By its first request for a preliminary ruling, the German Constitutional Court aired its doubts about the lawfulness of the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs) program. In this article it is argued that the ECB's pledge in the summer of 2012 to do “whatever it takes” to safeguard the monetary policy transmission mechanism in all countries of the euro area by buying government bonds was generally compatible with EU law. However, it is argued that there is some potential for the ECB to infringe the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) while acting according to this announcement. The peculiarity of the situation, the author argues, is that we might be dealing with a “self-fulfilling prophecy” in that the ECB announces a particular policy, which might not be compatible with EU law, but the act announced, will never take place because the political problem would have been resolved by the measure previously announced. The critical question in this scenario refers to how a court should react to such a situation. The author argues that a court in such a situation has to show the legal limits of the particular institution, but neither the ECJ nor the German Constitutional Court may replace the central banks' task to maintain financial stability. Finally, a comment is given on how the German Constitutional Court will react to the ECJ's decision in that case.

The main purpose of the preliminary ruling procedure is to prevent divergences in judicial decisions applying European Union (EU) law and to ensure the uniform interpretation of EU legal provisions across Member States. The procedure, introduced in the Founding Treaties, has provided a platform for the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereafter, the ECJ or the CJEU) to deliver seminal judgments that have progressively defined the relationship between national and EU legal systems, among others. The procedure has also helped the ECJ to develop fundamental principles of EU law, including direct effect, indirect effect (i.e., the interpretation of national law in line with directives) and primacy. Being one of the most important aspects of the EU judicial system, the procedure provided by Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (hereafter, TFEU) has had an immense impact on the harmonious development of EU law and the way in which national courts and EU courts interact and communicate.

Using the secession claims in Ukraine and elsewhere as points of reference, this article reflects on the meaning of popular sovereignty and consent of the governed in divided societies.

The article begins by critiquing the approach to secession claims prevailing internationally. It finds that the imprecision of the applicable rules, the plethora of secession claims, and most importantly, the claims’ adverse effects on relations between and within states urge different treatment.

The article then assesses an alternative approach, based on realizing the principles of self-determination and democracy through independence referendums. It finds that a doctrine of democratic secessionism, if conceived consistently and implemented consequently, shows considerable potential as a guide in treating secession claims. Moreover, this alternative proves preferable to the prevailing approach, practically as well as conceptually.

According the principles of self-determination and democracy higher legitimacy than and precedence to other considerations would in some conflict cases lead to striking outcomes. Nonetheless, such an alternative approach could prove not only intrinsically but also instrumentally valuable, contributing, ceteris paribus, to conflict resolution.

Jiri Zemanek, Professor at Charles University, Prague, asks what conclusions may be drawn from the current state of acceptance of the European Union (EU) law doctrine by the constitutional courts of the new Member States for their performance in the agenda of preliminary rulings. What can they learn from the experience of the old Member States? Should they follow the practice of the Austrian Verfassungsgerichtshof (Constitutional Court), which referred its first question in 1999, four years after its accession, and later repeated it several times? Or should they follow the most active Belgian Cour Constitutionnelle? Should Hungary follow the practice of the Italian Constitutional Court, Lithuania, France, Spain, or Germany? Having reviewed the case law of the Hungarian Constitutional Court and the scholarly analysis in search of the “missing links,” this study wishes to contribute to the diverse range of ideas concerning European “rule of law” integration and constitutional court contributions to it.

The promise of the ECB to act effectively as the Eurozone's ‘lender of last resort’ was widely praised as a central plank in a broader strategy to protect the Euro and avoid financial meltdown in its Member States. “Never has so much effect been gained by doing so little. Words alone, it seemed, calmed the markets. …” The OMT program appeared as a “watershed” in the Eurozone crisis, “one of the most effective announcements any central bank has ever made.”

Using the crisis in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea as a foil, the aim of this article is three-fold. First, it offers an internal critique of the influential answers that normative theory and international jurisprudence provide to the paradox of constitutionalism. Second, building on critical engagement with these approaches, this article mobilizes constitutional theory to find a constructive response to the crisis in Ukraine that goes beyond the prescriptions offered either by normative theory or international jurisprudence. In doing so, it seeks to sketch a broad constitutional framework not for post but rather for early-conflict constitution-making. The final aim of this article is to contribute to a richer self-understanding of constitutional theory vis-à-vis its disciplinary neighbors.

The conflict in the Ukraine—barely placated by a fragile truce that temporarily froze its territorial fault lines—remains one of the gravest threats to both regional and international peace since the end of the Cold War. The present de facto territorial arrangements in Ukraine remain highly unstable—as well as entirely unacceptable—to at least one of the parties to the conflict. With the fate of the second Minsk Agreement in question, neither the parties involved in the conflict nor the powers that support them have been able to propose mutually-acceptable, comprehensive solutions that would significantly diminish the danger of a renewed violent confrontation. In such a situation, the wider international community could play a helpful role in achieving a lasting political settlement.

The preliminary reference procedure under Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) is instrumental for the so-called “judicial dialogue” within the European Union (EU). The goals of the preliminary reference procedure are to ensure the uniform interpretation and application of EU law and to contribute to the harmonious development of the law throughout the EU. It was through the preliminary reference procedure to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) that the principles of direct effect and supremacy were developed. It took many years before the first request by a Constitutional Court was sent to the CJEU. So far, the Constitutional Courts of Belgium, Austria, Lithuania, Italy, Spain, France, Germany, and most recently Slovenia, have sent requests for preliminary rulings to the CJEU. By far the most active of these in sending requests has been the Belgian Court. The Portuguese Constitutional Court has indicated that it can request preliminary rulings from the CJEU but is yet to do so. In the other Member States (MS) with Constitutional Courts, references have not been sent yet, although worthy occasions in terms of EU-law-related cases have occurred, as also observed in various contributions in this special issue. These MSs include Bulgaria.

This Article aims to constructively analyze the emerging constitutional dialogue between the Constitutional Court of Romania (the CCR or the Court) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). It focuses, in particular, on the lack of a reference for a preliminary ruling from the first court, and aims to unveil the possible motives underlying this passive behavior.

The Constitutional Courts of a number of Member States exert a constitutional review on the obligation of national courts of last instance to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).

Pursuant to Article 267(3) TFEU, national courts of last instance, namely courts or tribunals against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, are required to refer to the CJEU for a preliminary question related to the interpretation of the Treaties or the validity and interpretation of acts of European Union (EU) institutions. The CJEU specified the exceptions to this obligation in CILFIT. Indeed, national courts of last instance have a crucial role according to the devolution to national judges of the task of ensuring, in collaboration with the CJEU, the full application of EU law in all Member States and the judicial protection of individuals’ rights under EU law. With preliminary references as the keystone of the EU judicial system, the cooperation of national judges with the CJEU forms part of the EU constitutional structure in accordance with Article 19(1) TEU.

He was a Huron, but a particular one. Lulled during his childhood by the stories of the public law teacher of his Tribe who had the chance to get a scholarship enabling him to mix with intricacies of the French recourse for misuse of power—a real first!—he had seen some of his friends cross the Ocean.

The aim of this Article is to analyze the peculiar jurisdictional reaction that originated at the level of both the European Union (EU) and the Member States following the introduction, on 15 March 2006, of Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and the Council, “on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communication services or of public communication networks.”

In 2012 and 2013, we observed how the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) was adjudicated by “EU courts, plural”: a number of high courts of the Member States (among them “Kelsenian” constitutional courts as well as representatives of a more hybrid model of judicial review of constitutionality) and the European Court of Justice (CJEU) were seized by challenges to the mechanism. What attracted attention was the fact that only one court, the Supreme Court of Ireland, decided to submit a preliminary reference to the CJEU, while the other courts, as would appear from their judgments, did not even consider the option. This was a suboptimal example of judicial dialogue in the case of ESM adjudication.

The European continent has become a space of constitutional interdependence and consequently, national Constitutional Courts are now embedded in a constitutional fabric made of national constitutions, European Union (EU) law, European treaties, and conventions. This is all the more evident in the domain of fundamental rights.