The appearance of a Republican majority among Southern members of the US House of Representatives provides a substantive reason to reconsider political change in the post-war South. And a newly created, merged dataset makes it possible to address the central and recurrent propositions about change in Southern politics in a manner not previously possible. When this is done, four basic contributions are highlighted, each a clear modification of the standard story. The main impetus for partisan change proves to be economic development, and a changing politics of economic interest. The main brake on this impetus proves to be legal desegregation, and a changing politics of racial identity. Several indirect interactions of race and class then enhance the impact of both contributions, while their joint impact is also powerfully shaped by the strategic response of partisan elites: by the appearance of Republican challengers but, especially, by the practical resistance of Democratic incumbents.

Administrative centralization has been a fact of life in France since Louis XIV. Political analysts have alternately praised the system as ‘the envy of all Europe’ and condemned it as ‘a glittering example of “blockage” in our society’. Very few of them have, however, made any serious effort to study the impact of centralized structures on local governments. The literature is remarkable for the absence of empirical research on the exercise of power by elected local officials in France.

Adopted in 1913, the 17th Amendment to the US Constitution requires that members of the US Senate be elected by citizens of their respective states. This article is concerned with understanding what factors have influenced Senate election outcomes and how their effects have changed over time. I focus on three independent variables, state partisan composition, incumbency, and national partisan tides, and then develop a model of Senate election outcomes that allows their effects to change from election year to election year. The results reveal substantial variability and lead to a new and detailed understanding of Senate elections in the United States. The significance of the findings is further demonstrated by showing how the effects of the independent variables have affected actual election outcomes.

What is the relationship between debt and the welfare state? Recent arguments suggest that credit markets fill gaps left by limited social benefits but often rest on thin empirical grounds. This article makes two contributions to this debate by using micro-level panel data and leveraging variation in welfare state generosity across US states and over time. First, it shows that households that experience unemployment borrow significantly more in states where unemployment benefits are low compared to states where benefits are high. A 10-percentage-point decrease in unemployment replacement rates increases debt levels by about 30 per cent, or $5,300. Secondly, the article documents that rising indebtedness in the context of weak social policies has political consequences and increases support for a stronger safety net. One explanation is that voters seek social protection against downstream debt-induced economic risks. These findings suggest that welfare states can play a critical role in mitigating growing indebtedness.

This article is a comparative study of the relationship between social movements and the individual rights of citizenship. It identifies three main connections between collective action and individual rights made in theory and history, and analyses them in the context of modern authoritarian regimes. It does so by measuring both social mobilization and the presence of rights over time in Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Spain, and analyses their mutual impact statistically – both within and across these national cases. The results demonstrate the mutual impact between rights and movements, and more importantly, constitute a robust defence of democracy as the direct result of collective struggles for individual rights.

Empirical studies show that many governments gear the provision of goods and services towards their ethnic peers. This article investigates governments’ strategies to provide ethnic favors in Africa. Recent studies of ethnic favoritism find that presidents' ethnic peers and home regions enjoy advantages, yet cannot disentangle whether goods are provided to entire regions or co-ethnic individuals. This article argues that local ethnic demography determines whether governments provide non-excludable public goods or more narrowly targeted handouts. Where government co-ethnics are in the majority, public goods benefit all locals regardless of their ethnic identity. Outside of these strongholds, incumbents pursue discriminatory strategies and only their co-ethnics gain from favoritism. Using fine-grained geographic data on ethnic demographics, the study finds support for the argument's implications in the local incidence of infant mortality. These findings have important implications for theories of distributive politics and conflict in multi-ethnic societies.

William Riker is one of the most influential political scientists at present writing on the theory and practice of democracy. A quick count on my part of the Social Science Citation Index, normally a Siva of academic reputations, revealed nearly one thousand entries under Riker's name between 1971 and the beginning of 1982. Not only is his work frequently cited, it is read long after it is originally published. The Theory of Political Coalitions, probably his best known work, was published in 1962, and is still seriously discussed by those engaged in the empirical study of political coalitions. Moreover, Riker has always been anxious to show the relevance of technical work in political science to the political philosophy of democracy. His work therefore represents not simply an impressive scholarly and academic achievement, but also an important contribution to the more wide-ranging public debate about the nature and value of democracy.

The relationship between median citizen opinion on the left–right dimension, as measured in the Eurobarometer and European Electoral Studies series of surveys, and the left–right positions of governments in West European democracies is explored to gain a fuller understanding of how and to what extent median opinion may influence what governments subsequently set out to do. The analysis allows for the possibility that measurement may not be equivalent across countries and surveys, that the data may contain significant dynamic effects, and that different countries may exhibit different relationships between the two variables. The analyses show that changes in the citizen median generally produce larger changes in government position, the size depending mainly on the proportionality of the electoral system.

We explore the reasons for the unexpected defeat of Winston Churchill's Conservatives by Labour in the British general election of 1945. Was the outcome a result of Churchill's election campaign errors, as many have supposed, or did the coming-of-age of a new political generation make it a foregone conclusion? Much controversy in the partisanship literature centres on whether electoral realignments result primarily from conversion of existing voters or from mobilization of previously non-voting individuals. In particular, the 1930s US realignment has been the focus of considerable debate. In this article we shed new light on realignment processes by examining the 1945 British realignment that brought the Labour party to power. We find that, in this more straightforward case, the critical impetus came from new voters rather than from converts. Our findings raise questions that need to be confronted in the analysis of other realignments, such as that accompanying the American New Deal. They also shed new light on a much-interpreted episode in British electoral history.

The First World War is often cited as proof par excellence of the flaws in the liberal peace argument because the adversaries it engaged had been each other’s major pre-war trading partners. Although commonly assumed to have wreaked havoc on the trade of the states it engaged, the war’s impact on commerce has rarely been rigorously examined. Using an original dataset, this study shows that the Great War triggered substitution processes that reduced its trade-related costs. Although recourse to second-best alternatives always induces efficiency losses, the costs of adjustment were small relative to the other costs that states incurred during the war. The analysis shows that the Great War is not the egregious exception to the theory that conventional wisdom has long assumed it to be. At the same time, it makes clear that the deterrent power of trade varies inversely with belligerents’ ability to access the markets of alternative trading partners.

Across Western democracies, immigration has become one of the most polarizing and salient issues, with public discourses and individual attitudes often characterized by misperceptions. This condition undermines people's ability to develop informed opinions on the matter and runs counter to the ideal of deliberative democracy. Yet, our understanding of what makes immigration so prone to misperceptions is still limited – a conundrum that this review seeks to answer in three steps. First, we take stock of the existing evidence on the nature of misperceptions about immigration. Secondly, we borrow from diverse bodies of literature to identify their motivational underpinnings and elaborate on how the protection of group identity, the defence of self-interest and security concerns can lead to distorted perceptions of immigration. Thirdly, we highlight relevant determinants of misperceptions at the level of both contextual influences and individual predispositions. We conclude that misperceptions about immigration are ubiquitous and likely to remain a key element of immigration politics.

Research has highlighted the role of the state in sustaining authoritarian regimes. But how does state capacity support autocrats during elections? The author argues that one specific aspect of state capacity – control over territory through the state apparatus – helps autocrats ensure large majority electoral victories. High-capacity rulers can rely on local agents and institutions to subtly manipulate elections, for instance by controlling the media or inhibiting the work of domestic election monitors throughout the territory while staying clear of costly manipulation such as election violence. In cross-national analyses of authoritarian multiparty elections from 1946 to 2017, the study finds that state territorial control increases the likelihood of large victories. Furthermore, high levels of state control correlate with subtle strategies of manipulation, including media bias and restrictions on domestic monitors – strategies that are also positively associated with large victories. At the same time, state control is negatively associated with election violence.

Politicians and political scientists have long known that there is a slight tendency among voters to prefer candidates whose names appear at the top of the ballot compared with lower-placed candidates, and hence that ceteris paribus the former have a somewhat better chance of being elected than the latter. When the candidates' names appear on the ballot in alphabetical order, this positional voting bias is usually called ‘alphabetic voting’. It is of special importance and interest in preferential voting systems where the voters may indicate their first, second, third, etc., preferences among a list of candidates, as in the single-transferable vote elections to the Irish Dáil, or where they must do so, as in the alternative-vote elections to the Australian House of Representatives.

Renewed scholarly interest in the role of US congressional parties has recently coincided with a continuing interest in legislative committee influence and the extent to which that influence relies on committee preference composition. We argue that majority party incentives to influence composition vary by committee salience and party margins. In turn, the party’s ability to influence composition of salient committees is constrained, but varies by party resource levels. We present data on committee composition for the 80th to 104th US Houses and test these expectations using time-series cross-section analysis. The evidence provides support for the predictions – which have been hypothesized or tested anecdotally but have not heretofore been systematically tested – explaining both spatial and temporal variation.

Political scientists have long noted the key role racial attitudes can play in electoral politics. However, the 2016 election of Donald Trump raises questions about prevailing theories of racial attitudes and their political effects. While existing research focuses on ‘cultural’ or ‘modern’ forms of racial prejudice, this article argues that a sizeable portion of White Americans, disturbingly, dehumanize Black people: that is, they view Black people as less than fully human. Unsurprisingly, given the blatant racism of Donald Trump's campaign, this study also demonstrates that dehumanizing attitudes toward Black people are more strongly associated with support for Trump than with support for other candidates in the 2016 Republican primary. The authors also find evidence that dehumanizing attitudes toward Black people bolstered Donald Trump's vote share among Whites in the 2016 presidential election. Finally, dehumanizing attitudes are negatively associated with Whites' evaluations of Barack Obama, even after holding standard measures of racial prejudice constant. These findings suggest that a fundamental form of racism – dehumanizing attitudes toward Black people – can powerfully shape candidate evaluations and voting decisions in the twenty-first century.

Recent research on political discussion has focused on whether aspects of interaction create a ‘democratic dilemma’ for the mass public in which people face a choice between political participation and political tolerance. This article argues that there are important variations in how people react to their immediate social contacts. It explores this idea by studying how social disagreement and expertise interact with gender to explain variance in political participation. First, it shows that there are conflicting expectations in the literature about how such dynamics should manifest, despite agreement that men and women should experience different kinds and degrees of social influence. Secondly, it examines these expectations by revisiting prominent, network-based explanations of political participation; it finds that these relationships do not display consistency across sex differences. The results point to the existence of varied ‘social logics’ for men and women, and suggest the need to reconsider how to think about the efficacy of discussion and disagreement in a democratic society.

Socialization theory claims that the ability of education to reduce anti-foreigner sentiment varies cross-nationally because state authorities are not equally committed to accepting ethnic minorities: higher educated persons harbor less anti-foreigner sentiment because they spend longer in educational institutions that impose official democratic values, which forbid negative reactions toward ethnic minorities. Consequently, higher educated persons ought to diverge from the lower educated as democratic institutions progress. Analyses support these claims: the impact of education on reducing anti-foreigner sentiment is strongest in the oldest democracies, moderate among the medium-aged (e.g., South European) democracies and weakest among the youngest (East European) democracies; and higher educated persons are disproportionately influenced by the maturation of democratic institutions. Analyses utilize data from the 28-country 2008 European Social Survey.

David Mayhew’s Divided We Govern significantly challenged the conventional wisdom of the adversarial effect of divided government on government effectiveness in the United States. While the post-Mayhewian literature has been centred on legislative productivity as a measure of gridlock, gridlock is here defined as an ‘inability to change policy’. In this study, the preferences of the legislators, such as the filibuster, override and House median veto players are plotted in Euclidean space. The analysis focuses on the influence of the area of the winset, which is an intersection overlapped by the veto players’ indifference curves. There is a substantial impact of the area of the winset on the change in policy output point, which is measured by the ADA scores and by Poole’s Mean Winning Coordinate. Yet divided government has marginal or no effect on policy swing. The conclusion is that the preferences of veto players, but not party control of the government, have a substantial impact on gridlock in the United States.

This article examines the conflict in political liberalism between the demands placed on education by liberalism and those placed on education by democracy. In so far as the principles of political liberalism entail both that the state not interfere with individuals' private commitments and that it ensure the maintenance of liberal democratic institutions, I suggest that it is rent by an internal tension that poses particular dilemmas for education. This tension is explored through three competing models of the school as a politically liberal institution, expressed in terms of a schematic analysis of three countries' approach to education: England, the United States and France. I argue that while all three countries capture important aspects of the politically liberal educational project, and while the American approach especially successfully and self-consciously addresses the balance between liberalism and democracy in constructing the school as a public square, no model in theory or in practice is able to meet the diverse and competing demands of political liberalism. In so far as any political system is viable only if it is able to maintain itself across generations, however, I conclude that political liberalism fails as a theory in at least one important respect, and that the problem of education thus deserves much deeper attention from liberal political theorists than it has yet enjoyed.