Since the 1920s the pattern prevailing in the field of primary and secondary education in China has been that of a twelve-year cycle divided into three basic parts—a six-year primary or elementary school followed by a three-year “junior middle” or junior high school and a three-year “senior middle” or senior high. The six-year elementary cycle was further subdivided into four years of junior grades followed by two years of senior grades.

As a result of the split between the Communists and the Kuomintang at Wuhan in July 1927, the Nationalists managed to set up a unified régime of their own at Nanking. But T'ang Sheng-chih, the KMT military leader at Wuhan, rebelled against that unified régime. So Nanking decided to send troops to fight him on October 24. This KMT civil strife led immediately to an intra-Party power struggle among the Communists who had been forced underground since July. The Communist struggle took the form of a dispute over a proposed insurrection at Wuhan in the event of T'ang Sheng-chih's defeat.

The events of the “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution” have resulted in Lin Piao becoming the heir apparent of Mao Tse-tung while the armed forces have become the principal power factor in Communist China. However, much of the basis for the greatly expanded roles and power of Lin and the military establishment was actually laid in the period 1959–66. In considerable part, Lin Piao and his lieutenants gained power by establishing themselves as “the most loyal” supporters and potential heirs of the venerable, charismatic Mao Tsetung. In addition, for several years they have been carefully infiltrating into numerous key institutions of the state and Party and have played an important role in seeking to purge the opposition. Many of Marshal Lin's supporters and some of his opponents are professional party-soldiers, who have long been the Party's senior specialists in military affairs. Legally these men no longer have the title of marshal or general, for ranks were officially abolished in June 1965. However, since these powerful figures continue to dominate the massive armed forces, while extending their influence much further into the battered party and government structure, it will help to clarify a complex struggle if those who are primarily party-soldiers are still designated by their previous military ranks. For example, after the party reorganisation of August 1966 there were eight former marshals on the list of members of the new Politburo of the Party.

The sixth congress of the Communist Party of India (CPI) met at Vijayawada, Andhra, from April 7 to April 16. Since it was the first such congress to be held since the beginning of the frontier disputes between India and China, it was clearly of some importance. The disputes have created bitter divisions within the party, and the ideological rift between the Soviet Union and China has intensified these divisons. For nearly two years the CPI has been unable to function effectively and the rift within it is openly acknowledged by members.

It would be only a mild exaggeration to say that China has been dominating the international conference on Laos. Certainly the weight of the Chinese presence has made itself felt in ways that were not true of the Far Eastern conference held in the same city—Geneva—in 1954. In various respects, indeed, the Chinese seem to have been determined from the start to make an impact on other participants commensurate with their own estimation of China's international stature. To this end, they sent the largest of all the sixteen delegations to Geneva and—though willing on occasion to display a proper co-existential courtesy towards carefully selected other delegations—they have consistently stuck to a line that is, in most respects, markedly more intransigent than the Soviet Union's.

The annual sessions of the National People's Congress have always been more like a national rally than the parliamentary institution outlined in its own constitution. The leaders meet a large selected group deemed to represent the nation, outline their picture of national and international affairs, describe their plans and hopes for the future and call on the citizens to rally to the flag. From the floor of the house deferential speeches assure the leaders that all sections of the nation agree with them and will obey their call with alacrity. For the student outside China the first consideration is of course not what is said but how much is published. Six or eight years ago he had to wade through reams of material to catch the general flavour and find the occasional grain of fact in drifts of formal and repetitive chaff. In 1962, and now again in 1963, the problem was very different. The published documents are very brief and many passages are so generalised and indeed abstract that only an initiate can be sure of their meaning. The student's task is to expand these generalities and to suggest their context and their real meaning.

Anyone who had hoped that the proceedings of the National People's Congress would shed more light on China's current problems and future prospects than previous pronouncements had done, could console himself after its adjournment with the thought that he had been right in his suspicions, after all. By convening behind closed doors, the Congress avoided having to provide information on the state of the economy in the customary detail and thus merely reinforced the common speculation that all was not well or all was ill, depending on one's predilections.

“Who friend, who enemy?” So asks Rewi Alley, poet-laureate of Sino- Foreign Friendship, echoing Mao. This article considers Friendship2 in the Chinese Communist sense; its principal focus is on the work of Alley and his role as an official Friend of China.3 Friendship is a key theme in China'ss foreign policy repertoire, and the Friend of China is a living embodiment of that Friendship. In the days when the People'ss Republic was isolated in the international community, any foreigner who was involved in China in some way had the potential to be labelled a Friend. Friendship implied obedience to the Chinese government'ss version of events. Declared ideological commitment to the ideals of the Chinese Communist Party was preferred, but not essential.

In the five years between the disappearance of Lin Biao in 1971 and the death of Mao Zedong in 1976 the Chinese political scene was highly volatile. Mass campaigns erupted regularly, disrupting and diverting efforts to normalize political, economic and social activities, which had originally been thrown into chaos during the upheavals of the Cultural Revolution. After the 10th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in August 1973 the question of succession to the ageing Mao and ailing Premier Zhou Enlai became a matter of urgency to the political elite. At issue was the direction China would take in the post-Mao era, central to which was an assessment of the validity of Mao's thesis concerning the continuation of class struggle in socialist society, and his attempt to put into operation the conclusions he drew from this analysis.