The paper offers a rights-based, Kantian interpretation of the idea/expression dichotomy in the law of copyright. It demonstrates that the idea/expression dichotomy normatively structures the relation between the parties to a copyright action in terms of their equal rights to authorship. To the extent that the defendant has not copied the plaintiff’s expression but has instead expressed an idea anew, the defendant has exercised her own authorship. The limits of the plaintiff’s right (i.e. the law’s refusal to copyright ideas) are therefore the contours of a public domain that, as a matter of equality, the plaintiff himself must be held to recognize. The public domain is not externally imposed upon but internally constitutive of authorial right. Thus the paper shows that a Kantian understanding of the fundamentals of copyright questions the perceived opposition between authorial right and public domain that informs much of contemporary copyright discourse. In so doing, the paper establishes the largely neglected possibility of a rights-based defense of the public domain.

Focusing on the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision, Eldred v. Ashcroft, which held that the U.S. Congress acted constitutionally when it extended copyright terms by twenty years, this article argues that copyright law in the United States for the most part responds to pragmatic imperatives. The article examines the theoretic/pragmatic distinction at an institutional level and argues that intellectual property lawmaking is at its most pragmatic in the legislative realm. While there is greater potential for theoretical concerns to influence intellectual property law-making in the judicial review context, in Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Court declined to allow grand intellectual property theories to dictate the freedom Congress enjoys to craft copyright legislation in the light of its rational view of the best (pragmatic) cultural and economic policies. The article concludes that in Eldred v. Ashcroft there can be detected an ontological approach to the “Copyright Clause” in the U.S. Constitution. The Court’s role is to ensure that Congress acts consistently with what copyright “is”; that is, a vehicle for motivating the “creative spark” of authorship. Congress has relatively free rein to determine what copyright should “do”. Moreover, any limitations on what copyright is meant to achieve are certainly not to be determined by theoretical concerns. Even the Court’s ontological approach to copyright law should be regarded as “modest,” however, given the Court’s general deference to the policy and cultural choices legislators make in the copyright field.

This article emanates from a Symposium hosted by Professor Margaret Ann Wilkinson and sponsored by the University of Western Ontario Law School and Centre for Innovation Law and Policy. The Symposium and the resulting articles aim to explore the theoretical dimensions of intellectual property law. This article argues, in contrast to the learned scholarship of my co-panellist, that theorising about intellectual property law is an innately political act that implements a pragmatic moment fueled by economic, social and cultural factors.

Legal systems such as those in the United States and Canada, which include fundamental moral rights or provisions in their constitutions, present an interesting and difficult problem for legal positivists. Are such moral standards to count among the existence or validity conditions of laws in those systems, or are they better understood as fundamental objectives or justification conditions which laws may or may not achieve or respect in practice? The first option, known as inclusive legal positivism, expands the traditional positivist separation thesis to mean that although there is no necessary connection between law and morality in general, it is possible that in some systems it is a necessary truth that laws reproduce or satisfy certain demands of morality. The second option, known as exclusive legal positivism, denies this possibility, and maintains instead that it is never a necessary condition that laws reproduce or satisfy certain demands of morality, even if such demands are constitutionally recognized. On the exclusive account, in the context of constitutional states such as the U.S. and Canada, the separation thesis is expanded to mean that there is no necessary connection between the existence and content of laws and the demands of political morality typically included in constitutions. In this paper I defend exclusive positivism and argue that it best follows from traditional positivist commitments and avoids what I take to be a critical problem with inclusive positivism. Further, I argue that the concepts, distinctions, and arguments deployed in the internal positivist debate are also of value in the wider debate between H.L.A. Hart and Ronald Dworkin.

Fundamental legal conceptions are considered in relation to the analytical concerns of Hohfeld and Bentham, and also in relation to the normative concerns of constitutional and common law protection of rights and liberties. The use of a square of opposition to expound fundamental conceptions is rejected in favour of “a triangle of possibilities”. It is argued that using this device helps to provide a clearer understanding of which conceptions may appropriately be recognised as analytically fundamental, and in turn avoids confusion over the normative treatment of practical situations that may arise through the designation of legal rights and liberties as “fundamental”. In particular, the nature of legal liberties, and the priority accorded to legal rights, are both questioned.

In the most general terms, this article focuses on the tension between competing justifications of intellectual property. Section I examines the nature and definition of economic pragmatism and argues that, while economic pragmatism comes in many flavors, each is either unstable or self-defeating. Section II advances the view that Anglo-American systems of intellectual property have both theoretical and pragmatic features. In Section III a sketch of a theory is offered--a theory that may limit applications of economic pragmatism and provide the foundation for copyright, patent, and trade secret institutions. To be justified--to warrant coercion on a worldwide scale--systems of intellectual property should be grounded in theory. Intellectual property rights are, in essence, no different than our rights to life, liberty, and tangible property. Intellectual property rights are neither pure social constructions nor bargains without foundations.

This article is a jurisprudential analysis of the idea of a ‘living Constitution’, as a common feature of the constitutional practice in democratic countries. The main argument of the article is that constitutional interpretation encompasses, rather than excludes the judicial power to develop and change the content of constitutional guarantees. The metaphor of the ‘living Constitution’ is appropriate to the nature of constitutional adjudication because it suggests gradual, incremental change on a case-by-case basis. While it is stressed that courts can and should be creative, this judicial creativity is subject to significant legal and practical constraints.

The traditional philosophical justifications for copyright policy fail to account for current expansionary trends. The proprietary logic of contemporary copyright policies is justified on neither utilitarian nor rights-based grounds. Instead, copyright developments are located within the broader framework of commodification and the logic of capital itself. Since copyright law has been outpaced by a technology that undermines both the legal framework and the underlying economic theory on which it is based, a critical theoretical framework rooted in political economy is needed to harmonize the use and dissemination of information with the developing productive forces in society. Central to this framework is the contradiction between use-value and exchange-value, which is inherent in every commodity. This tension, which is particularly acute in the case of the information commodity, becomes sharper with the use of new technologically enabled exclusion mechanisms, as well as with various policy initiatives that seek to expand the duration, scope, and intensity of the copyright monopoly. Reconceptualizing copyright theory through the lens of critical political economy will help raise issues that are often overlooked in the current policy environment, and should decrease the acceptance of traditional justifications without considering all of the policy alternatives.

Legal positivism is often described as the view that there is no necessary relationship between law and moral values. Such an understanding of positivism, this essay argues, is both unfruitful and far removed from the concerns of the figure most often associated with the origins of the positivist tradition, Thomas Hobbes. For Hobbes, legal positivism represented a decisive break with the intellectual tradition of common law scholarship which could no longer provide a satisfactory account of political authority. Positivism began, therefore, as an explanation of the basis of law’s authority within wider theories of social order: legal rules came to be seen as possessing authority not as the specific outcomes of broader moral precepts, but because they represent definitive, posited solutions to the problems of collective living. Analytical positivism, by contrast, centres upon the possibility of descriptive neutrality: an essential property of law, it is felt, is that ascertainment of its content does not necessarily depend upon moral assessments of the purpose of value of legal rules. Such an understanding, it is contended, is only very indirectly related to the traditional concerns of the legal philosopher, and hence marginal to a rich and detailed view of law’s nature. This essay traces the developments which led to the narrowly analytical view of legal positivism, and argues that positivism is much better understood as a series of peculiarly potent reflections on the rule of law: Hobbes’s answers to the questions of social order and the authority of law are often highly unsatisfactory; but it is his questions, rather than those of the modern positivists, which are most worth asking, and which should drive the legal philosopher.

This Article responds to one challenge to the aspiration to incorporate distributive-egalitarian sensitivity into tort law. Arguably, any attempt to effect redistribution by means of tort law is bound to be random and, hence, unjust. There are two facets to the randomness charge: partiality of the participants and crudeness of the distributive result. I argue that the randomness charge, in both its aspects, does not provide a convincing reason to oppose infusing tort law with distributive-egalitarian sensitivity. The charge of randomness is based on two factual assumptions and one normative claim: namely, that existing tort law has no significant redistributive effect; that redistribution through tort law is especially susceptible to the charge of randomness; and that random progressive redistribution is less fair than the status quo distribution. In this Article, I challenge all three claims. I first argue that existing tort law has inevitable distributive consequences and that these consequences are predominantly regressive. I then raise four challenges to the assumption that distribution through tort law is partial, arguing that either such distribution is not partial at all or that it is no more partial than the distribution produced by alternative mechanisms: “localized distributive justice”; “participation through insurance”; “the complement thesis”; and “no comparative randomness.” Next, I develop a methodology for comparing the fairness of the post-tort litigation redistribution with that of the status quo distribution. This methodology is based on the respective proximity of these distributions to the reference point of society’s ideal distributive scheme. Applying this methodology, I argue that partial progressive redistribution is fairer than the status quo distribution. Regarding the problem of partiality of participants, I maintain that any injustice that arises from treating differently members of the same group is overridden by the more egalitarian distribution achieved between the different groups, namely, that the inter-group justice outweighs the intra-group injustice. With respect to the problem of the crudeness of the distributive result, I posit that adopting a guideline for redistribution that is “pro-disadvantaged” rather than “anti-well-to-do” ensures the superiority of the partial progressive redistribution relative to the status quo. Furthermore, even under a more radical “anti-well-to-do” benchmark for redistribution, that superiority might still be maintained. Finally, I apply my three claims to the context of gender inequality and lost earnings. I argue that the theoretical framework developed in this Article provides support for gender-neutral damages awards for lost earnings.

A critical analysis of theories of commercial impossibility and frustration of purpose is best undertaken in conjunction with a theoretical analysis of contract in general. Contracts function as a means of transferring social benefit, which can be subcategorised into subjective and objective benefit. Contracts also regulate the transfer or risk, which is inherent in property and hence any contractual relationship. In the light of the transfer of subjective and objective benefit and risk, contracts can be shown to be by definition ex ante Pareto superior for both parties. Frustration of purpose or commercial impossibility is pleaded where the ex post overall benefit differs greatly from the ex ante expected value. This difference results from the manifestation of a risk which one party bears under the terms of the original contractual risk/benefit equilibrium. Considering the various subjective and objective risks and benefits involved in the contract, it is possible to classify frustrating eventualities under eight heads. In at least six cases the importance of the principle of security of exchange clearly precludes the operation of frustration. One of the remaining cases corresponds with the controversial Krell v Henry; there appears to be a temptation to regard frustration as the most socially utilitarian solution. Given however the dynamics of contractual risk and benefit, allowing frustration there would be unworkable because it would entail placing a subjective risk burden on the party which is in a worse position to evaluate it. There should be no place in the law for a doctrine of frustration of contract on the grounds of commercial impossibility orchanged circumstances.

How can one explain the normative outcome of the initial law-creating practices without any reference to some pre-existing natural laws “guaranteing” the lawgiver’s enterprise? The challenge which the rejection of the classical natural law model represents amounts to explaining the normative dimension of law despite the arbitrariness of the social practices from which it stems. Montaigne gave both an exemplary formulation and a peculiar solution to that question: in order to reconstruct the authority of law despite the “dangerous arbitrariness” from which it flows, Montaigne decides to avoid any inquiry regarding the original law-creating practices by positing a “law of pure obedience”.

This discussion is a critique of Professor Randy E. Barnett's solution to the problem of filling in gaps in incomplete contracts. The articles discussed are “The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent” (1992) and “Rational Bargaining Theory and Contract: Default Rules, Hypothetical Consent, the Duty to Disclose, and Fraud” (1992).

Unlike those who read Fish as declaring that free speech is an illusion or incoherent, I argue that Fish provides a superior explanation of what makes free speech possible, and a more insightful description of what judges are doing when they decide cases under laws which protect it. In this paper I first identify the central philosophical commitment from which Fish derives most of his controversial positions. Next, I demonstrate how his position on free speech in particular flows from this central philosophical commitment. Finally, in the main section of the paper, I consider three serious objections to Fish’s analysis of free speech, and consider how Fish might respond to them. I seek to defend Fish's denial that the relationship between freedom and constraint is one of simple opposition; rather he claims that constraint is the precondition for freedom. He therefore sees all speech as made under conditions of constraint. He also sees a commitment to censoring some speech as inherently contained within any commitment to freedom of speech, and so toleration of all viewpoints is impossible. He denies that any free speech principle can be neutral regarding viewpoints, and he denies that any "free market of ideas" is without bias and exclusions. He therefore rejects the accounts given by American courts deciding cases under the First Amendment which stress a fidelity to neutral principle. Since there are no such principles in existence, such courts are really doing one of two things. Either they are pragmatically advancing a partisan agenda, and constraining some speech in a way which is obfuscated, or their false belief in the existence of neutral principles paralyses them in the face of danger and prevents them from performing this pragmatic exercise.

Most common law jurisdictions require mistakes about self-defence to be reasonable. But there is a lively debate about whether reasonably mistaken self-defence should be regarded as excused or justified. On one view, reasonably mistaken self-defence is not justified but excused because the conduct is, all things considered, wrongful; on another view, reasonably mistaken self-defence is justified because the reasonable appearance of an attack gives one a right to respond. This paper argues in favour of the second view. When viewed through the lens of cases involving the defence of third parties, the first view leads to counter-intuitive results, and that the source of these results is the effort to characterize mistaken self-defence through conceptual rather than normative argument. Moreover, the second view is more compatible with both the blame-assigning and conduct-guiding aspects of criminal law.

This is a Critical Notice of two books: Evaluation and Legal Theory by Julie Dickson and Law as a Social Institution by Hamish Ross, both published by Hart.