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Economics without history: objections to the rights hypothesis

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 November 2013

ERIC L. JONES
ERIC L. JONES*
Affiliation:
Emeritus Professor, La Trobe University, and former Professorial Fellow, Melbourne Business School.
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Abstract

Reasons are given for doubting the currently fashionable thesis that economic growth and industrialisation in the case of England derived from establishing secure property rights after 1688. Customary and public rights remained at risk. Ancient arrangements often persisted far into Victorian times. Detailed evidence is presented of survivals and of illiquid features in the land market. Evidence is also given of endemic disputes over enclosure and tithes. Unlike some European countries, England failed to establish a land registry. Limited transactions probably reflected unwillingness to risk litigation. That unsatisfactory property rights did not, however, stifle growth is tribute to the underlying power of the market.

Economie sans histoire: objections à l'hypothèse des droits de propriété

Cet article présente de bonnes raisons de mettre en doute la thèse en vogue actuellement que, dans le cas de l'Angleterre, la croissance économique et l'industrialisation furent suscitées par l'institution de droits de propriété sécurisés après 1688. Les droits coutumiers et publics sont restés en vigueur. Des arrangements anciens persistaient encore à l'époque victorienne. L'auteur le prouve en présentant des exemples de comportements qui ont survécu et certaines caractéristiques d'un marché foncier où ce n'est pas toujours l'argent cash qui a le dernier mot. Des cas sont aussi présentés de vieilles querelles restées vivaces qui resurgissent en matière de clôtures ou de dîmes. Contrairement à certains autres pays européens, l'Angleterre n'a pas réussi à établir un cadastre. Le nombre limité des transactions reflète probablement la crainte du litige. Ces droits de propriété imparfaits n'ont cependant pas étouffé la croissance, hommage, s'il en est, à la puissance sous-jacente du marché.

Ökonomie ohne geschichte: einwände gegen die eigentumsrecht-hypothese

Die gegenwärtig beliebte These, dass Wirtschaftswachstum und Industrialisierung in England – für beides das Musterbeispiel – auf die Durchsetzung sicherer Eigentumsrechte nach 1688 zurückzuführen sind, lässt sich aus mehreren Gründen anzweifeln. Gewohnheitsrechte blieben riskant und althergebrachte Regelungen bestanden oft weit bis in die viktorianische Zeit hinein. Detailliertes Material verweist auf altertümliche Überbleibsel und illiquide Strukturen des Grundstücksmarktes sowie auf endemische Dispute über Einhegungen und Zehntrechte. Im Unterschied zu anderen europäischen Ländern gelang es in England nicht, ein Grundstücksregister einzurichten, und die Einschränkungen bei der Grundstücksübertragung deuten wohl auf mangelnde Bereitschaft zur juristischen Auseinadersetzung über riskante Geschäfte hin. Dass die unzulänglichen Eigentumsrechte dennoch das Wachstum nicht bremsten, ist auf die unterschwellige Macht des Marktes zurückzuführen.

Type
Research Article
Information
Continuity and Change , Volume 28 , Issue 3 , December 2013 , pp. 323 - 346
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013 

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References

ENDNOTES

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