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Duress as a Vitiating Factor in Contract

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 January 2009

Jack Beatson
Jack Beatson
Affiliation:
Fellow of Merton College, Oxford.
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Extract

The notion that a real consensus ad idem is necessary in the formation of a contract valid at common law is currently an unfashionable one. It is, perhaps, for this reason that in recent years little attention has been paid to the effect of duress on the validity of contracts.

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Articles
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The Cambridge Law Journal , Volume 33 , Issue 1 , April 1974 , pp. 97 - 115
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge Law Journal and Contributors 1974

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References

1 Chilly on Contracts, 23rd ed., § 3; Anson's Law of Contract, 23rd ed., pp. 2–6; and see Upton R.D.C. v. Powell [1942] 1 All E.R. 220Google Scholar; Fredrick E. Rose (London) Ltd. v. William H. Pim Jnr. & Co. Ltd. [1953] 2 Q.B. 450, 460Google Scholar (per Denning L.J.).

2 Treitel, The Law of Contract, 3rd ed., pp. 344–345; Cheshire and Fifoot, The Law of Contract, 8th ed., pp. 280–281; Chitty, op. cit., § 348; Anson, op. cit., pp. 246–247.

3 The Law of Restitution (1966), p. 143Google Scholaret seq. The last category may involve either duress of the person or duress of goods.

4 Fraser v. Pendlebury (1861) 31 L.J.(n.s.)C.P. 1, 4 (per Byles J.); Carter v. Carter (1829) 5 Bing. 406, 409 (per Best C.J.); Goff and Jones, op. cit., p. 145. The cases cited deal with duress of goods, but they refuse to distinguish payments made as a result of such duress from payments made as a result of duress of the person.

5 See textbooks at n. 2, supra; Coke, 2 Inst. 483; Sheppard's Touchstone, p. 61; Kaufman v. Gerson [1904] 1 K.B. 591Google Scholar; Skeate v. Beale (1841) 11 Ad. & El. 983, 990; Scott v. Sebright (1886) 12 P.D. 21, 23. This last case is not strictly relevant because it concerned a marriage ceremony.

6 Astley v. Reynolds (1731) 2 Str. 915; T. D. Keegan Ltd. v. Palmer [1961]Google Scholar 2 Lloyd's Rep. 449.

7 Skeate v. Beale (1841) 11 Ad. & El. 983. The authorities cited in the textbooks (supra, n. 2) all depend on this case apart from The Unitas [1949] p. 205Google Scholar; [1950] A.C. 536 which also turned upon rules peculiar to prize law.

8 Textbooks cited at nn. 2, 5, supra; Atlee v. Backhouse (1838) 3 M. & W. 633, 650; Liverpool Marine Credit v. Hunter (1868) 3 Ch.App. 479, 487–488.

9 Notes 5, 6, supra.

10 Op. cit., pp. 143, 150–151.

11 Winfield, The Law of Quasi-Contracts (1952), p. 78. But see Goff and Jones, op. cit., p. 151, for a contrary view.

12 Attenborough, The Recovery of Stolen Goods and Goods Obtained by Fraud (1906), pp. 109–111.

13 Goff and Jones, op. cit., p. 144, and cases cited therein.

14 Dawson, 11 Tulane L.R. 345, 347–350; 45 Mich.L.R. 253; Stoljar, The Law of Quasi-Contract (1964), pp. 50–54.

15 Note 3, supra. Examples of this include illegal charges made a condition of the exercise of a right (Steele v. Williams (1853) 8 Ex. 625); demanding sums over and above the contract price as a condition of performance (Sundell & Sons v. Emm Yannoulatos (Overseas) Pty. Ltd. (1956) 56 S.R. (N.S.W.) 323).Google Scholar

16 Example B, supra.

17 Note 4, supra; see infra for a discussion of the payment/agreement distinction, especially nn. 67–69 which show that no distinction is made between categories of duress as far as payments are concerned.

18 Jackson, The History of Quasi-Contract (1936), pp. 66–71; Winfield, The Law of Quasi-Contracts (1952), pp. 63–67; Goff and Jones, op. cit., pp. 18–20.

19 Cook v. Wright (1861) 1 B. & S. 559 and Callisher v. Bischoffsheim (1870) L.R. 5 Q.B. 449 are generally taken as the origin of the rule: Treitel, op. cit., pp. 73–75; Cheshire and Fifoot, op. cit., pp. 70–71; Goff and Jones, op. cit., pp. 20, 76. See infra for a different view.

20 Brown v. M'Kinally (1795) 1 Esp. 279; Marriot v. Hampton (1797) 7 T.R. 269.

21 Ibid. and see n. 18, supra.

22 See Reynolds and Treitel (1965) 7 Malaya L.Rev. 1 for a discussion of “legal and “factual” detriment.

23 Jones v. Ashburnham (1804) 4 East 455.

24 Longridge v. Dorville (1821) 5 B. & Ald. 117; Haigh v. Brooks (1839) 10 Ad. & El. 309.

25 Longridge v. Dorville (supra, n. 24). There were conflicting decisions on the point at issue.

26 Haigh v. Brooks (supra, n. 24). There was ambiguity in the words of a guarantee.

27 Callisher v. Bischoffsheim (supra, n. 19).

28 Atlee v. Backhouse (1838) 3 M. & W. 633, and see infra.

29 Ibid. pp. 637–638.

30 Ibid. p. 650.

31 Ibid. p. 647 (per Abinger C.B.), pp. 650–651 (per Parke B. citing Longridge v. Dorville, supra, n. 24), p. 651 (per Bolland B.), pp. 652–653 (per Gurney B.).

32 (1861) 1 B. & S. 559, 568 (per Curiam), supra, n. 19. The fusion of the two doctrines is seen in Cook v. Wright where it was argued that a compromise could not be binding unless litigation had actually commenced.

33 (1838) 3 M. & W. 633, 643, 650 (per Parke B.). Parke B. also said that had they known it to be an illegal seizure there might be a question as to the validity of the agreement (Ibid. pp. 650–651). See also Miles v. New Zealand Alford Estate Co. (1886) 32 Ch.D. 266, 291.

34 (1861) 1 B. & S. 559.

35 Ibid. p. 569 (emphasis added).

36 Ibid. p. 570 (emphasis added).

37 (1870) L.R. 5 Q.B. 449.

38 Ibid. p. 452.

39 Ibid. p. 452. Blackburn J. quoted the second statement of the court in Cook v. Wright, without the first statement. The second statement, viewed out of context, might justify the interpretation he placed on it.

40 Miles v. New Zealand Alford Estate Co. (1886) 32 Ch.D. 266, 291 (per Bowen L.J.); Cheshire and Fifoot, op. cit., p. 71.

41 Cook v. Wright, supra, n. 34; Miles v. New Zealand Alford Estate Co. (1886) 32 Ch.D. 266, 284.

42 (1838) 3 M. & W. 633, 643, 651.

43 (1791) 4 T.R. 485.

44 See (1838) 3 M. & W. 633, 638–639.

45 (1861) 1 B. & S. 559, 567.

46 See infra for other examples of pressure beyond a claim and the probability of being sued.

47 (1841) 11 Ad. & El. 983.

48 (1731) 2 Str. 915.

49 Ibid. p. 916.

50 (1776) 1 Cowp. 414.

51 Ibid. p. 415.

52 Ibid. p. 417; see also Jackson, op. cit., pp. 71–72.

53 Ibid. p. 417.

54 (1794) 1 Esp. 84; Peake 276.

55 (1731) 2 Str. 915, 916; Kanhaya Lal v. National Bank of India (1913) 29 T.L.R. 314, 315; Ashmole v. Wainwright (1842) 2 Q.B. 837, 845; cf. some U.S.A. jurisdictions which use the adequateness of an alternative remedy to establish whether an act or a threat has coercive force: e.g. Miller v. Eisle, 168 A. 426, 431–432; Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Louis Dreyfus Corp., 249 F.Supp. 526, 530. The reason why an alternative remedy is not fatal in English law is that there is no consideration to support the payment (infra, n. 72), not that monetary compensation is inadequate (see Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort, p. 415 et seq.).

56 Chase v. Dwinal, 7 Greenf. 134, 139 (1830) explained the case on this basis. For the modern view, see Maskell v. Horner [1915] 3 K.B. 106Google Scholar, and nn. 81–82, infra.

57 (1838) 3 M. & W. 633.

58 Ibid. pp. 647, 650–651, 652–653; supra, n. 31 and text thereto.

59 (1841) 11 Ad. & El. 983.

60 (1776) 1 Cowp. 414.

61 (1794) 1 Esp. 84; Peake 276.

62 (1841) 11 Ad. & El. 983, 991. This view is supported by the interpretation of Knibbs v. Hall (n. 61) in Chase v. Dwinal (n. 56). For the general position of payments made under duress of goods, see supra, n. 6; infra, nn. 67–68. See Cook v. Wright (1861) 1 B. & S. 559, 564, where Crompton J. suggested in argument that because money paid could not have been recovered, therefore an agreement to pay in the same circumstances must have been binding. In other words, he rejects a sharp distinction between payments and agreements.

63 (1844) 6 Q.B. 276.

64 Ibid. p. 281. He also suggested that the judgment in Skeate v. Beale might have been delivered in terms “too general and extensive.” See also Ashmole v. Wainwright (1842) 2 Q.B. 837, 846 (per Coleridge J., who was also a judge in Skeate v. Beale).

65 Supra; Skeate v. Beale (1841) 11 Ad. & El. 983, 990; Atlee v. Backhouse (1838) 3 M. & W. 633, 650; Goff and Jones, op. cit., p. 150, nn. 90–91, cite other authority to this effect.

66 Rookes v. Barnard [1964]Google Scholar A.C. 1129, 1209 (per Lord Devlin); also Ibid, at pp. 1169, 1201. See infra for the view that as far as types of coercion are concerned, intimidation provides a fair analogy, but see Winfield (1944) 60 L.Q.R. 341, 345.

67 Fraser v. Pendlebury (1861) 31 L.J.(N.S.) C.P. 1, 4 (per Byles J.); Astley v. Reynolds (1731) 2 Str. 915; Valpy v. Manley (1845) 1 C.B. 594; Somes v. British Empire Shipping Co. (1860) 8 H.L.C. 338; Maskell v. Horner [1915] 3 K.B. 106Google Scholar; T. D. Keegan Ltd. v. Palmer [1961]Google Scholar 2 Lloyd's Rep. 449.

68 Carter v. Carter (1829) 5 Bing. 406, 409 (per Best C.J.).

69 The consequences of making such a distinction are stated by Treitel, op. cit., p. 345; Cheshire and Fifoot, op. cit., p. 281.

70 (1731) 2 Str. 915.

71 Skeate v. Beale (1841) 11 Ad. & El. 983, 990; Winfield, 60 L.Q.R. 341, 345; Goff and Jones, op. cit., p. 150, n. 65.

72 Treitel, op. cit., p. 73; Cheshire and Fifoot, op. cit., pp. 70–71; Winfield, The Law of Quasi-Contracts, p. 78; Re Hooper and Grass' Contract [1949] V.L.R. 269, 273; Sundell & Sons v. Emm Yannoulatos (Overseas) Pty Ltd (1956) 56 S.R.(N.S.W.) 323, 327.Google Scholar

73 Treitel, op. cit., pp. 78–86.

74 (1866) L.R. 1 C.P. 363; Re Hooper and Grass' Contract [1949]Google Scholar V.L.R. 269 (coerced party paid to third party, but recovered from the man who had acted coercively); Goff and Jones, op. cit., pp. 151–152.

75 Steele v. Williams is relevant here ((1853) 8 Ex. 625). An action for money had and received succeeded even though it appears that the coercive force was inoperative when the payment was made. S. wished to take extracts from a parish register, and W. told him that he would be charged. S. took the extracts, and it appears that he paid afterwards. It later turned out that the charge was excessive.

76 (1866) L.R. 1 C.P. 363, 372.

76a Sasportas v. Jennings, 1 Bay.(S.C.) 470, 475; Chamberlain v. Reed, 13 Me. 357 (1836). These cases applied Astley v. Reynolds (1731) 2 Str. 915.

77 Kaufman v. Gerson [1904] 1 K.B. 591Google Scholar; Williams v. Bayley (1866) L.R. 1 H.L. 200.

78 Supra; see Somes v. British Empire Shipping Co. (1860) 8 H.L.C. 338.

79 Close v. Phipps (1844) 7 Ma. & G. 586 (duress by mortgagee); Kanhaya Lal v. National Bank of India (1913) 29 T.L.R. 314Google Scholar (seizure of real property); Nixon v. Furphy (1925) 25 S.R.(N.S.W.) 151Google Scholar (refusal to complete contract for the sale of land).

80 Infra; Smith v. Sleap (1844) 12 M. & W. 585 (arguendo).

81 Bracton, De Legibus, fol. 16b–17; Notebook, pl. 182, 200, 229, 243, 750, 1126, 1643, 1913; Stoljar, op. cit., pp. 52–54.

81a [1915] 3 K.B. 106, 118; Carter v. Carter (1829) 5 Bing. 406, 409; Valpy v. Manley (1845) 1 C.B. 594, 603–604.

82 Goff and Jones, op. cit., p. 159.

83 Infra. Twyford v. Manchester Corporation [1946]Google Scholar Ch. 236 (right to work in corporation cemetery without payment of entry charges); Mason v. N.S.W. (1958) 102 C.L.R. 108Google Scholar (right to transport goods between states without a licence).

84 William Whiteley v. R. (1909) 101 L.T. 741Google Scholar; for criticisms, see Stoljar, op. cit., pp. 63–65, and Marsh, 62 L.Q.R. 333. See 13 Williston on Contracts (3rd ed.), § 1606.

85 Steele v. Williams (1853) 8 Ex. 625; Morgan v. Palmer (1824) 2 B. & C. 729: Great Western Ry. v. Sutton (1868) L.R. 4 H.L. 226.

86 Steele v. Williams (1853) 8 Ex. 625 (infra): Morgan v. Palmer (1824) 2 B. & C. 729 (licence to sell ale withheld until fee paid).

87 Atlee v. Backhouse (1838) 3 M. & W. 633 (liquor seized by customs officers); Irving v. Wilson (1791) 4 T.R. 485 (carts seized by revenue officers).

88 Mason v. N.S.W. (1958) 102 C.L.R. 108, 117Google Scholar (per Dixon C.J.).

89 (1853) 8 Ex. 625; Newdigate v. Davey (1693) 1 Ld. Raym. 742.

90 Ibid. p. 631. And see Stoljar, op. cit., pp. 59–61.

91 Mason v. N.S.W. (1958) 102 C.L.R. 108Google Scholar, 115, 117 (per Dixon C.J.).

92 Ibid. at pp. 126–127 (per Kitto J.); p. 146 (per Windeyer J.).

93 Ibid. at p. 117 (per Dixon C.J.); Stoljar, op. cit., pp. 62–67.

94 [1946] Ch. 236.

95 Ibid. at p. 241.

96 Ibid. at pp. 239, 242.

97 By Marsh, 62 L.Q.R. 333; Stoljar, op. cit., p. 66; Goff and Jones, op. cit., pp. 158–159.

98 (1860) 8 H.L.C. 338, cited at [1946] Ch. 236, 241.

99 op. cit., p. 159.

1 Mason v. N.S.W. (1958) 102 C.L.R. 108Google Scholar, 117 (per Dixon C.J.); 128–129 (per Kitto J.), see supra, n. 91.

2 Deacon v. Transport Regulation Board [1959]Google Scholar V.L.R. 458, 460; Mason v. N.S.W. (1958) 102 C.L.R. 108Google Scholar, 143, see supra, nn. 18–64 and text thereto.

3 Some jurisdictions have held that a threat may be wrongful even though the threatened act is lawful. 13 Williston on Contracts (3rd ed.), § 1607; Wolf v. Marlton Corp., 154 A. 2nd 625 is a good example. See Carter, v. Carter, 5 Bing. 406 for a possible development along these lines in England.

4 (1923) 34 C.L.R. 38.

5 Ibid. p. 56 (per Issacs J.), pp. 64–65 (per Higgins J.). See also Frauhauf S.W. Garment Co. v. U.S., 111 F.Supp. 945, 952 (1953)Google Scholar; Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Louis Dreyfus Corp., 249 F.Supp. 526, 529 (1955).Google Scholar

6 Ibid.; see also Nixon v. Furphy (1925) 25 S.R.(N.S.W.) 151Google Scholar, 159–160 (per Long Innes J.).

7 Astley v. Reynolds (1731) 2 Str. 915; Parker v. G.W. Ry. (1844) 7 Man. & G. 253, 285 (per Tindal C.J.); Valpy v. Manley (1845) 1 C.B. 594, 603; Somes v. British Empire Shipping Co. (1860) 8 H.L.C. 338; Kanhaya Lai v. National Bank of India (1913) 29 T.L.R. 314, 315Google Scholar; Maskell v. Horner [1915] 3 K.B. 106.Google Scholar

8 (1925) 25 S.R.(N.S.W.) 151.

9 (1956) 56 S.R.(N.S.W.) 323.

10 Rookes v. Barnard [1964]Google Scholar A.C. 1129; Morgan v. Fry [1968] 2 Q.B. 710.Google Scholar

11 J. T. Stratford & Sons Ltd. v. Lindley [1965]Google Scholar A.C. 269, 325.

12 Hoffman, 81 L.Q.R. 116, 127–128; Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort, Hamson [1964] C.L.J. 159, 168.

13 Supra, n. 55 and text thereto.

14 Morgan v. Fry [1968] 2 Q.B. 710, 724, 727, 733, 738Google Scholar, relying on Rookes v. Barnard [1964]Google Scholar A.C. 1129, 1218 (per Lord Devlin).

15 (1925) 25 S.R.(N.S.W.) 151.

16 (1956) 56 S.R.(N.S.W.) 323.

17 Manno v. Mutual Benefit Health and Accident Assoc., 187 N.Y.S. 2d 709, 712; 13 Williston on Contracts (3rd ed.), § 1616 and infra.

18 TriState Roofing Co. of Uniontown v. Simon, 142 A. 2d 333, 335 (no such injury because S. could have got another sub-contractor); Gallagher Switchboard Corp. v. Heckler Electric Co., 229 N.Y.S. 2d 623, 630 (items to be delivered unobtainable elsewhere).

19 Smith v. Charlick (1923) 34 C.L.R. 38Google Scholar, 56 (per Issacs J.), approved in Nixon v. Furphy (1925) 25 S.R.(N.S.W.) 323.Google Scholar

20 I gratefully acknowledge helpful criticisms made by Dr. L. S. Sealy and Mr. G. H. Treitel, but retain full responsibility for remaining faults.