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Functional identification of constraints on feature creation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 December 2002

Phillipe G. Schyns
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, G12 8QB, United [email protected] www.psy.gla.ac.uk
Robert L. Goldstone
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405 [email protected] cognitrn.psych.indiana.edu/
Jean-Pierre Thibaut
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Université de Liège, Batiment B32, Sart-Tilman, 4000 Liège, [email protected]

Abstract

Dawson's provocative comment makes three connected points: (1) to be falsifiable, theories that assume flexible features must constrain their feature creation and mechanisms, (2) the explanatory power of such functional theories is rooted in the properties of their underlying physical mechanisms, and (3) to derive the relevant constraints of feature creation from these mechanisms, it is critical to avoid the scope slip. We will argue here that even though we agree with (1) and (2), (3) confuses two different levels of analysis of computational systems: the functional identification and the physical implementation of relevant constraints.

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Author's Response
Copyright
© 2001 Cambridge University Press

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