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Democratization, Nationalism and Regional Security in the Southern Caucasus

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 March 2014

S. Neil MacFarlane
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Extract

FOR SOME YEARS NOW, WESTERN ACADEMICS AND POLICY-MAKERS HAVE embraced the cause of democratic reform in Central and Eastern Europe. To take but one well-known example, President Clinton in the 1994 State of the Union Address cited the absence of war among democracies as a reason for promotion of democracy around the world. Assistance to former Warsaw Pact and newly independent states has been made conditional to varying degrees on the acceptance of democratic change. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the European Union, the United States Agency for International Development and associated non-governmental organizations have unleashed armies of promoters of democracy throughout the region to: observe elections; monitor human rights; draft new constitutions and laws defending civil and political rights; train judges and police personnel; and organize and assist political parties, media and non-governmental pressure groups. In short, they have sought to transplant the fabric of civil society and democratic institutions. These armies have landed on terrain often quite foreign to them and have often displayed little sensitivity to the social, economic and political context in which they are operating. This may have contributed to results other than those intended.

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Articles
Information
Government and Opposition , Volume 32 , Issue 3 , July 1997 , pp. 399 - 420
Copyright
Copyright © Government and Opposition Ltd 1997

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References

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30 Taking Gamsakhurdia as an example, Stephen Jones notes that ‘his actions must be seen in the context of a fanatical commitment to Georgian independence’. Jones, ‘Georgia: The Trauma of Statehood’, p. 521. I am indebted to Professor Jones for his assistance in understanding ‘the Gamsakhurdia phenomenon’.

31 Snyder and Ballentine, ‘Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas’, p. 20.

32 ibid., p. 20. They go on to state that ‘still less do ethnic market segments start out with consumer preferences for militant xenophobic nationalism, based on “ancient hatreds”.

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