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Acquiring a new concept is not explicable-by-content

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 May 2011

Nicholas Shea
Nicholas Shea
Affiliation:
Faculty of Philosophy and Somerville College, Philosophy Centre, University of Oxford, Oxford OX1 4JJ, United Kingdom. [email protected]://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/members/nicholas_shea
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Abstract

Carey's book describes many cases in which children develop new concepts with expressive power that could not be constructed out of their input. How does she side-step Fodor's paradox of radical concept nativism? I suggest that it is by rejecting the tacit assumption that psychology can only explain concept acquisition when it occurs by rational inference or other transitions that are explicable-by-content.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 34 , Issue 3 , June 2011 , pp. 148 - 149
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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References

Carey, S. (2009) The origin of concepts. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fodor, J. A. (1975) The language of thought. Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Fodor, J. A. (1981) The present status of the innateness controversy. In: Representations: Philosophical essays on the foundations of cognitive science, pp. 257–316. MIT Press.Google Scholar