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Trade Associations as Industry Reputation Agents: A Model of Reputational Trust

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 January 2017

Andrew Tucker
Andrew Tucker*
Affiliation:
University College London
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Abstract

Scholars have started to focus on the ways in which firms manage their reputations through collective action. Collective reputation management is most often carried out through trade associations (TAs). But what do these TAs actually do? How do they further their members' interests with stakeholders like regulators, industry financial analysts, employees, suppliers, and the media? Informed by a rich set of 43 qualitative interviews with the trade associations (TAs) representing the UK's 24 largest business sectors, the paper builds a model of the reputational incentives that drives the dynamic relationship between trade associations, firms and multiple stakeholder groups. The paper's preliminary empirical research coupled with the conceptual model provides five directions for future research.

Keywords

trade associationsindustry reputationreputational trustcollective action
Type
Article
Information
Business and Politics , Volume 10 , Issue 1 , April 2008 , pp. 1 - 26
Copyright
Copyright © V.K. Aggarwal 2008 and published under exclusive license to Cambridge University Press 

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