘O Leviatä Acorrentado: a Crise Brasileira dos anos 80’, in Sola, L. Google Scholar (ed.), ibid.

3 See Sola, L., ‘Estado, Transformaçäo Econômica e Democratizaçäo’, in Sola, L. (ed.), ibid.Google Scholar; and Moura, A., ‘Stabilization Policy as a Game of Mutual Distrust: the Brazilian Experience in Post‐1985 Civilian Governments’ and Franco, G., ‘Brazilian Hyperinflation: the Political Economy of the Fiscal Crisis’, in Kinzo, M. D. (ed.), Brazil: the Challenges of the 1990s, London, British Academic Press, 1993 Google Scholar.

4 See Rocca, C. A., ‘Brazil’s Plano Real: a Real Chance of Success?’, in Kinzo, M. D. and Bulmer‐Thomas, V. (eds), Growth and Development in Brazil: Cardoso’s Real Challenge, London, The Institute of Latin American Studies, 1995 Google Scholar.

5 See Kinzo, Maria D. G., ‘The Election of Fernando Henrique Cardoso’, in Growth and Development in Brazil: Cardoso’s Real Challenge, London, The Institute of Latin American Studies, 1995; and ‘A Eleiçäo Presidencial de 1994 no Brasil: Fernando Henrique Cardoso e o Plano Real’, in C. R. Pinto and H. Guerrero (eds) America Latina – O Desafio da Democracia nos Anos 90, Porto Alegre, ditora da Universidade do Rio Grande do Sul, 1996Google Scholar

6 Among the vast literature on this theme, see especially Cox, G. W. and Kernell, S. (eds), The Politics of Divided Government, Boulder, Westview Press, 1991 Google Scholar.

7 Unfortunately, the vast literature on coalition government refers primarily to experiences under parliamentary systems. Due to lack of cases, nothing is said about party politics and coalition government under a presidential system. Thus, all the literature theorizing on the functioning of political systems, and more specifically, on party politics, executive‐legislative relations and decision‐making, has been based either on the European experience which, in spite of the diversity of party systems, shares the basic features of a parliamentary form of government, or on the American experience of the presidential system with its two‐party structure. If Latin American recent experience of democratic government endures, as we expect, it will become a case to be seriously considered in comparative political analysis and an alternative to the two models of democratic governance as far as institutional structures are concerned.

8 According to Laakso’s and Taagepera’s index to measure the number of effective parties. See Laakso, M. and Taagepera, R., ‘Effective Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to West Europe’ Comparative Political Studies, 12 (1979)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

9 Cf. Nicolau, J. M., ‘A Volatilidade Eleitoral nas Eleiçōes para a Câmara dos Deputados Brasileira (1992–1994)’ unpublished paper, XXII Encontro Anual da ANPOCS, Caxambu, 10 1998 Google Scholar.

10 See J. M. Nicolau, op.cit.

11 See Tsebelis, G., ‘Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism’, British Journal of Political Science, 25 (1995), pp. 289–325.Google Scholar

12 The Brazilian main parties are:

PMDB – Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement: it was created in the early years of the military regime as the legal channel for opposition and since then has been an important political actor in the democratization movement. The largest party in Congress, the PMDB is internally very heterogeneous and its position tends to be in the centre of the ideological spectrum.

PFL – Party of the Liberal Front. It stems from the split‐up of the pro‐military government PDS in 1984. This dissident group allied with the opposition to support its presidential candidate Tancredo Neves. Apart from its centre‐right position, PFL’s main propensity is to side with the government.

PSDB – Party of the Brazilian Social Democracy. Cardoso’s party, it was founded by PMDB dissidents who left this party during the Constituent Assembly in 1988. Depending on the issue, it can be classified either as a centre or centre‐left party.

PPB – Brazilian Progressive Party. No party has changed its name so many times as the PPB: it was formerly called PPR, which was formerly the PDS which was formerly called ARENA – the pro‐military government party created in 1966.

PT – Workers’ Party. Created in 1980 by trade‐union leaders, social movements and left‐wing groupings, this is the most important left‐wing party in Brazil. Its principal leader is Lula who has run for president three times.

PTB – Brazilian Labour Party. Though preserving the name of the old PTB, this party has little resemblance to that which was a growing political force in the 1945–64 democratic period in Brazil. Its position tends to be in the centre‐right of the political spectrum.

PDT – Democratic Labour Party. Its origin is the old PTB of the period prior to the military regime. Its chief leader is Leonel Brizola who was one of the main political figures in the Brazilian Labour Party during the 1945–64 democratic period.

13 The Provisional Measures not only give the Executive power to legislate but also interfere in the definition of the Legislature’s agenda, since the MPs have to be examined by Congress in a period of a month, so their examination has priority over other bills. See Figueiredo, A. and Limongi, F., ‘O Congresso e as Medidas Provisórias: abdicação ou delegação?’, Novos Estudos Cebrap, 47 ( 12 12 1997 ), pp. 127–154 Google Scholar.

14 Itamar Franco issued an MP, on his behalf, on 12 December, creating a new source of revenue to replace the IPMF tax, which would expire in 1994. In addition, an MP reforming the administrative structure of the new government was issued on the day the new president took office.

15 The Executive’s legislative power is not limited to the Medidas Provisdrias. It has also the exclusive right to propose to Congress bills dealing with the Federal Budget, the creation of positions and functions in the state‐owned firms and in the public administration, salaries of civil servants, changes in the administrative structure, and changes for the armed forces. And in order to speed their proceedings the government can have priority for their examination by requesting the Council of Leaders to treat a bill as urgent or extremely urgent which means that it can be put to the vote without having gone through all the phases used in the ordinary legislative proceedings. See Figueiredo, A. and Lomongi, F., ‘O Processo Legislativo e a produçäo legal no Congresso pós‐Constituinte’, Novos Estudos Cebrap, 38 (1994)Google Scholar.

16 To cope with this problem the government’s proposal originally embraced the following changes: end of the criteria for retirement based on the number of working years, replacing it by a rule that combines age and years of social security contribution; cancellation of the special categories of pensioners, such as teachers, magistrates, parliamentarians and civil servants, who are allowed to have earlier retirement and full salary payment; end of a different status for women and rural workers; restrictions to fund pensions created by state companies.

17 Sent to the House of Deputies, a constitutional amendment bill is first examined by the House’s Constitution and Justice Committee. It will decide, on grounds of the general principles of the Constitution, whether the bill can be accepted for examination or not. The second stage is the Special Committee’s work. It must examine the substance of the bill and prepare the final draft to be put to the vote on the House’s floor. The third stage is actual voting of the bill to be approved, in two rounds, by three‐fifths of the House’s members. The fourth, fifth and sixth stages will repeat the same proceedings in the Senate. In case the Senate decides to alter the bill, it will have to go back to the House of Deputies where the proceedings start all over again. Considering that a minimal number of congressional sessions must be complied with at each stage, an amendment bill will take, under the most favourable conditions, at least three months before it is approved.

18 It is important to remember the role played by dientelism. In the Brazilian context it is especially significant in political negotiations between the Executive and Legislature. Although it is not a peculiarity of Brazilian politics, clientelism has persisted due to several factors. One is related to the large number of politicians coming from regions where the role of the central government and of patronage politics are still prominent (the disproportionate share of seats among the states representing the less populated and poorest states contributes to this). Secondly, dientelistic practices have also to do with the functioning of Congress: apart from its insignificant role in the past, legislative procedures operate in a very centralized structure that leave very little space for the participation of backbenchers, who are then left free to take care of their own individual interests. Moreover, in Brazil the service system to supply public needs is far from reaching the poorest areas. In those areas, politicians are seen as the only ones who can help them. Thus, access to public offices, which would allow politicians influence on the selective way the provision of public needs is decided, is crucial. As a consequence, politicians’ demand for public offices in exchange for support for the government is still a common practice. This has also made any demand for participation in government to be seen with suspicion, because it became impossible to draw a line separating a legitimate demand for effective participation and influence on policy‐making, from a not so legitimate demand for a position that would just allow access to political resources for clientelism.

19 These numbers are the average of the scores recorded in 18 surveys carried out by Data Folha from January 1995 to September 1998. Cf. newspaper Folha de Säo Paulo, 30 December 1996 and 6 September 1998.

20 Such as the actions taken by the Ministry of Education targeted at elementary education and professional formation, the projects carried out by the Solidarity Community – a public agency designed to tackle the problems in the poorest areas of the country – and the agrarian reform programme.

21 On 4 October 1998 Brazilian voters went to the polls to elect the president, one‐third of the Senate, all the members of the House of Deputies and of the State Assemblies and the governors of 27 Brazilian states.

22 Because voting in Brazil is compulsory, at least part of the blank and null ballots can be added to the abstention rate which had grown as compared to the 1994 election. The use, for the first time, of electronic polling may have contributed to increased abstention and null ballots. Errors in using the electronic machine as a consequence of a low level of information and schooling are frequent in some areas of Brazil.

23 This got worse after the decision taken by Itamar Franco ‐ governor of Minas Gerais state and former president of Brazil – to default on payment of his state’s debt with the Union.