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Persian Accounts of Alexander's Campaigns

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2009

P. A. Brunt
P. A. Brunt
Affiliation:
Oriel College, Oxford
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Extract

J. Kaerst, following a suggestion made by Ranke, conjectured that Diodorus' source for Alexander, whom he identified with Clitarchus, derived information from the mercenaries who served Darius. This conjecture has been developed into an elaborate theory by Sir William Tarn, a theory that has found some favour. He holds that the ‘mercenaries' source’, which I shall henceforth call M, was Diodorus' ‘principal guide [my italics] down to Issus’, and also ‘largely used’ by Curtius (p. 71); from certain texts in Curtius Tarn infers (pp. 105–6) that M went down to Darius' death, and he thinks that till that point both Diodorus and Curtius continued to draw upon him, as well as upon other authorities.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Classical Quarterly , Volume 12 , Issue 1 , May 1962 , pp. 141 - 155
Copyright
Copyright © The Classical Association 1962

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References

page 141 note 1 Gesck. des Hellenismus (Berlin, 1927), i 3. 544.Google Scholar

page 141 note 2 Alexander the Great, ii (Cambridge, 1948), see index, s.v. ‘mercenaries' source’. I refer to this in the text by pages.Google Scholar

page 141 note 3 See for instance Jones, A. H. M., C.R. lxiii (1949), 122Google Scholar; Robinson, C. A., A. J. P. lxx (1949), 195–6Google Scholar (with some reserve). Schachermeyr, F., Alexander der grosse (Graz, 1949), n. 69Google Scholar, virtually reverts to Kaerst's position, as does Burn, A. R. (J.H.S. lxxii [1952],'82, n. 4)Google Scholar, but his objections to Tarn's thesis of a written ‘mercenaries'source’ are characterized by Andreotti, R. (Historia i [1950], 554, n. 2) as ‘rather weak’.Google Scholar

page 141 note 4 The Lost Historians of Alexander the Great (American Philological Association, 1960), pp. 78–82. I must dissent from one objection raised by Pearson. He asks: ‘in what Greek city could a Greek mercenary expect a favourable reception for an account that was sympathetic to the Persian cause?’ The answer is: ‘in most, for most Greek cities showed their hatred of Alexander either in Agis' revolt or in the Lamian war‘. But Pearson has, I think, made the most valuable contribution to the criticism of die Alexanderhistorians we yet have.Google Scholar

page 142 note 1 For trouble in Egypt 338–335 see Kienitz, F. K., Die polit. Gesch. Agyptens (Berlin, 1953). PP. 109 ff.Google Scholar

page 142 note 2 Cf. also Diod, . 17. 48. 2–5Google Scholar; Curtius, 4. 1. 27–33 for further details.Google Scholar

page 143 note 1 For what follows see the Appendix.

page 143 note 2 Diod, . 17. 39Google Scholar records that Darius (a) rearmed survivors from Issus (cf. Curt, . 4. 9. 3Google Scholar); (b) mustered forces from the upper satrapies which there had been no time to mobilize in 333 (cf. Curt, . 4. 9. 1—note ‘aegre’Google Scholar); in 53 he adds (c) that he had his men armed with longer spears and swords than in the past (cf. a. 1. 15. 5Google Scholar) and (d) collected 200 scythe-bearing chariots (cf. Curt, . 4. 9. 4–5Google Scholar; Arrian, 3. 11Google Scholar); Curtius adds (e) that he provided his men with better defensive armour (cf. Arrian, 3. 13. 4 for the Scythians) and (f) that he increased the number of horses (4. 9. 3).Google Scholar

page 143 note 3 Arrian (like Plutarch) writes Spithridates and (like Curtius) Arsames where Diodorus has Spithrobates and Arsamenes (Berve, , Alexandemich, ii, nos. 715, 149Google Scholar). Diodorus makes out that the son-in-law of Darius whom Alexander killed was ‘Spithrobates’, not Mithridates, and that Clitus thereafter saved his king from ‘Rhosaces’, not from Spithridates after he had already killed Rhoesaces. He also kills off Atizyes both at the Granicus and (rightly) at Issus (cf. Arr, . 2. 11. 8). But even if he drew on M, who should have got such facts right, any errors could be imputed to his own carelessness.Google Scholar

page 144 note 1 Arr, . 3. 8. 2; 3. 9. 1Google Scholar; I judge that 3. 8. 3–7, sandwiched between these references to the prisoners' reports, derives from them. (Cf. p. 153, n. 2.) Darius’ plans got abroad or were guessed by contemporaries. Before Issus he hoped(Arr, . 2. 6. 5Google Scholar). Demosthenes, according to Aesch, . 3. 164, was then predicting that AlexanderGoogle Scholar

page 144 note 2 Residence at Pella and relation to Memnon, Diod, . 16. 52. 3–4Google Scholar; Curt, . 5. 9. 1; 6. 5. 2Google Scholar; his loyalty to Darius and subsequent reception by Alexander, Arr. 3. 23, etc.Google Scholar (cf. Berve, , ii, no. 152).Google Scholar

page 144 note 3 But see Pearson, L. (Historia iii [1954–1955], 429 ff.).Google Scholar

page 144 note 4 Cf. p. 143, n. 3. Curtius, 4. 12.Google Scholar 7 makes Ariobarzanes and Orontobates (Berve, , ii, nos. 115, 594Google Scholar) commanders at Gaugamela of Persians, Mardians, and Sogdians, but Arrian, 3. 8Google Scholar rightly associates die Sogdians with the Bactrians under Bessus, while the Mardians should have been associated with the Tapurians (Berve, , i. 265Google Scholar). Note also discrepancies over names of Alexander's oriental officials, Curtius' Abistamenes (3. 4. 1) for Arrian's Sabictas (2. 4. 2) as satrap of Cappadocia, and Arsaces (Curt, . 8. 3. 17Google Scholar) for Atropates (Arr, . 4. 18. 3) as satrap of Media. Yet in general Curtius' information on appointments seems to be sound.Google Scholar

page 145 note 1 See for instance 3. 2. 10–19; 3. 8. 1–11; 4. 10. 25–34.

page 145 note 2 Cf. Schwartz, E., R.E. iv. 1873 ff.Google Scholar = Gr. Geschichtsschreiber 158 ff.Google Scholar

page 145 note 3 Pearson, , op. cit. (in p. 141, n. 4), ch. viii, has powerfully restated the view that Diodorus depended on Clitarchus.Google Scholar

page 145 note 4 But cf. p. 151 on M's alleged partiality for the Thessalians which Tarn ascribes to their part in the Lamian war.

page 145 note 5 Arr, . 1. 16. 6 (but cf. 1. 19. 6; 3. 23. 8 with 3. 24. 5).Google Scholar

page 145 note 6 Identity of source for both Theban and Spartan revolts might be surmised.

page 145 note 7 17. 25. 6 ff.

page 146 note 1 Arr, . I. 10. 4Google Scholar; other evidence in Berve, , ii, no. 329.Google Scholar

page 146 note 2 Amyntas, Berve, ii, no. 58Google Scholar; Thymondas, ibid., no. 380. It would seem that they shared the command of the mercenaries with Aristomedes and Bianor (ibid., nos. 128, 214). Probably Arrian and Curtius are both right; the mercenary commanders concurred in their advice, but different historians singled out different persons for mention. Arrian, however, makes Amyntas recommend Darius not to leave Syria, and Curtius makes Thymondas urge withdrawal to Mesopotamia.

page 147 note 1 Arr, . 3. 22; 3. 23. 7; 3. 25. 8; 3. 30. 4–5; 4. 7. 3, etc.Google Scholar (cf. Badian, E., C.Q. N.s. viii [1958], 144 ff.).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

page 147 note 2 The absurdly large figure for Persian infantry in Diodorus in itself suggests a source whose author exaggerated in the Macedonian interest.

page 149 note 1 A ‘scorched earth’ strategy is said to have been proposed or designed on other occasions, Curt, . 3. 4. 3 (Cilicia)Google Scholar; 3. 8. 8 (Syria, ), 4. 9. 8 and 1454. 10. 13–14Google Scholar;4. 13.23 (Babylonia), Arr, . 3. 19. 1 (Hyrcania)Google Scholar; 3. 28. 8 (Bactria, ); it must always have been attended with great difficulties, but least so in Iran, where there was more popular resistance to Alexander.Google Scholar

page 150 note 1 The number is probably much inflated, cf. Parke, H. W., Greek Mercenary Soldiers (Oxford, 1933), pp. 183–4, and therefore originates with a Macedonian source, presumably Callisthenes.Google Scholar

page 151 note 1 This was remarked by Robinson, , loc. cit. in p. 141, n. 3.Google Scholar

page 151 note 2 Curtius, whose narrative is lost for the time of the Climax episode (which all Alexander-historians had, according to Josephus, , B.I. 2. 348), certainly recorded Gordium (3. 1. 11 ff.); but this cannot be used against Tarn, since he allows that Curtius drew on other sources besides M.Google Scholar

page 151 note 3 For the other survivors cf. Parke, , op. cit. (in p. 50, n. 1), pp. 199 ff.; Arrian mentions them in 2. 13, but more information is naturally found in Curtius and Diodorus, because their interest is less exclusively in Alexander's own doings.Google Scholar

page 151 note 4 For 1,500 see Tarn, , p. 184, n. t. But Curtius 5. 8. 3; 5. 12. 4 (= M!) gives 4,000 much later.Google Scholar

page 151 note 5 No ancient account of Gaugamela is fully intelligible, and every modern reconstruction is conjectural.

page 152 note 1 For criticism see Griffith, G. T. (J.H.S. lxvii [1947], 84, n. 26)Google Scholar; A. R. Burn (ibid. lxxii [1952], 89); Major-Gen. Fuller, J. F. C., Generalship of Alexander the Great (London, 1958), p. 174.Google Scholar

page 152 note 2 Fuller, , op. cit., p. 148 accepts this.Google Scholar

page 152 note 3 1. 12; 2. 6, cf. pp. 143–4.

page 152 note 4 For recent discussions see Hamilton, J. R. (C.Q. N.s. v [1955], 218–19Google Scholar; Griffith, G. T. (Proc. Comb. Philol. Soc. N.s. iv [1956–1957], 3 ff.). The hypaspists are included by Arrian in the ‘phalanx’ (3. 11. 9; 4. 28. 8–30. 3), but the very frequency with which they were used by Alexander suggests that they were more mobile than the pezetairoi, and in 2. 4. 3 they, together with other light troops, are contrasted with the more heavily armed regiments of foot, apparently including those of the phalanx; cf. also 3. 21. 7 (as interpreted by Hamilton); 4. 30. 6; 5. 23. 7. In 4. 25. 6, indeed, Alexander takes with him cavalry, light troops, and two phalanx regiments over rough country, but not the hypaspists; I am not clear that any contrast is intended widi ‘the more heavily armed troops’ mentioned just before, though all Macedonian troops are distinguished in 3. 18. 1–2 from the heavy-armed Greek infantry. Griffith has made out a good case for the view that even the pezetairoi lacked the breastplate worn by Greek hoplites; Mr. de Ste Croix (to whom I am indebted for material in this note) tells me that he conjectures that the hypaspists at this time did not carry the long sarissa.Google Scholar

page 152 note 5 Details of the Macedonian battle order in Diod. 17. 57 (despite the substitution of Philippus for Simmias) and Curtius (4. 13. 26 ff. where they are incomplete) betray a source that is ultimately Macedonian (hence the description of the ethnic origin of the phalanx regiments). So too Curtius (4. 13. 32) was aware of Alexander's general plan, and both he (ibid. 4. 13. 33–34) and Diodorus (17. 57. 6) knew how he proposed to deal with the attack by the Persian chariots (cf. Arr, . 3. 13. 5–6).Google Scholar

page 153 note 1 Tarn says (p. 105) that Curtius' ‘long writing up of Darius (3. 8–11) contains much which no one could ever have known’ (my italics) ‘but the loyalty of the mercenary leader Patron must be from' M. Why? On Curtius' own showing Patron and Artabazus were closely co-operating. But note discrepancies between Curt, . 5. 8. 1–3Google Scholar with Arr, . 3. 19. 1 and cf. p. 151, n. 3.Google Scholar

page 153 note 2 Artabazus especially might have been responsible for any marked admiration for Memnon that can be detected in any of our sources.

page 153 note 3 Contrast the opinion of Schwartz, E., Gr. Geschichtsschreiber, p. 166: ‘so far as events in the Persian camp come in question, Arrian only repeats the news which successively reached Alexander, a clear proof that his authority, probably Ptolemy, would only consult official sources.’ Schwartz based this on 3. 19, but such passages can be interpreted as evidence of a literary mannerism. The information given in texts cited in p. 152, n. 3, cannot have reached Alexander before the battles which followed the debates recorded.Google Scholar

I am indebted for helpful criticism to Mr. G. L. Cawkwell and Mr. G. E. M. de Ste Croix.