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Cliffhangers and Sequels: Stories, Serials, and Authorial Intentions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 December 2017

PETER ALWARD
PETER ALWARD*
Affiliation:
University of Saskatchewan
*
*<[email protected]>
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Abstract

A fictional work contains a cliffhanger if it ends with a central character finding herself in perilous circumstances. The goal of this paper is to establish that authors’ narrative intentions determine what happens next in works that end in cliffhangers when no sequel is produced. To this end, I argue from the fact that a sequel written by the original author would uniquely resolve a fictional work that ends in a cliffhanger to the conclusion that the author’s narrative intentions serve as truth-makers for claims about what happens next in the absence of some such sequel.

Une œuvre de fiction contient une mise en suspens (cliffhanger) si elle se termine au moment où un personnage central se retrouve dans des circonstances périlleuses. Le but de cet article est d’établir que les intentions narratives des auteurs déterminent ce qui se passe ensuite dans les œuvres qui se terminent par des mises en suspens et pour lesquelles aucune suite n’est produite. À cette fin, j’argumente à partir de l’idée qu’une suite écrite par l’auteur original résoudrait de façon unique une œuvre de fiction qui aboutit à une mise en suspens; je conclus que les intentions narratives de l’auteur servent de vérifacteur pour des affirmations sur ce qui arrive ensuite en l’absence d’une telle suite.

Keywords

fictioninterpretationstoriesintentionscliffhangerssequels
Type
Original Article/Article original
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 57 , Issue 1 , March 2018 , pp. 163 - 172
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Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2017 

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References

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