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Truth and intra-personal concept stability

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 1999

Mark Siebel
Mark Siebel
Affiliation:
Research Group in Communication and Understanding, University of Leipzig, 04109 Leipzig, [email protected]
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Abstract

I criticize three claims concerning simulators: (1) That a simulator provides the best-fitting simulation of the perceptual impression one has of an object does not guarantee, pace Barsalou, that the object belongs to the simulator's category. (2) The people described by Barsalou do not acquire a concept of truth because they are not sensitive about the potential inadequacy of their sense impressions. (3) Simulator update prevents Barsalou's way of individuating concepts (i.e., identifying them with simulators) from solving the problem of intra-personal concept stability because to update a simulator is to change its content, and concepts with different contents are distinct.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 22 , Issue 4 , August 1999 , pp. 632 - 633
Copyright
© 1999 Cambridge University Press

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