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ARROGANCE, TRUTH AND PUBLIC DISCOURSE

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 July 2018

Michael Patrick Lynch
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Abstract

Democracies, Dewey and others have argued, are ideally spaces of reasons – they allow for an exchange of reasons both practical and epistemic by those willing to engage in that discourse. That requires that citizens have convictions they believe in, but it also requires that they be willing to listen to each other. This paper examines how a particular psychological attitude, “epistemic arrogance,” can undermine the achievement of these goals. The paper presents an analysis of this attitude and then examines four arguments for how its adoption – especially by the powerful – undermines the ideal of democracy as a space of reasons.

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Articles
Information
Episteme , Volume 15 , Special Issue 3: 2017 Episteme Conference , September 2018 , pp. 283 - 296
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018 

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