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The possibility of subisomorphic experiential differences

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 December 1999

Christopher D. Viger
Affiliation:
Center for Cognitive Studies, Tufts University, Medford, MA 02155-7059 [email protected] ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/mainpage.htm

Abstract

Palmer's main intuition pump, the “color machine,” greatly underestimates the complexity of a system isomorphic in color experience to humans. The neuroscientific picture of this complexity makes it clear that the brain actively produces our experiences by processes that science can investigate, thereby supporting functionalism and leaving no (color) room for a passive observer to witness subisomorphic experiential differences.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
© 1999 Cambridge University Press

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