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IV. Underground Politics in Post-War Japan*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

Harry Emerson Wildes
Harry Emerson Wildes*
Affiliation:
Formerly of Government Section, SCAP
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Extract

Party Organization Undemocratic. Outwardly, Japan is governed by political parties working for democracy through parliamentary action. The presence of four major parties, plus some 1,250 other political groups officially recognized by the nine-member Election Management Commission, offers what appears to be corroborative evidence that Japan follows the line of Western political development.

In practice, this is sheer illusion. The 1,250 parties seem bewilderingly numerous, yet no one but the American is in the least confused. All Japanese realize that the so-called parties are, in reality, nothing more than local subdivisions of major groups, together with a swarm of wholly unimportant minor factions made up of irresponsibles with no actual following. An Oriental will form a group, dignified by a high title, at the drop of a hat. Because the law requires it, and because it satisfies his vanity, the Japanese will register his association (although actually composed of himself, his brother-in-law, and his next door neighbor) as a political party; as such, it will appear on the record as one of the 1,250 organizations. As a matter of fact, it may, and probably will, split into fragments and even disappear before the registrant has returned home; but since no procedure is provided for the erasure of a name from the list, the total snowballs into astronomical figures.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 42 , Issue 6 , December 1948 , pp. 1149 - 1162
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1948 

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Footnotes

*

Completing a symposium arranged by Harold S. Quigley and begun in the preceding issue.

References

1 Nothing contained in this article is to be construed as in any sense an official statement, either of fact or of opinion, either by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) or by any agency or individual in the SCAP organization. All opinions expressed are those of the author, a former member of SCAP's Government Section, and author of Social Currents in Japan, Japan in Crisis, and Aliens in the East. All data not otherwise credited have been collected by the author through personal, and in most instances private, interviews with the individuals concerned.

2 Japan has 1,250 officially recognized “parties,” but if the same procedure existed in the United States of registering each local club as a separate unit, the 3,000 American counties, to say nothing of the city, town, and village organizations, would roll up a staggering total. One division club for one party only in the author's home town would yield more “parties” than are registered in all Japan. Judged by this yardstick, Japan is actually under-supplied rather than over-supplied with parties.

3 In 1946, the People's Coöperative party expelled two charter members who protested against the absorption of a minor party which opposed coöperative principles. In December, 1947, the Democratic party expelled a member who absented himself from a Diet session rather than vote for nationalized control of coal mines, and 23 other members “seceded” rather than face expulsion for opposing this measure.

4 In Osaka, in the 1946 Diet election, the Liberals had exactly five members in the First election district, from which nine Diet members were to be chosen. This situation has since been remedied, to a large extent, but it is still true that actual party membership is but a tiny fraction of the vote cast for any party.

5 In very few instances is there a real contest over these elections. As Prime Minister Katayama expressed it: “We usually agree in advance and when we find out who has the strength to win we advise the opposition to wait until next time.”

6 An excellent illustration of this concern with foreign affairs appeared early in 1948, when the Liberals and Democrats planned a merger into a new conservative party. Chief Prosecutor James B. Keenan, of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, had praised retired General Ugaki Kazushige, former governor-general of Korea, as “a pacifist.” Because of this supposed favor with SCAP, the conservative backers suggested Ugaki, a lifelong military man, a plotter of armed insurrection, and a purgee, as president of their proposed new party.

7 These statements may seem libellous, but each of them has been verified to the author by the contractors concerned. Both Sugahara and Chiizaki were frank in their admissions.

8 Hatoyama, Inukai, and other purgees admit having held such conferences. Hatoyama has also held frequent important conferences on party policy matters with key figures such as Yoshida and Ono Banboku, former Liberal secretary. This practice has not been legal; it led in December, 1946, to a scathing rebuke by Brigadier General Courtney Whitney, Chief of Government Section, but the conferences nevertheless continued.

9 This is the 1948 figure, a larger amount because of the continuing inflation than in 1947 when the common Japanese explanation ran “seven wins, five loses,” referring to the belief that a candidate who spent only 500,000 yen would not succeed whereas an outlay of 700,000 yen would insure success. In January, 1948, Hara Susumu, a Liberal Diet member, publicly declared what everybody knew when he said: “No Diet member has been elected without breaking the law.”

10 The author made a careful study of the financial reports made by each political party and by the successful Diet candidates; the above comments are based upon his findings. The report was never published.

11 Nakasone made his confession to the Tokyo public procurator in Nov., 1947. Tsuji's statement of the expenses he paid for the 19 Diet members refers to the 1946 campaign, but he says that the same practice was followed in 1947. Sugahara and Chiizaki made statements to the writer in October and November, 1947. Hara was publicly accused by the Tokyo public procurator and by Prime Minister Katayama in Jan., 1948, at which time Katayama requested permission from the Diet to try him for fraud. Yasui denied to the writer that he had received any of the money, but Tsuji, who helped elect Yasui, said that the charge was true. It should, however, be remembered that Governor Yasui, following election, refused to follow Tsuji's guidance. Kato and Suzuki also denied complicity, and even entered suit against Hara for libel. Statements referring to Hatoyama are endorsed by Hatoyama himself.

12 Sugahara, the generous contractor who financed three different, and presumably rival, parties, was matched by his associate Chiizaki Usaburo, who, while running as nominal independent in the Hokkaido (immediately after election he joined the Democrats), also gave heavily to the Liberals and offered large sums to the Socialists which, they say, they rejected. Chiizaki, meanwhile, allowed his news paper, Hokkaido Shimbun, to campaign earnestly for the Communists while he himself donated the entire campaign expenses of his Communist rival, who was elected at the same time as himself. These contributions were acknowledged in the Communist's official campaign report, but were not reported by Chiizaki until his attention was called to the omission. He then explained that he gave the money because he admired the candidate's mother!

13 As in Europe, a strong sense of status and an exaggerated sense of honor permeate the system. Where, as in rural regions, it matured without undue interference, a hereditary relationship arose whereby the same family of oyabun (pseudoparent) governed the same kobun (child, or follower), families for several centuries. In some instances a curious tradition existed whereby the oyabun must not marry, but instead, as in so many other Japanese circles, must adopt a promising kobun as his son and successor.

14 On Oct. 16, 1947, Miyako Shimbun reported the Coal Production Coöperation Society as saying that 10 per cent of the nation's 407,000 coal miners were “lawless,” that murder, violence, blackmail, burglary, and black-marketing flourished in the coal areas, and that neither management nor labor unions dared protest for fear of vengeance being visited upon them. Tokyo Mimpo, on Dec. 10, 1947, estimated that 5,300 underground miners and 19,700 other coal workers in Hokkaido, held in slavery under what the paper called the “octopus system,” would be freed when their “feudalistic contract labor system” ended in Apr., 1948.

15 The word “gambler” has wider overtones in Japanese than in English. For one reason or another, not always clear to Occidentals, the Japanese gambler is understood to be a peculiar combination of gangster, political leader, and petty criminal. The Tokyo Metropolitan Police insists that during the first year of the Occupation gambler gangs committed “18 murders, 18 injuries, 3 robberies, 85 cases of blackmail, 550 larcenies, plus other offenses not yet discovered.” (Cf. Walker, Gordon, in Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 13, 1947 Google Scholar; Mainichi, Jan. 21, 1948.)

16 Gambling abuses are, of course, not new in Japan. They stem, as in most Oriental countries, far back into the past. During the entire period since the Meiji Restoration of 1868, Japanese police have campaigned for their eradication. One of the chief objectives of the so-called “Puritan reformers” of the 1930 period was the abolition of the mah jong racket. One of the strangest incidents, not yet clarified, was the amazing arrest, about 1893, of the entire Japanese Supreme Court on charges of gambling.

17 Much confusion results from the misuse of English terms to describe these ruffians. A common word for the gangster of bygone days was the machiyakko (street guy), whom the ever-chivalrous Japanese dictionaries convert into “chivalrous man-about-town.” Toyama Mitsuru, long head of the Black Dragon Society, delighted in being called “The Robin Hood of Japan.” Even Gordon Walker, op. cit., refers to the roughnecks as “vigilantes.”

18 Youth Action Corps are primarily Communist party adjuncts described euphemistically as protective guards. Such groups are not, however, new features in Japan. Ever since the Meiji Restoration, Japanese politicians, of every shade of political opinion, have consistently relied upon the strong-arm tactics of soshi and ronin both for their own protection and for the discouragement of rivals.

19 The Shinei Taishuto (Élite Party of the New Masses) is a typical example. Organized in 1946 by Maki Yasutoshi, a tekiya leader, as an “intermediary between capital and labor,” it funnelled relief supplies, distributed by the city of Tokyo through Maki as its agent, to Maki's satellites. Maki built up a kobun following to help him in his campaign as a Liberal candidate for the Diet in his unsuccessful bid for election in 1946. Two of his satellites knifed Katsunami Katsuji, an undercover Communist who headed the Japan Congress of Industrial Organizations, when he attempted, in Jan., 1947, to call a general strike. The party called an anti-communist mass meeting, to be held on Dec. 14, 1947, the anniversary of the day when Japan's traditional heroes, the 47 ronin, met to avenge the death of their feudal lord. The meeting was not held, because Maki was arrested two days prior to the scheduled date. Toyama Naoki, Maki's successor as leader, thereupon publicly announced that his boys would burn down the house of assignation in which Maki had been arrested. This particular party was abolished as a dangerous reactionary organization, but scores of similar societies continue to exist.

20 A curious confusion resulted. SCAP experts, not too well grounded in Japanese history and not fully aware of the complex social system, seeing the rise of gang politics, assumed that the fault lay with the tonari gumi (neighborhood associations) whereby all Japan had been subdivided into blocks of 5 to 10 households under an elective leader. The tonari gumi had sufficient grievous faults not to need attack upon this particular score, but by loading responsibility for political shortcomings upon them, and by abolishing the system on Mar. 31, 1947, SCAP broke up a going concern that might have been used constructively under better and more scientific leadership, without seriously affecting the evil it sought to end.

21 The Kades speech, made to the public procurators in their annual meeting, is reported in Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 13, 1947.

22 Cf. Wichita Beacon, Nov. 7, 1947.

23 Ikutaro, Shimizu, “Anti-Social Groups in Japanese Society,” Chuo Koron, Sept., 1947 Google Scholar; see also Sekai Nippo, Sept. 22, 1947.

24 Walker, Gordon declared (Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 13, 1947)Google Scholar that Welfare Minister Hitotsumatsu Sadakiohi, a Democrat, was the adviser of an Osaka tekiya organization. Ozu Kinnosuke, oyabun of Shinjuku ward, Tokyo, wae the officially recognized Liberal candidate for the Diet in 1947.

25 The Matsuda Gang was founded by Matsuda Giichi upon his return from Shanghai after the war. Matsuda, shocked by the anarchy of Shimbashi Market, where tekiya keepers, ruffians, black-mailers, and gangsters fought and killed one another, welded them into a firm oyabun-kobun organization. He was killed in a gang war in July, 1946, and was succeeded by his widow, the chic young Matsuda Yoshiko, who found the task too difficult. She now says that the yakuza (scamps) must be wiped out, that movies and novels glorifying the oyabun-kobun system must be eradicated, and that the yakuza, “many of whom have clean pure hearts, though their profession is to fight,” must lead honest lives. Shukan Asahi, Aug. 10, 1947.

26 The dissolution of this and other gangs was marked by almost extravagant professions of democracy. Shimuyama Masuhisa of Asakusa ward, Tokyo, declared: “Some say our world is feudalistic, but what would humanity be without our spirit of benevolence and righteousness? I am in this business because I like it.” Ibid.

27 Sekine, learning that the police wanted him, ran away with a girl friend. For a month thereafter, although the Tokyo newspapers carried exact reports of his wanderings, the police could not find him. Then, when a lieutenant called upon Police Chief Tagano Mineo with a message that Sekine would surrender if assured of “a peaceful and amicable talk with the police,” proper assurances were given, and Sekine consented to be caught. Meanwhile his organization, in Sekine's absence, voted to dissolve; but many members questioned the validity of the action. Jiji Press, Sept. 1, 1947. Seiji, Aug. 21, 1947, reported that approximately 500 groups had thus “dissolved.”

28 The machine gun was never linked to Sekine himself. Jiji Press, Oct. 16, 1947.

29 It is noteworthy that some of these trials were for other charges than intimidation and violence, due to the fact that many witnesses proved reluctant to testify. Ozu, for instance, was convicted, and his property sold on Jan. 19, 1948, “for failure to pay delinquent taxes.” The proceeds brought only 510,000 yen out of a total of 5,040,000 yen which had been levied upon him. Yasuda, who, according to Mainichi, Aug. 21, 1947, had taken a toll of from 10,000 to 30,000 yen per store, was not penalized for this as much as for his having extorted money from 37 tekiya which had never been set up; Yasuda had cheated them of the refunds due. Yasuda was also alleged (Jiji Press, Aug. 21, 1947) to have confiscated a sawmill set up within his “sphere of influence” without his prior consent.

30 The nation-wide drive started later and full reports were slow of receipt. As of Oct. 20, Mainichi reported that a total of 7,962 arrests had been made. Of these, more than one-fifth (1,607) were in Nagasaki, another 1,143 in Osaka. The home minister, Kimura Kozaemon, announced that this total represented about 15 per cent of the 1,260 groups, of 53,051 known members, of the gangs. “They may not all be gamblers, toughs, or gangsters,” he said, “but they are undesirable parasites grouped into ‘gumi’ or ‘ikke,’ led by so-called kaoyaku (neighborhood bosses).”

31 Katayama's statement was made in response to an interpellation of Councillor Hani Goro, who asked about the truth of news dispatches sent to the United States by Howard Handleman of International News Service. Seiji, Nov. 30, 1947.

32 This poll was taken by Asahi in Oct., 1947, after the police drive had been under way for nearly four months. It was reported in Asahi, Dec. 15, 1947. The poll covered 7,000 persons in Tokyo, Osaka, and northern Kyushu, and 2,822 replies were tabulated. Of those replying, 4 per cent supported the oyabun-kobun, 72 percent opposed. Replies showed that 31 per cent had heard of the system through newspapers and radio, 24 per cent by rumor, 18 per cent through “friends who are members,” 13 per cent through novels or story-tellers, 4 per cent through movies and 1 per cent through magazines. An additional 7 per cent claimed to be within the oyabun “sphere of influence” and 2 per cent admitted to being kobun. A further break-down disclosed that 2 per cent thought that the system was not objectionable, 58 per cent said it was undesirable, 78 per cent saw both good and bad effects, 2 percent “generally good but with some defects,” 14 per cent “some merits,” and 6 percent “don't know.” It is characteristic of Japanese statistics that the figures do not add up to 100 per cent.

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