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Changing National Business Systems: Corporate Governance and Financing in the Netherlands, 1945–2005

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 April 2011

Abe de Jong ,
Ailsa Röell  and
Gerarda Westerhuis
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Abstract

This study traces the evolution of corporate governance and financing structures in the Netherlands during the second half of the twentieth century. A description of Dutch shareholder rights, fi nancing structures, and networks of directors reveals the changes that have occurred in many aspects of the Dutch corporate system over the course of six decades. The case of Royal Ahold illustrates some of the developments that have taken place. Most indicate a transition from a coordinated market economy to a more liberal system. The internationalization of the Dutch economy, which has played an important role in the transition of the system, is reflected in the expansion of Dutch firms beyond the national borders and in the growing number of foreign investors in Dutch fi rms.

Type
National Business Systems: Focus on the Netherlands
Information
Business History Review , Volume 84 , Issue 4: Business History and Varieties of Capitalism , Winter 2010 , pp. 773 - 798
Copyright
Copyright © The President and Fellows of Harvard College 2010

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