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Concepts and theoretical unification1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 June 2010

Eric Margolis
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, V6T 1Z1, Canada. [email protected]://web.mac.com/ericmargolis/primary_site/home.html
Stephen Laurence
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Sheffield, Sheffield S3 7QB, United Kingdom. [email protected]://www.shef.ac.uk/philosophy/staff/profiles/slaurence.html

Abstract

Concepts are mental symbols that have semantic structure and processing structure. This approach (1) allows for different disciplines to converge on a common subject matter; (2) it promotes theoretical unification; and (3) it accommodates the varied processes that preoccupy Machery. It also avoids problems that go with his eliminativism, including the explanation of how fundamentally different types of concepts can be co-referential.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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Footnotes

1.

This article was fully collaborative; the order of the authors' names is arbitrary.

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