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Representation and knowledge are not the same thing

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 October 1999

Leslie Smith
Leslie Smith
Affiliation:
Department of Educational Research, Lancaster University, Lancaster LA1 4YL, United [email protected]
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Abstract

Two standard epistemological accounts are conflated in Dienes & Perner's account of knowledge, and this conflation requires the rejection of their four conditions of knowledge. Because their four metarepresentations applied to the explicit-implicit distinction are paired with these conditions, it follows by modus tollens that if the latter are inadequate, then so are the former. Quite simply, their account misses the link between true reasoning and knowledge.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 22 , Issue 5 , October 1999 , pp. 784 - 785
Copyright
© 1999 Cambridge University Press

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