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Logical possibility and the isomorphism constraint

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 December 1999

Bernard Harrison
Bernard Harrison
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT 84112 [email protected]
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Abstract

Palmer's “isomorphism constraint” presupposes the logical possibility of two qualitatively disparate sets of sensory experiences exhibiting the same relationships. Two arguments are presented to demonstrate that, because such a state of affairs cannot be coherently specified, its occurrence is not logically possible. The prospects for behavioral and biological science are better than Palmer suggests; those for functionalism are worse.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 22 , Issue 6 , December 1999 , pp. 954 - 955
Copyright
© 1999 Cambridge University Press

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