Since the 1970s many firms expanded their operations across national borders and were restructured to fit the changing economic conditions during these times of economic globalization. Using a sociological approach to transnational firms, in this article the authors research the consequences of these developments for the responsibility of two transnational firms towards their employees in the Netherlands. These firms experienced a shift in their dual embeddedness in national and transnational economic fields, with the latter gaining importance. In response, they adjusted their corporate policies and structure to fit the competitive conditions of these fields, causing a centralization of their corporate labor policy on the transnational level, the polarization of this policy and the instrumentalization of labor and labor policy. This also meant that their responsibility for their employees was restructured and reduced.

Political economists have paid increasing attention to distinctions between exporting and nonexporting firms, particularly with regard to their preferences on trade policy liberalization. A multitude of past studies focusing on economically advanced democracies characterized exporters as a small, elite group of large and highly productive firms, but this profile of a prototypical exporter is not necessarily representative of the body of firms operating under different domestic contexts. Using current and methodologically consistent cross-national surveys of firms conducted by the World Bank, this paper re-evaluates the link between certain firm-level characteristics and firms’ propensity to export, taking into account how national-level political, economic, and geographic conditions affect these relationships. The pooled sample of firms from approximately 100 countries spanning different political regimes and levels of development confirms that, generally speaking, exporters are large, productive, and innovative. However, in less democratic and less developed settings, productivity and innovation do not appear to be a prerequisite to export orientation. When developing generalizable theories of firms’ participation in the policymaking process, we must therefore be careful not to treat export behavior as an unqualified predictor of pro-free-trade attitudes.

This paper examines the influence of three different forms of global economic engagement on the lobbying behavior of US businesses with regard to trade relations with China: (a) input sourcing; (b) downstream export; and (c) vertical foreign direct investment. It will be hypothesized that firms involved in all three forms of global economic activities should have incentives to lobby over China-related trade issues in order to maintain unimpeded access to sources of supply or markets and to ensure the smooth operation of the entire supply chain. Going further, drawing on the exit-voice framework developed by Albert Hirschman (1972), it will be argued that compared to firms in those industries mainly involved in input sourcing from China, American multinational corporations that have verticalized their production should have even stronger incentives to engage in lobbying activities and “voice” their policy preferences due to their greater “sunk costs” and hence the higher cost of “exit.” Statistical analysis of the China trade-related lobbying activities of US firms between 2006 and 2016 lends substantial support to these conjectures.

Although the global economy has flourished in the current global economic governance regime, the foundations of this order are starting to crumble. Both in trade and in finance, the existing institutions are under severe stress. In trade, more and more countries undermine the WTO by implementing preferential trade agreements. In finance, the IMF has been weak for most of this decade, although it experienced a revival in the current crisis. First and foremost, this weakness of the institutions of global economic governance is the result of policies implemented by the transatlantic powers. Both the European Union and the United States are actively pursuing policies that weaken the existing institutions. In trade, there is a large gap between the official rhetoric, which highlights the importance of the multilateral regime, and the trade policy practice, which is weakening the WTO. In finance, the transatlantic powers have until very recently blocked any progress in the IMF with regard to lending policies. In addition, the EU continues to defend its unjustified overrepresentation in the IMF's governance structures. The article suggests that one of the key explanations for this development is the weak support for globalization in most OECD-countries. Confronted with no enthusiasm for globalization in their domestic constituencies, policy makers in Europe and the United States are increasingly opting for policies that will, over time, erode the existing regimes of global economic governance.

We know from observation that some democracies intervene deeply in their domestic economies while others adopt a more laissez faire approach. Can we explain these differences solely with ideology, or are other political influences also at work? I argue in this paper that elected leaders sometimes opt for hefty economic regulation purely to generate sources of patronage that can be used to maintain their political positions. Leaders are most tempted to take this approach, I contend, when their political parties are not stably linked to sources of electoral support. Unstably linked governing parties will tend to have very short time horizons, focusing on the immediate objective of avoiding massive vote losses in the next election. As a result, they will be less concerned with the potential future damage that a patronage-based policy may inflict on the national economy. I find support for this argument with a close examination of Indian economic policy under Indira Gandhi. Prime Minister Gandhi, I contend, increased the Indian state's control over trade, industrial production, and credit allocation just as the Congress Party's linkages to the electorate were destabilizing.

Among the triggers of the Egyptian Revolution are the sentiments of resentment against the convoluted alliances between private businesses and policymakers that deprived the masses of their fair share of the high GDP growth. But does this indictment extend to the Egyptian banking sector? Based on a field survey and a dataset of 3218 business loans made by 33 banks during 1999–2010, this research differentiates between growth catalysts and crony coalitions within the Egyptian banking sector. The results of the Generalized Estimating Equations reveal that preferential lending to politically-connected businesses has a negative impact on employment and income distribution. Loans to small and medium enterprises and public firms help enhance income distribution and job generation, albeit that the soft-budget constraint on loans to public firms deters growth. The paper presents some policy recommendations that could help exorcise patrimonialism and clientelism and enhance growth alliances within the sector that controls most of the credit flow in the Egyptian economy. The study is not only of grave importance to the Egyptian nation whose members are actively engaged in refurbishing its institutional framework, but is of equal significance to other emerging economies that are keen to install equity, political stability and socioeconomic prosperity.

There is a continuing need for an analytical approach to institutional change, especially as applied to incremental, agent-driven change. Important institutional change can be incremental and not necessarily linked to immediate crisis. Institutional adjustments initiated by actors in the course of meeting specific economic and political goals can unblock systemic bottlenecks leading to improved economic performance. Aggregate incremental change could also lead to system evolution that deviates significantly from the original system model. This paper presents an approach that engages agent impact on the institutional system, and the political or social motives for action; the two-tiered approach moves away from the categories described in Varieties of Capitalism, one of the more influential approaches to analyzing institutional impact in an economy. Instead of static national categories, the approach presented in this paper differentiates between defining institutions and instrumental institutions, the differences in ease and speed of change which characterize each institutional tier, and how the system's evolution is impacted by the combined effect of changes in each tier. Differentiating between institutions in this manner, the paper provides an approach that is more flexible in explaining the interactions between agents and institutions, and the changes which may result.

This paper tackles the question of trade strategy and differential economic performance in Latin America, with a focus on the four countries—Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico—most important for the successful completion of a full Western Hemispheric integration scheme. The analysis distinguishes between a ‘standard’ market strategy that assigns the task of economic adjustment to market forces, and a ‘competitive’ strategy that more actively employs a range of public policies to facilitate adjustment and correct for instances of market failure. The choices of strategy are explored against the backdrop of international pressures, government business relations, and institutional reform within the state. Two main conclusions are drawn: first, the competitive strategy strongly correlates with more favorable macro- and microeconomic outcomes and, second, mediocre economic performance under a standard market strategy has undermined the spirit of collective action that will be necessary to forge ahead at the hemispheric level.

This paper examines the attitudes of multinational corporations (MNCs) toward the U.S.-China trade war through an original survey of China-based MNC subsidiaries in the manufacturing industry. Our argument is in two parts. First, firms that have relocated production outside of China or are considering such moves should be less likely to oppose the trade war as they possess outside options that reduce their vulnerability to trade restrictions. Second, firms’ tendency toward production relocation can in turn be explained by their local sourcing dependence, as measured by the level of such dependence and the degree to which their operations require supplier certification. This is because firms more heavily embedded in local supplier networks face stronger resource dependence that increases organizational inertia, reducing their ability to switch to alternative suppliers and therefore relocating production to other destinations. Our findings corroborate our hypotheses, highlighting how the heterogeneity in MNCs’ supply chain relationships may influence both their manufacturing relocation decisions and trade policy preferences.

What explains the design of international institutions? Existing research has largely neglected how experience in cooperation in one set of international institutions impacts on design choices made by states in other globally-oriented institutions. We contribute to this evolving debate by analyzing spillovers in experience in international trade. We argue that countries' track record of interaction in multilateral trade disputes affects the design of their preferential trade agreements (PTAs). If a country participates in a complaint against a prospective PTA partner at the World Trade Organization (WTO), the challenge in Geneva alerts the defendant's import-competing industries with respect to potential challenges under the planned PTA. As a result, these industries exert pressure on their government to preserve leeway under the future treaty, leading to increased flexibility and a lower level of enforcement in the PTA. We find support for our hypotheses in an empirical analysis of 347 PTAs concluded post 1990.

The existing literature in public policy has commented mostly on mature and established businesses, leaving the relationships between entrepreneurial businesses and public policies less explored. Relying on qualitative research methods and quantitative surveys, we examine how managers in an intensively regulated entrepreneurial setting assessed the desirability of public policies. We show that managers in the regulated energy efficiency and renewable (EERE) business sector in the 1990s tended to view public policies favorably only if they lacked control over the business environment. The less control they perceived they had over the business environment, the more favorably they tended to view public policies. Our findings suggest that managers in a regulated entrepreneurial setting tend to view public policies as substitutes for their efforts to control their business environment, not as complements, as studies of mature and established companies in regulated settings commonly find. However, we also find some evidence to suggest these perceptions may evolve, as a business experiences greater success attracting customers.

Since deregulation in 1980, there has been a major shift in antitrust enforcement to the states, specifically to state attorneys general (AGs). For advocates of deregulation, this move has had important unintended consequences. Specifically, it has allowed antitrust litigation to become hitched to the political incentives of AGs. Analysis of a panel dataset of all state antitrust actions between 1990 and 2008 suggests that antitrust enforcement by state attorneys general appears to follow electoral cycles, which is especially pronounced depending on specific institutional constraints that exist between the states.

We study how rich shareholders use their political influence to deregulate firms that they own, thus skewing the income distribution towards themselves. Individuals differ in productivity and choose how much labor to supply. High productivity individuals also own shares in the productive sector and thus earn capital income. All individuals vote over a linear tax rate on (labor and capital) income whose proceeds are redistributed lump sum. Shareholders also lobby in order to ease the price cap imposed on the private firm. We first solve analytically for the Kantian equilibrium of this lobbying game together with the majority voting equilibrium over the tax rate. We then proceed to a comparative statics analysis of the model with the help of numerical simulations. We obtain that, as the capital income distribution becomes more concentrated among the top productivity individuals, increased lobbying effort generates efficiency as well as equity costs, with lower labor supply and lower average utility levels in society.

This article systematically examines how access of business groups and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to the executive branch of the European Union varies across political heads, civil servants, and an understudied yet critical intermediary figure of the executive branch: political advisers. Building upon exchange theory, we argue that the occurrence of a meeting between public officials and interest groups depends on information and legitimacy sought and offered by both types of actors, the public officials’ public exposure, and the interest groups’ lobbying strategies. The empirical analysis is focused on the executive body of the European Union (i.e., the European Commission). Our results show that, while political advisers and civil servants are more likely to meet with business groups than with NGOs, political heads are not biased in favor of any of these two groups.

This article examines the responses of the US Chamber of Commerce and state- and local-level chambers of commerce to Black Lives Matter (BLM). The US Chamber of Commerce's Equality of Opportunity Initiative stresses the business case for racial equity and the economic benefits that can be attained by overcoming race-related inequalities. Many chambers are adopting racially progressive positions, often at some cost to themselves. This article contributes a typology of stances and actions and draws on interviews with American business leaders to characterize American business organization responses to BLM. There is some movement beyond a progressive neoliberal vision of nondiscrimination to acknowledge that it is necessary to “level the playing field.” And the Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) initiatives of state- and regional-level chambers suggest that they are making genuine and, in some cases, bold and meaningful attempts to advance the cause of racial equity. The evidence suggests that popular mobilization and social pressure following George Floyd's brutal murder played a critical role in enabling this progress. However, the parallels and similarities between current chamber and business DEI efforts and business stances in the tumultuous 1960s and 1970s raise the question: Can current efforts succeed where previous efforts have failed?

Firms and governments often negotiate economic development deals, such as tax abatements, with limited transparency, using exceptions to public records laws or other strategies for nondisclosure. In this article we explore the motivations of firms for keeping economic development deals out of the public eye. We explore legal challenges to public records requests for deal-specific, company-specific participation in a state economic development incentive program. By examining applications for participation in a major state economic program, the Texas Enterprise Fund, we find that a company is more likely to challenge a formal public records request if it has renegotiated the terms of the award to reduce its job-creation obligations. We interpret this as companies challenging transparency when they have avoided being penalized for noncompliance by engaging in nonpublic renegotiations. These results provide evidence regarding those conditions that prompt firms to challenge transparency and illustrate some of the limitations of safeguards such as clawbacks (or incentive-recapture provisions) when such reforms aren't coupled with robust transparency mechanisms. We speculate that the main motivation for these challenges is to limit scrutiny of these deals that could lead to backlashes against future economic development agreements.

Why do some countries indulge in urban bias, potentially harming economic development in the process, while others promote a vibrant agricultural sector? Two main explanations have been put forth. On the one hand, market failures, due to information asymmetries, mean that farmers who dearly require credit to succeed are shut out of lending markets, even if lenders could potentially benefit from making loans more readily available. On the other hand, political failures, due to state capture, mean that farmers will be subject to implicit taxes as a way of generating rents for politically powerful, industrial interests in the city. This paper builds on the latter view and corroborates [Bates, Robert. 1981. Markets and States in Tropical Africa. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.] insight that the state might have its own fiscal reasons for indulging in urban bias since both infant industries in the manufacturing sector and monopsony endowing marketing boards in the agricultural sector potentially provide easy-to-collect revenues. I adduce cross-national empirical support for the fiscal roots view that is robust across measures of state capacity and instrumental variables. A case study of Mexico also provides supporting evidence.

In recent decades, both South Korea and Taiwan have made remarkable leaps in the development and production of semiconductors-the core element in burgeoning global telecommunications, computer, and computer equipment industries. Although many aspects of their sectoral industrial strategies have differed, both countries are now moving aggressively to adapt their semiconductor industries to turbulent global markets. In the wake of the severe regional financial crisis that began in 1997, this case study compares and contrasts continuing processes of adaptation among primary semiconductor manufacturers in the two countries. The crisis had observable effects, especially in Korea, but it was not deep enough to force fundamental adjustments in either country. In the early days of the industry in both places, a sense of vulnerability-the need to come from behind-gave rise to quite different corporate structures and attendant strategies. Remarkable differences persist in the ways in which the South Korean and Taiwanese semiconductor firms are seeking new advantages in rapidly changing regional and global markets. Strategic change and structural continuity mark the attempt of two relatively small countries to stay competitive in a key industry.

For the first time in modern history, free trade coexists with free finance. Free trade and free finance (defined as the deregulation and internationalization of banking and finance) are not mutually reinforcing, but cause a mismatch between the demand and supply of financial instruments. Investors want more marketable instruments whereas entrepreneurs want more transaction-specific instruments. This mismatch potentially hurts small firms and local interests most. What can they do about it? It depends on state institutions. The more centralized the state, the fewer opportunities available to potential losers to curb free finance. Free finance is most successful in centralized countries, where resistance to free finance is least strongly felt. This hypothesis is systematically tested on a sample of OECD countries.

Reform of the multilateral trade regime is not simply a second order problem within a wider economic crisis. The completion of the Doha Round may be a second order question but the global trade regime faces a series of broader systemic challenges beyond the completion of the current negotiations. This paper identifies five challenges: (i) a marked reduction in popular support for open markets in major OECD countries; (ii) the stalling of a transition from one global economic equilibrium to another; (iii) a lack of clarity and agreement on the agenda and objectives for the WTO as we move deeper into the 21st century; (iv) the demand for fairness and justice in the governance of the WTO'the ‘legitimacy’ question and (v) the rise of regional preferentialism as a challenge to multilateralism. Failure to address these challenges will represent not only a fundamental question for the future of the WTO as the guarantor of the norms and rules of the global trade regime specifically, but also the ability to establish greater coherence in global economic governance overall when its need is arguably greater than at any time since the depression years of the 20th century inter-war period.