While the West is struggling to find a way out of recession, emerging markets present myriad opportunities for growth. This paper offers a new perspective on how global economic triangulation facilitates trade between regions. Triangulation occurs where barriers exist to trade and investment between two countries and a third party (e.g., a country) acts as a facilitator or bridge. The “bridge model,” as we call it, shifts the focus away from national policy as a facilitator of international trade and emphasizes the role of companies. Corporate bridge-building is essentially a form of economic triangulation, and we use the terms “bridge” and “triangulation” interchangeably. Various examples are cited to show how Spanish multinational companies have served as a bridge connecting Asia and Latin America, and in so doing have expanded their own business. Thanks to their links with both regions they create business relationships that might otherwise be impeded by cultural or language barriers, facilitating the flow of products, knowledge and financial resources. In this way firms in otherwise stagnating economies have an opportunity to grow by facilitating trade and investment between emerging markets via the bridge model.

Why do voters shun some business tycoons yet elect others into power? As structural conditions facilitate the entry of super-wealthy actors into politics, the differential electoral support across business elites suggests a puzzle. We conceptualize four mechanisms behind the popular support for “tycoon candidates”: competence signaling, framing, fame, and clientelism. To test their relative efficacy, we leverage an experiment embedded in a nationally representative survey in South Africa, an important developing democracy where certain tycoons are successfully running for office. We find that, across distinct electoral appeals by tycoon candidates, clientelism is particularly effective, especially for mobilizing support from the less affluent voters. Racial framing significantly decreases support among white voters. Meanwhile, tycoons’ competence signaling or fame do not help them at the ballot box. By identifying the micro-level underpinnings of voter support across tycoon candidates, our study contributes to the literatures on business and politics, voting behavior, and clientelism.

Studies inspired by the varieties of capitalism (VoC) approach suggest that in coordinated market economies, some employer associations support public social policies to encourage the workforce to invest in company and industry-specific skills (VoC thesis). Yet the VoC thesis remains disputed. We present and assess an alternative thesis that builds on employers’ interest in the protection of labor supply (labor supply thesis). We test the labor supply thesis using a systematic content analysis of 370 press releases issued from 2002 to 2017 and find evidence of moderate employer support for more labor-activating social policies and less labor-protective social policies. Moreover, the analysis shows a decline in preference heterogeneity, with the positions of the four German employer associations converging toward the end of the period analyzed. Our findings have theoretical and methodological implications: First, they point to the relevance of labor supply as a source of employers’ social policy preferences. Second, they point to the need for a more systematic measurement of employer policy positions to be able to compare positions accurately.

Our aim with this special issue on the future of artificial intelligence (AI) politics, policy, and business is to give space to considering how the balalnce between risk and reward from AI technologies is and perhaps should be pursued by the public and private sectors. Ultimately, private firms and regulators will need to work collaboratively, given the complex networks of actors involved in AI development and deployment and the potential for the technology to alter existing policy regimes. We begin the introduction of this special issue of Business & Politics with a discussion of the growth in AI technology use and discussions of appropriate governance, followed by a consideration of how AI-related politics, policy, and business intersect. We then summarize the contributions of the authors in this issue and conclude with thoughts about how political science, public administration, and public policy scholars have much to offer, as well as much to study, the establishment of effective AI governance.

China's maritime militia groups have attracted much scholarly attention in recent years. Systematically funded and trained by the Chinese authorities, the militia groups help advance China's maritime claims but risk both intended and unintended physical clashes at sea. Based on the 2001 Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, this study explores the possibility of establishing and recognizing China's state responsibility in relation to the internationally wrongful conduct of its maritime militia. China's maritime militia groups blur the line between fishing boats and naval forces. In essence, they are empowered to perform the critical function of the Chinese government as provided by Chinese internal laws. As shown by emerging evidence, China's maritime militia groups are also instructed, directed, and/or controlled by the Chinese state organs including military authority and party leadership, both central and local. This study finds that the conduct of Chinese maritime militia constitutes the breach of China's international obligations in terms of (1) due regard for other states, (2) maritime safety, (3) marine environment protection and preservation, and/or (4) the overfishing ban.

The rapid emergence of artificial intelligence (AI) technology and its application by businesses has created a potential need for governmental regulation. While the federal government of the United States has largely sidestepped the issue of crafting law dictating limitations and expectations regarding the use of AI technology, US state legislatures have begun to take the lead in this area. Nonetheless, we know very little about how state legislatures have approached the design, pursuit, and adoption of AI policy and whether traditional political fault lines have manifested themselves in the AI issue area. Here, we gather data on the state-level adoption of AI policy, as well as roll call voting on AI bills (classified on the basis of consumer protection versus economic development), by state legislatures and analyze the political economy of AI legislation. We find that rising unemployment and inflation are negatively associated with a state’s AI policymaking. With respect to individual legislator support, we find that liberal lawmakers and Democrats are more likely to support bills establishing consumer protection requirements on AI usage. The results suggest that economic concerns loom large with AI and that traditional political fault lines may be establishing themselves in this area.

This article explores market reactions to regulations that addressed the link between armed conflict and the diamond industry. The results show that several regulatory actions taken by the United Nations and the United States in the early 2000s corresponded with lower stock returns for diamond mining companies. Such effects are inconsistent with predictions made by some critics of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. On the other hand, stock returns for jewelry companies were abnormally negative for events that hurt the reputation of conflict-free production and trade regimes. The expansion of legal diamond markets also coincided with abnormally positive returns for jewelry companies, while new restrictions on market access coincided with abnormally negative returns. The results suggest that i) diamond trade regulations affected businesses in important and measurable ways, and ii) that similar regulations may have broader applicability in related industries.

What explains the variation in countries’ propensity to engage in austerity policy? Economic and political country-level factors are the paramount explanations in the literature. Nevertheless, variation in fiscal preferences at the executive level remains underexplored, except for ideology. Moreover, budget decisions are endogenous to the state of the economy, thus casting doubt on standard measures based on the debt and/or deficit ratio. This article contributes to the literature in two ways. First, I turn to the individual level of analysis and suggest that leaders with business experience are more likely to pursue a balanced budget and tend to implement fiscal consolidation policies based on spending cuts. Second, I ease concerns about individuals’ self-selection into office by relying on fiscal adjustments that are weakly orthogonal to the economic cycle. The statistical analysis of a panel of 17 OECD countries between 1978 and 2014 confirms the theoretical expectations. The results are robust to a variety of specification and statistical methodologies and hold for a subset of as-if random leadership transitions following close elections. A case study of Brian Mulroney's governments in Canada (1984–93) further illustrates the argument.

The examination of the U.S.—Japan conflicts from the mid-1980s to early 1990s over the space industry sheds light on our understanding of the Japanese political economy. The Japanese response to U.S. pressure was not so strategic as conventional wisdom suggests. Under U.S. pressure, Japan shifted to international cooperation, abandoning the autonomous development policy it had sought for four decades. This unexpected policy change primarily resulted from the lack of clear jurisdictional authority among the government actors over the rapidly changing space industry. This study's findings will apply to other high technology industries such as telecommunications and information technology, where bureaucratic boundaries are ambiguous and technological change is rapid.

South Korea and Singapore display distinctive patterns of social provision. The Singaporean welfare state has served as the primary provider of social infrastructure and services, whereas the South Korean welfare state has developed its primary role in supporting income maintenance. These differences are not well accounted for in the existing literature, which focuses on similarities between the two regimes. This paper shows that deep institutional legacies in the two countries’ respective financial structures powerfully shaped their unique social policy instruments. In South Korea, where financial openness was low and firms relied on relationship-based financing, the corresponding long-term perspectives on production and employment encouraged the private provision of welfare-related infrastructure and services. In Singapore, where firms have relied heavily on arm's length financing, the corresponding flexible investment and employment perspectives encouraged the utilization of private income maintenance arrangements. Each country's government prioritized the mode of social provision that the firms were less willing to engage in. These findings suggest that financial liberalization may be an important determinant of welfare regimes in developing countries.

Campaign finance reform is the subject of ongoing public policy debates in many modern democratic societies. In the United States, individuals and interest groups from across the ideological spectrum have proposed or embraced a variety of campaign finance reforms in attempts to alter the electoral landscape. At least one recent presidential candidate highlighted the issue of campaign finance reform which appear to resonate with voters, as part of a broader strategy to secure his party's nomination. Many of these reforms propose to alter the sources and uses of financial resources in Congressional elections.

Scholars have long held that partisan politics cause aggregate-level fluctuations in markets. However, if investors hold different policy preferences, the effects of election campaigns on their behavior should be more nuanced. In particular, investors in economic sectors benefiting from neo-liberal economic policies might respond favorably to gains in support by right-leaning candidates, whereas those expected to profit from state-led economic development might react favorably to gains by left-leaning contenders. To test these propositions, I examine stock market performance by economic sector during Mexico's 2006 presidential race. Statistical analysis of pre-election polls and stock market returns during the campaign reveals that, although investors did not react to potential partisan policy change in the ways originally expected, they did respond to polling news differently by economic sector. The findings demonstrate the importance of disaggregating stock, bond, and currency markets according to economic criteria, and thus the limitations of aggregate level analysis for research on politics and markets.

Beginning in the early 70s, ACME, a highly innovative and successful U.S. chemical firm, began commercializing an important and versatile polymer invention. This case study chronicles the many travails faced by ACME in obtaining patent protection for its innovations in major developed economies. ACME's experiences suggest that international differences in patent regimes that stem from ideological, historical, and institutional differences are pervasive, and need to be accounted for in a company's patenting approach. International strategy in the patent area is thus inherently multi-domestic. Further, we also observe that in global industries, obtaining a modicum of exclusivity through strong patent protection in certain key markets may be adequate to preserve a firm's competitive advantage versus multinational rivals. Moreover, a firm's patent strategy seems intrinsically integrated with its continuing innovative and commercial performance.

Why do business leaders support or oppose interstate wars? This article clarifies and empirically illustrates two competing perspectives on the sources of business war preferences: the opinions businesses have about interstate conflict. Namely, while an “economic consequences” perspective argues that business war preferences stem primarily from the economic effects of interstate conflicts, a “leader ideology” perspective predicts that business leaders’ domestic policy preferences and political ideology will determine their war preferences. I reexamine historical survey data on American business leaders’ opinions about the Vietnam War using item response theory scaling and regression analysis and find support for both perspectives. These results point toward the importance of further theoretical and empirical research on the sources of business war preferences, so I propose a structured, forward-looking research agenda on business war preferences based on different conceptualizations of businesses, their motivations, and the consequences of interstate conflicts.