Les attaques que Feyerabend a dirigées depuis un certain temps contre les conceptions dominantes de la rationalité scientifique, celles des inductivistes et de Popper principalement, sont intimement liées à sa manière d'envisager l'opposition entre le réalisme scientifique et l'instrumentalisme, c'est-à-dire entre deux thèses concernant les rapports de la rèalité et de la connaissance scientifique. C'est ce dernier point que nous aimerions aborder ici, dans le projet d'y apporter un certain nom-bre de clarifications, qui permettront aussi de montrer que les difficultés que Feyerabend a cru trouver recemment dans la position realiste, et qui ont provoqué une modification de ses conceptions, viennent de ce qu'il n'a pas vu toute l'importance de certaines distinctions.

Any substantive notion of self-ownership presupposes well-defined property rights over external resources. Left-libertarians usually limit this category to natural resources. I argue that in a specialized economy, substantive selfownership equally needs to be complemented by a definition of property rights to the cooperative surplus. The natural way for left-libertarianism to provide such a definition is to view the cooperative surplus as an external resource and to distribute it equally. The second part of the article makes the general point that a complete theory of justice needs to take a stance on distribution in various contexts. Articulating the differences between these contexts allows us to gain a better understanding of how left-libertarianism relates to other theories of justice.

On ne retient plus guère aujourd'hui le nom de T. Campanella parmi les philosophes qui ont compté à l'aube du XVIIe siècle. Cet ardent défenseur de Galilée, longtemps emprisonné pour la hardiesse de ses propres idées, a cependant joué un rôle non négligeable dans l'avènement d'une philosophie naturelle affranchie des traditions aristotéliciennes. Je voudrais attirer ciaprès l'attention sur quelques-unes de ses positions qui semblent avoir été prises en compte par Leibniz dans l'élaboration de sa première physique.

In a recent article in this journal, Bernard Carnois has given us a valuable comparative study of desire in the Stoa and in Spinoza (‘Le desir selon les Stoïciens et selon Spinoza’, Dialogue 19 [1980], 255–277). I am in no position to judge what he says about Spinoza, but his generally accurate account of ⋯ρμή in Stoic doctrine is marred by one or two misconceptions which ought to be set right. These criticisms do not, it should be said, detract from the value of the overall comparison he wishes to make.

La méditation sur la mort au début du XVIe siècle se développe à la mesure des exigences humanistes qui viennent équilibrer par la raison la hantise médiévale du péché, de la repentance et de la miséricorde.

Au moment de l'exil d'Holbein en Angleterre, les représentations de la mort suscitent encore la frayeur qu'accompagne une douloureuse tristesse en face de la fragilité de la vie. Simulachres et historiees faces de la mart (1526), en plus de compatir à la souffrance humaine et de dénoncer l'injustice et l'oppression, font surgir la mort au œeur de l'activité humaine et ainsi accentuent la conscience du temps présent, la fulgurance de l'instant.

In this paper, I reply to Sharon Street’s objection against quasi-realism, according to which this theory is subject to a problem of unexplained coincidence between the normative truths and our evaluative attitudes. I argue that this problem cannot be applied to quasi-realism because the necessary element for it to be applied is missing in this theory: an ontological commitment towards robust normative entities. This lack of commitment allows quasi-realists to argue for a minimalist conception of normative truths, and to escape the scope of the problem of unexplained coincidence.

The recent push to diversify philosophy courses is often motivated by a desire to include underrepresented students. Although incorporating non-Western philosophy would achieve greater diversity, there seems to be no special reason to select non-Western traditions for this purpose. I argue this appearance is deceiving. Data suggests an absence of non-Western content in the curriculum causes alienation for some of our students of colour. Given the minimal burden it would impose on philosophy instructors to address this suffering, we have good reason to include some non-Western content in our introductory courses, where it is likely to have the greatest impact.

Recently the discussion surrounding the conceivability thesis has been less about the link between conceivability and possibility per se and more about the requirements of a successful physicalist program. But before entering this debate it is necessary to consider whether conceivability provides us with even prima facie justification for our modal beliefs. I argue that two methods of conceiving—imagining that p and telling a story about p—can provide us with such justification, but only if certain requirements are met. To make these arguments, I consider those of Paul Tidman, whose position I use as a foil.

One cannot determine whether a book is a work of political philosophy merely by glancing at its contents. Heidegger's Being and Time is a case in point. It offers no discussion of the topics which are commonly thought to constitute political philosophy—the state, the nature of law, human rights, and so on. But particular themes such as these reflect in large part the actual conditions which prevailed at certain times and places, fourth-century Athens and seventeenth-century England, for example, so they must not be thought to constitute an outline of the eternal problems of political philosophy. When a philosopher embarks upon a new line of thought at a different time and under novel circumstances, he may find himself instituting a new vocabulary for the problems of the human community.

The aim of this article is twofold: first, to show that, in Plato's Hippias Major, Hippias is the mouthpiece of a materialist ontology; second, to discuss the critique of this ontology. My argument is based on an interpretation of Hippias Major 300b4–301e3. I begin by revealing the shortcomings of P. Woodruff's and I. Ludlam's interpretations. Next, I define the concept of materialism as it was understood in ancient Greece (Democritus) in order to outline the specificity of Hippias' materialism. Finally, I argue that the opposition between the two characters of the Hippias Major represents in fact an ontological opposition between two conceptions of what a unity is, i.e., Hippias' elementary corporal unities and Socrates' “formal unity.”

This article retrieves, situates, and interprets Ludwig Wittgenstein's overlooked remarks about the composer Gustav Mahler, and connects them with Wittgenstein's philosophical perspective and practice, as well as with his musical aesthetics.