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Politics and Jurisprudence in the British Courts

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 June 2015

Susan Sterett
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Extract

One thing seems clear in British politics today: many of the old truths no longer hold. Voters no longer vote according to class. The current government has made some effort to shake up the civil service and bring in outsiders. And a third political party is struggling along. Faced with all this, scholars have had to rethink their approach to British politics and governance. Appellate courts have long been considered Britain’s least interesting governing institution, but they have also benefited from the shake-up. Studies published in recent years mean to examine the politics of the British courts, primarily the Law Lords, the members of the House of Lords who comprise the final court of appeal in Britain. And, congruent with other changes in politics, studies find that courts have become interesting enough that they ought at least be considered in discussing British politics.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence , Volume 1 , Issue 2 , July 1988 , pp. 173 - 185
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 1988

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References

I am grateful to Desmond King. Harry Scheiber, Jack Tweedie, Jeremy Waldron, and the editors of this journal for comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

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