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Guilt by dissociation: Why mindreading may not be prior to metacognition after all

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 April 2009

Philip Robbins
Philip Robbins
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Missouri–Columbia, Columbia, MO 65211. [email protected]://philosophy.missouri.edu/people/robbins.html
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Abstract

Carruthers argues that there is no developmental or clinical evidence that metacognition is dissociable from mindreading, and hence there is no reason to think that metacognition is prior to mindreading. A closer look at the evidence, however, reveals that these conclusions are premature at best.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 32 , Issue 2 , April 2009 , pp. 159 - 160
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009

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