Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-jn8rn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-18T16:59:46.107Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Stability is not intrinsic

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 February 1999

D. C. Dennett  and
C. F. Westbury
D. C. Dennett
Affiliation:
Center for Cognitive Studies, Tufts University, Medford, MA 02144 [email protected]@emerald.tufts.edu www.tufts.edu/as/cogstud/mainpg.htm
C. F. Westbury
Affiliation:
Center for Cognitive Studies, Tufts University, Medford, MA 02144 [email protected]@emerald.tufts.edu www.tufts.edu/as/cogstud/mainpg.htm
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

A pure vehicle theory of the contents of consciousness is not possible. While it is true that hard-wired tacit representations are insufficient as content vehicles, not all tacit representations are hardwired. O'Brien & Opie's definition of stability for patterns of neural activation is not well-motivated and too simplistic. We disagree in particular with the assumption that stability in a network is purely intrinsic to that network. Many complex forms of stability in a network are apparent only when interpreted by something external to that network. The requirement for interpretation introduces a necessary functional element into the theory of the contents of consciousness, suggesting that a pure vehicle theory of those contents will not succeed.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 22 , Issue 1 , February 1999 , pp. 153 - 154
Copyright
© 1999 Cambridge University Press

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)