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Responsible Government and Ministerial Responsibility: Every Reform Is Its Own Problem*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 November 2009

S. L. Sutherland
S. L. Sutherland
Affiliation:
Carleton University
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Abstract

The article defends the classical version of ministerial responsibility against recent initiatives to implement a form of direct accountability for administrators. Constitutional convention and ministerial resignations from active cabinets in the Canadian federal government and in Britain are described: in neither country do ministers resign for maladministration by their officials, nor does doctrine suggest they should. Rather, the pattern of resignations indicates the importance of collective responsibility, as well as the relative unimportance of ministerial misbehaviour. The conclusion sets out the negative implications for democratic government of substituting a kind of direct “accountability” of officials, extracted in political forums, for the responsibility of ministers.

Résumé

Cet article veut justifier l'interprétation dite classique de la responsabilité ministérielle par rapport aux récentes initiatives visant à accorder la responsabilité directe aux fonctionnaires. Nous pourrions décrire l'usage constitutionnel et les démissions dans les cabinets des gouvernements du Canada et de la Grande-Bretagne comme suit: ni en théorie ni en pratique les ministres de ces deux pays ne démissionnent en raison de la mauvaise gestion de leurs fonctionnaires. Le constat des démissions souligne plutôt l'importance de la solidarité ministérielle ainsi que la rareté de l'outrage à l'éthique. Dans le contexte politique actuel, on peut conclure que substituer une forme de responsabilité directe accordée aux fonctionnaires à celle des ministres aurait des effets malencontreux.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique , Volume 24 , Issue 1 , March 1991 , pp. 91 - 120
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association (l'Association canadienne de science politique) and/et la Société québécoise de science politique 1991

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References

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13 Lambert Report, 181–84.

14 The credibility of the practice is based on the prime minister's interest to protect the government from potential attacks regarding probity.

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17 This does not mean that it is easy to find a balance between the rights of central agenda ministers versus those with substantial public-oriented portfolios. See Johnson, A. W., “The Treasury Board of Canada and the Machinery of Government of Canada of the 1970s,” this Journal 4 (1971), 346–366Google Scholar; and Veilleux, Gérard and Savoie, Donald J., “Kafka's Castle: The Treasury Board of Canada Revisited,” Canadian Public Administration 31 (1988), 517–539CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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21 Bibliographies and Compilations Section, Information and Technical Services Branch, Library of Parliament, “Ministerial Resignations 1867 to Date,” August 1989. Sources for the list include the Guide to Canadian Ministries; Canadian Directory of Parliament, 1867–1967; House of Commons Debates and Journals; Senate Debates and Journals; Canada Gazette; Dominion Annual Register and Canadian Annual Review; and Canadian News Facts.

22 Charles Tupper, Lionel Chevrier and Walter Gordon each resigned on two occasions from working cabinets.

23 A judicial inquiry under Judge William Parker found that Stevens had violated conflict of interest guidelines on 14 occasions. See Simpson, Spoils of Power, 370–72; McQueen, Rod, Blind Trust (Toronto: Macmilian, 1987) provides a chronologyGoogle Scholar; and Coyle, Jim et al. , Sinc (Toronto: Fitzhenry and Whiteside, 1987), provide much documentationGoogle Scholar.

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28 But both employees and private citizens can and have been charged with criminal responsibility for possession of budget documents. In late April 1989, four people were charged in connection with a leak earlier that month of information pertaining to the forthcoming federal budget. As of mid-1990, one of them, an employee of a government printing plant, had been found guilty and fired.

29 With regard to the question of identity, see the June 21, 1990, judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of the Minister of Employment and Immigration and the Secretary of State for External Affairs v. Debora Bhatnager. The Federal Court had earlier found the two ministers in contempt of court for failing to produce an immigration file. An order had been served on the ministers' solicitor but not on the ministers personally. In the unanimous ruling, the Supreme Court ruled that the ministers could not be held criminally liable. Common law requires evidence of personal service or actual personal knowledge, which was not established. Criminal law, where natural persons are responsible roughly when they have been the primary actors or instigators, precludes vicarious liability. Further, the theory of identification in corporate law could not be used to establish a kind of vicarious liability for the ministers that is precluded by the criminal law.

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32 Lambert Report, 54.

33 Ibid., 376, 371. The split of responsibilities between ministers and deputies is discussed at some length in chap. 9, and deputy minister accountability is discussed at 188 and 189.

34 Ibid., 370, 373.

35 McGrath Report, 20. Emphasis added.

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38 Ibid., Issue No. 14. Dye talks about his intentions for the advice audit on page 14:7 and passim. In this issue the OAG presents a master plan to restructure the House of Commons on rational lines.

39 1982 OAG Annual Report, para. 1.71. This is a strong programme budget position and would restrict politics to opportunistic partisan advantage plus perhaps ports, airports and building leases, that is, where we do not want it.

40 Ibid., para. 1.40.

41 1985 OAG Annual Report, para. 1.68, “Matters of Special Interest and Importance.”

42 The minister, Jean-Luc Pépin, had provided a letter saying that he took responsibility for the decision on the airport, to calm his officials' unease that they might be called upon to justify the airport in strict cost/benefit terms.

43 1985 OAG Annual Report, paras. 1.53 to 1.68.

44 House of Commons, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts, Appendix PUBL-40, “Procedures and Practices of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts,” Issue No. 33, May 29, 1986. See para. 33:9 for the advice review. Because many federal Estimates “programmes” encompass whole departments, Defence and Transport being examples, the Committee's promise to stay within programme means less than one might assume. The new system of permissive references for standing committees does not apply to the Public Accounts Committee, whose formal terms of operation have not changed since 1977: “… to review and report on the Public Accounts of Canada and all reports of the Auditor General of Canada which shall be severally deemed permanently referred to the Committee immediately they are laid upon the Table…” (S.O. 108[3][f])). Emphasis added.

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49 House of Commons, Debates, 2nd Session, 33rd Parliament, Vol. 6, 06 2–30, 1987, 7383Google Scholar. Desrosiers spoke on June 19, demanding the immediate resignation of the deputy minister or his transfer to Privy Council, pending an “impartial” investigation of the alleged perjury.

50 On February 11, 1987, Jourdenais had spoken on a point of privilege, claiming that Lussier had fired John Quigley, an immigration officer, because Quigley had spoken to members of the House Committee on Labour, Employment and Immigration. See House of Commons, Debates, 2nd Session, 33rd Parliament, Vol. 3, 01 28-March 10, 1987Google Scholar.

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52 Kennnedy, Mark, “New Questions in Gander Crash, The Citizen (Ottawa), 11 2, 1989, A4Google Scholar, notes that some documents obtained under the Access to Information Act show that an answer to an anticipated question in the House had been written for Bouchard as early as March 2, warning him that the de-icing theory could not be substantiated. Bouchard nonetheless endorsed the report on March 8, 1989. His office said that he had not seen the suggested answer. “Questions” are an accepted way of briefing ministers and their offices.

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55 Franks, The Parliament of Canada, 245–49.

56 Kernaghan, “Power, Parliament and Public Servants in Canada,” 393.

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