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Canada’s Pro-Ban Stance on Double-Hatting: Playing the Long Game in ISDS Reform?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 19 October 2021
Abstract
The practice of arbitrators and counsel in investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) cases simultaneously playing both roles — known as “double-hatting” — has been the subject of much controversy in recent debates on ISDS reform, notably, at the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law’s (UNCITRAL) Working Group III where a Draft Code of Conduct for Adjudicators in International Investment Disputes is under discussion. While Canada has been less than consistent in its approaches to ISDS in recent international investment agreements (IIAs), its position against double-hatting has been rather constant. This article explores whether this stance reveals a commitment on the part of Canada towards increased judicialization of ISDS or reflects a “flavour of the month” reform likely to change with differing IIAs and negotiating partners. Analysis of Canada’s recent IIA practices, including its model Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement, released in May 2021, and the positions it has taken at UNCITRAL’s Working Group III, lead the author to conclude that Canada appears committed to increased judicialization of ISDS in the long run.
Résumé
La pratique souvent qualifiée de “double casquette,” soit lorsque des arbitres et des avocats/plaideurs agissent simultanément à ces deux titres dans le cadre de procédures de règlement des différends entre investisseurs et États (RDIE), a fait l’objet de controverses multiples au cours des débats portant sur la réforme du RDIE, notamment durant les discussions sur un Projet de Code de conduite pour les personnes appelées à trancher des différends internationaux d’investisssement se tenant actuellement au sein du Groupe de travail III de la Commission des Nations Unies pour le droit commercial international (CNUDCI). Bien que l’approche du Canada concernant le RDIE dans ses récents traités d’investissement international ne fasse preuve que de peu de cohérence, sa position en faveur d’une interdiction de la double casquette est plutôt constante. Cet article explore la question suivante: cette position révèle-t-elle un engagement de la part du Canada envers une judiciarisation accrue du RDIE ou reflète-t-elle plutôt une réforme “au goût du jour,” susceptible de varier selon les traités ou les partenaires de négociations? L’analyse des pratiques récentes du Canada dans ses traités d’investissement international, y compris le Modèle d’Accord sur la promotion et la protection des investissements étrangers datant de mai 2021, et les positions prises par le Canada au Groupe de travail III de la CNUDCI, mènent l’auteure à la conclusion que le Canada semble engagé à long terme envers une judiciarisation accrue du RDIE.
Keywords
Code of Conduct for Adjudicators in International Investment Disputesdouble-hattingforeign investment promotion and protection agreementsinternational investment agreementsinvestor-state dispute settlementISDS reformAccords sur la promotion et la protection des investissements étrangersCode de conduite pour les personnes appelées à trancher des différends entre investisseurs et Étatsdouble casquetteréforme du RDIErèglement des différends entre investisseurs et Étatstraités d’investissement
- Type
- Notes and Comments / Notes et commentaries
- Information
- Canadian Yearbook of International Law/Annuaire canadien de droit international , Volume 58 , November 2021 , pp. 382 - 407
- Copyright
- © The Canadian Yearbook of International Law/Annuaire canadien de droit international 2021
References
1 The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law’s (UNCITRAL) Working Group III webpage includes all available documents from 2017 to the present. See UNCITRAL, “Working Group III: Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform,” online: <uncitral.un.org/en/working_groups/3/investor-state>.
2 See e.g. Damien Charlotin & Lisa Bohmer, “UNCITRAL Working Papers on Appeal Mechanism and Selection and Appointment of ISDS Adjudicators Reveal Rift between Parties as to Desirability of Standing Investor-State Dispute Settlement Body,” Investment Arbitration Reporter (14 January 2021).
3 Canada-European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, 30 October 2016, ch 8, online:<www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/ceta-aecg/text-texte/08.aspx?lang=eng> (provisionally applied 21 September 2017) [CETA].
4 Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, 8 March 2018, ch 9, consolidated text online: <www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/tpp-ptp/text-texte/09.aspx?lang=eng> (entered into force 30 December 2018) [CPTPP].
5 Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement, 30 November 2018, ch 14, online: <www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/cusma-aceum/text-texte/14.aspx?lang=eng> (entered into force 1 July 2020) [CUSMA]. Under Annex 14-C, legacy investment claims are still possible for a period of three years after the entry into force of CUSMA (see art 3).
6 Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (FIPA) Model, 2021, released 13 May 2021, online: <www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/fipa-apie/2021_model_fipa-2021_modele_apie.aspx?lang=eng> [2021 FIPA Model].
7 See David A Gantz, “Canada’s Approaches to Investor State Dispute Settlement: Addressing Divergencies among CETA, USMCA, CPTPP and the Canada-China FIPA” (2020) 17:3 Transnational Dispute Management 1.
8 See e.g. Ruth Mackenzie & Philippe Sands, “International Courts and Tribunals and the Independence of the International Judge” (2003) 44:1 Harv Intl LJ 271; Mackenzie, Ruth, Malleson, Kate, Martin, Penny, and Sands, Philippe, Selecting International Judges: Principle, Process and Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
9 See Mackenzie & Sands, supra note 8 at 280–83.
10 See e.g. International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), Code of Conduct: Background Papers, Double-Hatting (undated) at 1, online: <icsid.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/Background_Papers_Double-Hatting_(final)_2021.02.25.pdf> [ICSID, Double-Hatting Background Paper]; Malcolm Langford, Daniel Behn & Runar Hilleren Lie, “The Revolving Door in International Investment Arbitration” (2017) J Intl Economic L 1 [Langford, Behn & Lie, “Revolving Door”].
11 See UNCITRAL/ICSID Secretariats, Draft Code of Conduct for Adjudicators in Investor-State Dispute Settlement (with commentary), version 1 (May 2020), online: <uncitral.un.org/en/codeofconduct> [Draft Code of Conduct for Adjudicators].
12 See e.g. ICSID, Double-Hatting Background Paper, supra note 10 at 1.
13 UNCITRAL/ICSID Secretariats, Draft Code of Conduct, Comments by Article and Topic (14 January 2021) at 114, para 22 (comments by Canada), online: <uncitral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/files/media-documents/uncitral/en/code_of_conduct_-_comments_by_article_-_update_01.14.21.pdf> [UNCITRAL/ICSID Secretariats, Comments by Article and Topic]. For all comments made by Canada on version 1 of the Draft Code of Conduct for Adjudicators, see UNCITRAL/ICSID Secretariats, Draft Code of Conduct, Comments by State/Commenter (14 January 2021) at 12-19, online: <uncitral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/files/media-documents/uncitral/en/code_of_conduct_-_comments_by_state-commenter_-_updated_01.14.21.pdf>.
14 UNCITRAL/ICSID Secretariats, Comments by Article and Topic, supra note 13.
15 Discussed further below.
16 CETA, supra note 3, art 8.30(1). It should be noted that CETA’s Investment Court System (ICS) is not in force yet.
17 CPTTP Commission, Code of Conduct for Investor-State Dispute Settlement under Chapter 9 Section B (Investor-State Dispute Settlement) of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (19 January 2019), online <www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/cptpp-ptpgp/isds_code_conduct-rdei_code_conduite.aspx?lang=eng> [CPTPP Code of Conduct].
18 2021 FIPA Model, supra note 6, art 30(6), Arbitrator Code of Conduct for Dispute Settlement, art 3(4).
19 See e.g. Pia Eberhardt & Cecilia Olivet, Profiting from Injustice: How Law Firms, Arbitrators and Financiers Are Fuelling an Investment Arbitration Boom, Corporate Europe Observatory and the Transnational Institute, Brussels/Amsterdam (November 2012), online: <www.tni.org/files/download/profitingfrominjustice.pdf>. Under the heading “The Hidden Agenda behind the Multiple Roles of Arbitrators,” the report states that “[i]t has become normal for investment arbitrators to constantly switch hats: one minute acting as counsel, the next framing the issue as an academic, or influencing policy as a government representative or expert witness” (at 43). For a reference to the halted Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations and double-hatting, see infra note 85.
20 Philippe Sands, “Conflict and Conflicts in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Ethical Standards for Counsel” in A Rovine, ed, Contemporary Issues in International Arbitration and Mediation (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2013) at 31–32 [Sands, “Conflict and Conflicts”]. See also Philippe Sands, “Reflections on International Judicialization” (2017) 27 EJIL 885. For earlier concerns expressed by Sands regarding international adjudicators playing multiples roles and issue conflict, see e.g. Mackenzie & Sands, supra note 8 at 280–83.
21 WR Park, “Arbitrator Integrity: The Transient and the Permanent” (2009) 46 San Diego L Rev 629 at 648. See also Nassib G Ziadé, “How Many Hats Can a Player Wear: Arbitrator, Counsel and Expert?” (2009) ICSID Rev – Foreign Investment LJ 49 at 49–50, who treats instances of arbitrator counsel double-hatting under the concept of issue conflicts.
22 In the initial Draft Code of Conduct for Adjudicators, supra note 11, some of the questions related to issue conflict are addressed under Article 5: Conflicts of Interest: Disclosure Obligations. The May 2020 commentary to the draft code states that “[i]ssue conflict may exist when an adjudicator has taken a position on a legal matter relevant to the case or has prior factual knowledge relevant to the dispute at hand” (at 15, para 59). In this context, it refers primarily to prior publications and speeches. See also International Council for Commercial Arbitration, Report of the ASIL-ICCA Joint Task Force on Issue Conflicts in Investor-State Arbitration, ICCA Reports No 3 (17 March 2016). While the task force did not come up with a unique definition of issue conflict (namely, for lack of consensus in and outside the task force), the introduction to the report does refer to the fact that “[a]rbitral institutions face a growing number of challenges to disqualify arbitrators on the ground of ‘issue conflict,’ an allegation that an arbitrator is biased towards a particular view of certain issues or has already prejudged them” (at 1) [internal note omitted].
23 Thomas Buergenthal, “The Proliferation of Disputes, Dispute Settlement Procedures and Respect for the Rule of Law” (2006) 22:4 Arbitration International 495.
24 Ibid at 498.
25 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, 18 March 1965, 575 UNTS 159 (entered into force 14 October 1966) [ICSID Convention].
26 ICSID, Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings (2006), online: <icsid.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/ICSID%20Convention%20English.pdf> at 99 [ICSID Arbitration Rules].
27 UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (2010), online: <uncitral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/files/media-documents/uncitral/en/arb-rules-revised-2010-e.pdf> [UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules].
28 See ibid, art 11; ICSID Convention, supra note 25, art 14(1); ICSID Arbitration Rules, supra note 26, rule 6(2). While the standards are worded differently, there is general agreement that they encompass both independence and impartiality requirements. See e.g. UNCITRAL, Working Group III, Possible Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS): Ensuring Independence and Impartiality on the Part of Arbitrators and Decision Makers in ISDS, Note by the Secretariat, Doc A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.151 (30 August 2018) at 5, n 5, online <undocs.org/en/A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.151> [UNCITRAL, Independence and Impartiality].
29 UNCITRAL, Independence and Impartiality, supra note 28 at 14.
30 International Bar Association (IBA), Guidelines on Conflict of Interest in International Arbitration (23 October 2014). On conflicts of interest, the guidelines at Part I(2)(c) provide for an objective test of justifiable doubts: “Doubts are justifiable if a reasonable third person, having knowledge of the relevant facts and circumstances, would reach the conclusion that there is a likelihood that the arbitrator may be influenced by factors other than the merits of the case as presented by the parties in reaching his or her decision.” ICSID, Double-Hatting Background Paper, supra note 10 at 10, notes that the IBA guidelines are cited extensively in cases involving double-hatting. See also John R Crook, “Dual Hats and Arbitrator Diversity: Goals in Tension” in Symposium: A Focus on Ethics in International Courts and Tribunals, AJIL Unbound (2019) at 286.
31 IBA, supra note 30, Part II, Practical Application of the General Standards, provides that “[t]he Orange List is a non-exhaustive list of specific situations that, depending on the facts of a given case, may, in the eyes of the parties, give rise to doubts as to the arbitrator’s impartiality or independence” (at para 3). See also ICSID, Double-Hatting Background Paper, supra note 10 at 10.
32 SGS Société Générale de Surveillance SA v Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No ARB/01/13, Decision on Claimant's Proposal to Disqualify Arbitrator J Christopher Thomas (19 December 2002) at para 26 [SGS v Pakistan].
33 North American Free Trade Agreement, 17 December 1992, Can TS 1994 No 2, (1933) 32 ILM 289 (entered into force 1 January 1994) [NAFTA].
34 ICSID Convention, supra note 25, art 57.
35 SGS v Pakistan, supra note 32 at paras 25–26.
36 Ibid at para 25.
37 Republic of Ghana v Telekom Malaysia Berhad, Case No 13/2004, Decision, District Court of the Hague, Civil Law Section (18 October 2004). Note that the provisional measure judge applied Dutch law to the challenge (see para 4 of the decision) [Ghana v Telekom Malaysia Berhad, October 2004].
38 Ibid at para. 1.
39 Ibid at para 4.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Republic of Ghana v Telekom Malaysia Berhad, Case No 17/2004, Decision, District Court of the Hague, Civil Law Section (5 November 2004) at para 11.
43 Malcolm Langford, Daniel Behn & Runar Hilleren Lie, “The Ethics and Empirics of Double Hatting” (2017) 6:7 ESIL Reflections 1 [Langford, Behn & Lie, “Ethics and Empirics”]; Langford, Behn & Lie, “Revolving Door,” supra note 10. For more empirical research on the central players involved in investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), see Sergio Puig, “Social Capital in the Arbitration Market” (2014) 25:2 EJIL 387.
44 Langford, Behn & Lie, “Ethics and Empirics,” supra note 43 at 4.
45 UNCITRAL/ICSID Secretariats, Comments by Article and Topic, supra note 13 at 123–24.
46 See e.g. GJ Horvath & R Berzero, “Arbitrator and Counsel: The Double-Hat Dilemma” (2013) 10:4 Transnational Dispute Management 1 at 5–6.
48 See e.g. UNCITRAL, Independence and Impartiality, supra note 28 at 14, 19.
49 See ICSID, Decisions on Disqualification, online <icsid.worldbank.org/cases/content/tables-of-decisions/disqualification>. See also Crook, supra note 30 at 286–87. After noting few challenges are upheld, Crook concludes: “In the end, the small number of successful challenges leaves uncertain the effectiveness of arbitration’s principal mechanism for ensuring independence and impartiality” (at 287).
50 This list is said to be non-exhaustive. See ICSID, Double-Hatting Background Paper, supra note 10 at 1, n 1.
51 Luke Eric Peterson, “In an Apparent First, an Arbitrator Is Disqualified from Tribunal after State Objects to His Serving as Counsel to Investor on Parallel Case Where Jurisdiction over Intra-EU Claims Was at Issue,” Investment Arbitration Reporter (13 December 2018). Cited in Crook, supra note 30 at 286.
52 For our purposes, cases where the adjudicator asked the arbitrator to pick one of the two roles (that is, arbitrator or counsel) were included. See e.g. Ghana v Telekom Malaysia Berhad, October 2004, supra note 37 at 6; Vito G Gallo v Government of Canada, NAFTA/UNCITRAL Decision on the Challenge to Mr J Christopher Thomas, QC (14 October 2009) at 11–12.
54 See UNCITRAL/ICSID Secretariats, Comments by Article and Topic, supra note 13 at 114–15, Comments by Canada. As of this date, other countries have shared their pro-ban positions or inclinations, but, as the process is ongoing, many have voiced their openness to compromises, such as through waivers (more on this in the last part of this article). See e.g. the positions of Armenia, Australia, Bahrain, Chile, China, Colombia, the European Union (EU) and its member states, Mexico, the United Kingdom, and Western Balkans countries (at 114–21).
56 See UNCITRAL/ICSID Secretariats, Comments by Article and Topic, supra note 13 at 120–21 (comments by the United States), 116–17, 119 (comments by Costa Rica, Israel, Switzerland, and Turkey).
57 For a discussion of “anti-ban” arguments, see Draft Code of Conduct for Adjudicators, supra note 11 at para 68; Crook, supra note 30 at 285, 288; Horvath & Berzero, supra note 46 at 12–13. In the comments received on the first version of the Draft Code of Conduct for Adjudicators, the most vociferous opponents to a ban on double-hatting were the representatives of lawyers’ associations. See e.g. UNCITRAL/ICSID Secretariats, Comments by Article and Topic, supra note 13 at 123–27 (on behalf of Corporate Counsel International Arbitration Group (CCIAG)), 127–31 (Inter-Pacific Bar Association).
58 See e.g. UNCITRAL/ICSID Secretariats, Comments by Article and Topic, supra note 13 at 116–17 (comments by EU and its member states), 114–15 (Canada).
59 See e.g. Mackenzie & Sands, supra note 8 at 280–83.
60 See e.g. Crook, supra note 30 at 287–88.
61 See e.g. UNCITRAL/ICSID Secretariats, Comments by Article and Topic, supra note 13 at 114 (comments by Canada).
63 Langford, Behn & Lie, “Ethics and Empirics,” supra note 43.
64 See e.g. Langford, Behn & Lie, “Revolving Door,” supra note 10 at 23; Anthea Roberts, “A Possible Approach to Transitional Double Hatting in Investor-State Arbitration,” EJIL Talk! (31 July 2017).
66 See Mackenzie et al, supra note 8 at 161–65.
67 Text on file with author.
68 European Commission, TTIP Proposal: Investment, Resolution of Investment Disputes and Investment Court System (12 November 2015), online: <trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/november/tradoc_153955.pdf>.
69 See e.g. August Reinisch, “The European Union and Investor-State Dispute Settlement: From Investor-State Arbitration to a Permanent Investment Court,” CIGI Investor-State Arbitration Series Paper No 2 (March 2016), online: <www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/isa_paper_series_no.2.pdf>; Céline Lévesque, “The European Commission Proposal for an Investment Court System: Out with the Old, in with the New?” Investor-State Arbitration Series Paper No 10 (September 2016), online: <www.cigionline.org/static/documents/isa_paper_series_no.10_0.pdf>.
70 In the case of the first instance tribunal, the terms are of five years and renewable once: see CETA, supra note 3, art 8.27(5). As for the appellate tribunal members, the terms are of nine years and non-renewable. See CETA Joint Committee, Decision No 001/2021 of the CETA Joint Committee of January 29, 2021 Setting Out the Administrative and Organisational Matters Regarding the Functioning of the Appellate Tribunal, art 2(3), online: <www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/ceta-aecg/appellate-tribunal-dappel.aspx?lang=eng> [CETA 2021 Decision].
72 See Lévesque, supra note 69.
73 CETA, supra note 3, art 8.30(1).
74 The ICS will only come into force once all relevant jurisdictions have ratified CETA (other parts of the treaty have been provisionally applied since 21 September 2017). To date, many members of the EU have not ratified CETA, and more delay can be expected. See Council of the European Union, online: <www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/treaties-agreements/agreement/?id=2016017>.
75 See CETA Committee on Services and Investment, Decision No 001/2021 of the Committee on Services and Investment of January 29, 2021 Adopting a Code of Conduct for Members of the Tribunal, Members of the Appellate Tribunal and Mediators, online: <www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/ceta-aecg/code-conduct-conduite.aspx?lang=eng>.
76 See ibid, art 5(2): limit of three years.
77 See Government of Canada, View the [CPTPP] Timeline, online: <www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/cptpp-ptpgp/view_timeline-consultez_chronologie.aspx?lang=eng>.
78 See US Trade Representative, The United States Officially Withdraws from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (30 January 2017), online: <ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2017/january/US-Withdraws-From-TPP>.
79 Trans-Pacific Partnership, text released subject to legal review on 5 November 2015, Ch 9 Investment, art 9.18–9.23 [TPP].
80 Ibid, art 9.21(6).
81 CPTPP Code of Conduct, supra note 17.
82 Ibid, art 3(d).
83 CUSMA, supra note 5.
84 As between Canada and Mexico, ISDS claims can be submitted under the investment chapter of the CPTPP, supra note 4.
85 Ibid, art 14.D.6(5) – (6). Regarding US practice, it has been said that Canada had proposed early on the inclusion of an ICS in CUSMA, a model that the United States would have been familiar with after the EU proposed its adoption (inclusive of a ban on double-hatting) in the context of the TTIP negotiations. See European Commission, supra note 68, art 11 (ethics). On another front, back in the winter of 2015, the TPP was being attacked in the US political arena in part on the basis of the risk of double-hatting in ISDS proceedings. See Crook, supra note 30 at 284, referring to Senator Elizabeth Warren’s opposition. Nevertheless, in the context of the Draft Code of Conduct for Adjudicators, supra note 11, the United States voiced concerns about an outright ban. See UNCITRAL/ICSID Secretariats, Comments by Article and Topic, supra note 13 at 121 (comments by the United States).
86 See the Government of Canada, Executive Summary of the Consultation Results, online: <www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/consultations/fipa-apie/report-rapport.aspx?lang=eng>.
87 See Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of Moldova for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 12 June 2018 (entered into force 23 August 2019), online: <www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/assets/pdfs/agreements-accords/Canada-Moldova-FIPA_EN.pdf>; Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of Kosovo for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 6 March 2018 (entered into force 19 December 2018), online: <www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/assets/pdfs/agreements-accords/fipa-kosovo-eng.PDF>.
88 See Joint Declaration by the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of Moldova Regarding Progressive and Inclusive Trade and Investment, 12 June 2018, online: <www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/assets/pdfs/agreements-accords/Canada-Moldova-FIPA-Declaration_EN.pdf> [emphasis in original]; Joint Declaration by the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of Kosovo Regarding Progressive and Inclusive Trade and Investment, 6 March 2018, online: <www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/assets/pdfs/agreements-accords/fipa-kosovo-declaration-eng.pdf>.
89 2021 FIPA Model, supra note 6, Arbitrator Code of Conduct for Dispute Settlement, art 3.4 [emphasis added].
90 CETA, supra note 3, art 8.29.
91 See e.g. European Commission and Canada, “Non-Paper: Reforming Investment Dispute Settlement: Considerations on the Way towards a Multilateral Investment Dispute Settlement Mechanism” (Paper presented at the OECD-hosted Investment Treaty Dialogue, Paris, 2016), online: <trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2017/january/tradoc_155265.pdf>; European Commission and Canada, “Discussion Paper: Establishment of a Multilateral Investment Dispute Settlement System” (Paper presented at the Expert Meeting, Geneva, 2016), online: <trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2017/january/tradoc_155267.12.12%20With%20date_%20Discussion%20p>; European Commission and Canada, “The Case for Creating a Multilateral Investment Dispute Settlement Mechanism” (Paper presented at the Informal Ministerial Meeting, World Economic Forum, Davos, 2017), online: <trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2017/january/tradoc_155264.pdf>.
92 CPTTP, supra note 4, art 9.22(11).
93 See David A Gantz, “An Appellate Mechanism for Review of Arbitral Decisions in Investor-State Disputes: Prospects and Challenges” (2006) 39 Vand J Transnatl L 39 at 56–57.
94 See CPTPP (non-consolidated text), art 1–2, online: <www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/cptpp-ptpgp/text-texte/cptpp-ptpgp.aspx?lang=eng>.
95 See e.g. Luke Eric Peterson, “Analysis: What Did Governments Agree (And Disagree) on at Recent UNCITRAL Meetings on Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform?” Investment Arbitration Reporter (4 January 2018).
96 2021 FIPA Model, supra note 6, art 46.
97 UNCITRAL, Working Group III, Possible Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS): Submission from the Government of China (19 July 2019) at 4, online: <undocs.org/en/A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.177>.
98 See Draft Code of Conduct for Adjudicators, supra note 11 at 2–3.
99 Ibid, art 6.
100 UNCITRAL/ICSID Secretariats, Comments by Article and Topic, supra note 13 at 114, para 22.
101 Ibid at 114, para 22.
102 Ibid at 115, para 24.
103 Ibid at 115, para 23.
104 ICSID/UNICTRAL, Draft Code of Conduct for Adjudicators in International Investment Disputes, version 2 (19 April 2021), online: <uncitral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/files/media-documents/uncitral/en/draft_code_of_conduct_v2.pdf>. For a description of the changes between version 1 and version 2 of the Draft Code of Conduct, see Chiara Giorgetti, “The Second Draft of the Code of Conduct for Adjudicators in International Investment Disputes: Towards a Likely Agreement?” Kluwer Arbitration Blog (29 May 2021), online: <arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2021/05/29/the-second-draft-of-the-code-of-conduct-for-adjudicators-in-international-investment-disputes-towards-a-likely-agreement/>.
105 See UNCITRAL, Working Group III (ISDS Reform), “Status of Work,” online: <uncitral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/files/media-documents/uncitral/210603_uncitral_wgiii_status_of_work.pdf>.
106 CETA 2021 Decision, supra note 70, art 2(1).
107 2021 FIPA Model, supra note 6, art 30(1) (arbitrators).
108 See Statement by the Honourable Chrystia Freeland, Debate on the Bill for the Implementation of CUSMA (11 June 2019): “Perhaps one of the achievements I am most proud of is that the investor-state dispute resolution system, which in the past allowed foreign companies to sue Canada, will be gone. This means that Canada can make its own rules about public health and safety, for example, without the risk of being sued. Known as ISDS, this provision has cost Canadian taxpayers more than $300 million in penalties and legal fees.”
109 See UNCITRAL, Report of Working Group III (Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform) on the Work of Its Resumed Fortieth Session (Vienna, 4 and 5 May 2021) (27 May 2021), online: <uncitral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/files/wg_iii_resumed_40th_session_final_003.pdf>.
110 This possibility might lead one to question the utility of such waivers: in what circumstances would a party be inclined to approve of the other side’s “double-hatter” nominee? Further, some would argue that allowing for waivers undermines a fundamental premise of a ban: the appearance of bias created by the practice. These questions will have to be left for another day.