Hostname: page-component-745bb68f8f-5r2nc Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-01-10T13:44:09.816Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Democratic Subversion: Elite Cooptation and Opposition Fragmentation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 July 2021

LEONARDO R. ARRIOLA Open the ORCID record for LEONARDO R. ARRIOLA [Opens in a new window] ,
JED DEVARO Open the ORCID record for JED DEVARO [Opens in a new window]  and
ANNE MENG Open the ORCID record for ANNE MENG [Opens in a new window]
LEONARDO R. ARRIOLA*
Affiliation:
University of California, Berkeley, United States
JED DEVARO*
Affiliation:
California State University, East Bay, United States
ANNE MENG*
Affiliation:
University of Virginia, United States
*
Leonardo R. Arriola, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, United States, and Associated Senior Researcher, Chr. Michelsen Institute, Norway, [email protected].
Jed DeVaro, The Wang Family Professor, Departments of Management and Economics, California State University, East Bay, United States, [email protected].
Anne Meng, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Virginia, United States, [email protected].
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Incumbents in electoral regimes often retain power despite having to regularly compete in multiparty elections. We examine a specific channel through which incumbents can seek to prevent the emergence of a strong opposition that might threaten them in future elections. We present a formal model demonstrating that incumbents can strategically induce opposition fragmentation by appointing some opposition members to ministerial cabinet positions. Opposition politicians who have the opportunity to secure a cabinet position in an incumbent’s government tend to compete for office independently rather than coalescing into broad-based parties or electoral alliances. The model shows that weaker incumbents are more likely to rely on this cooptation strategy. Using original data on presidential elections across African countries during 1990–2016, we show that past cooptation of opposition politicians is associated with a more fragmented opposition field in subsequent elections.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 115 , Issue 4 , November 2021 , pp. 1358 - 1372
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the American Political Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

REFERENCES

Adekanye, Bayo. 1998. “Power-Sharing in Multi-Ethnic Political Systems.” Security Dialogue 29 (1): 25–36.Google Scholar
Albertus, Michael, and Menaldo, Victor. 2018. Authoritarianism and the Elite Origins of Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Arriola, Leonardo R. 2012. Multiethnic Coalitions in Africa: Business Financing of Opposition Election Campaigns. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Arriola, Leonardo, DeVaro, Jed, and Meng, Anne. 2021. “Replication Data for: Democratic Subversion: Elite Cooptation and Opposition Fragmentation.” Harvard Dataverse. Dataset. https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/R8TUOQ.Google Scholar
Ariotti, Margaret H., and Golder, Sona N.. 2018. “Partisan Portfolio Allocation in African Democracies.” Comparative Politicsl Studies 51 (3): 341–79.Google Scholar
Beck, Nathaniel, and Katz, Jonathan N.. 1995. “What To Do (and not To Do) with Time-Series Cross-Section Data.” American Political Science Review 89 (3): 634–47.Google Scholar
Bleck, Jaimie, and van de Walle, Nicolas. 2018. Electoral Politics in Africa since 1990: Continuity in Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Bob-Milliar, George M. 2019. “‘We Run for the Crumbs and Not for the Office’: The Nkrumahist Minor Partis and Party Patronage in Ghana.” Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 57 (4): 445–65.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brambor, Thomas, Clark, William Roberts, and Golder, Matt. 2006. “Are African Party Systems Different?” Electoral Studies 26 (2): 315–23.Google Scholar
Buckles, Grant. 2019. “Internal Opposition Dynamics and Restraints on Authoritarian Control.” British Journal of Political Science 49 (3): 883–900.Google Scholar
Cheeseman, Nic, and Klass, Brian. 2018. How to Rig an Election. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Christensen, Darin, and Gibilisco, Michael. 2020. “How Budgets Shape Power Sharing in Autocracies.” Working Paper.Google Scholar
Clark, Tom S., and Linzer, Drew A.. 2015. “Should I Use Fixed or Random Effects?” Political Science Research and Methods 3 (2): 399–408.Google Scholar
Coppedge, Michael, Gerring, John, Knutsen, Carl Henrik, Lindberg, Staffan I., Teorell, Jan, Altman, David, Bernhard, Michael, et al. 2020. “V-Dem Codebook v10.” Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project.Google Scholar
Cruz, Cesi, Keefer, Philip, and Scartascini, Carlos. 2018. Database of Political Institutions 2017 (DPI2017) [computer file]. Inter-American Development Bank. Numbers for Development.Google Scholar
Cox, Gary W. 1997. Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World’s Electoral Systems. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Di Palma, Giuseppe. 1977. Surviving Without Governing: The Italian Parties in Parliament. Oakland: University of California Press.Google Scholar
Elgie, Robert, Bucur, Cristina, Dolez, Bernard, and Laurent, Annie. 2014. “Proximity, Candidates, and Presidential Power: How Directly Elected Presidents Shape the Legislative Party System.” Political Research Quarterly 67 (3): 467–77.Google Scholar
Fearon, James D. 2003. “Ethnic and Cultural Diversity by Country.” Journal of Economic Growth 8 (2): 195–222.Google Scholar
Gandhi, Jennifer. 2008. Political Institutions Under Dictatorship. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Gandhi, Jennifer, and Buckles, Grant. 2016. “Opposition Unity and Cooptation in Hybrid Regimes.” Unpublished Manuscript.Google Scholar
Gandhi, Jennifer, and Lust-Okar, Ellen. 2009. “Elections under Authoritarianism.” Annual Review of Political Science 12: 403–22.Google Scholar
Golder, Matt. 2006. “Presidential Coattails and Legislative Fragmentation.” American Journal of Political Science 50 (1): 34–48.Google Scholar
Hassan, Mai. 2020. Regime Threats and State Solutions: Bureaucratic Loyalty and Embeddedness in Kenya. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Hicken, Allen, and Stoll, Heather. 2011. “Presidents and Parties: How Presidential Elections Shape Coordination in Legislative Elections.” Comparative Political Studies 44 (7): 854–83.Google Scholar
Huntington, Samuel. 1968. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Jackson, Robert H., and Rosberg, Carl G.. 1982. Personal Rule in Black Africa. Oakland: University of California Press.Google Scholar
Kadima, Denis. 2014. “An Introduction to the Politics of Party Alliances and Coalitions in Socially-Divided Africa.” Journal of African Elections 13 (1): 1–24.Google Scholar
Kelly, Catherine Lena. 2018. “Party Proliferation and Trajectories of Opposition: Comparative Analysis from Senegal.” Comparative Politics 50 (2): 209–29.Google Scholar
Khisa, Moses. 2019. “Inclusive Cooptation and Political Corruption in Museveni’s Uganda.” Chap. 5 in Political Corruption in Africa: Extraction and Power Preservation , ed. Amundsen, Inge. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.Google Scholar
Knutsen, Carl Henrik, Nygård, Håvard Mkleiv, and Wig, Tore. 2017. “Autocratic Elections: Stabilizing Tool or Force for Change?” World Politics 69 (1): 98–143.Google Scholar
Kramon, Eric. 2016. “Electoral Handouts as Information.” World Politics 68 (3): 454–98.Google Scholar
Kramon, Eric, and Posner, Daniel. 2016. “Ethnic Favoritism in Education in Kenya.” Quarterly Journal of Political Science 11 (1): 1–58.Google Scholar
Lago, Ignacio, and Torcal, Mariano. 2020. “Electoral Coordination and Party System Institutionalization.” Party Politics 26 (5): 570–85.Google Scholar
LeBas, Adrienne. 2013. From Protest to Parties: Party-building and Democratization in Africa. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Lembani, Samson. 2014. “Alliances, Coalitions, and the Weakening of the Party System in Malawi.” Journal of African Elections 13 (1): 115–49.Google Scholar
Levitsky, Steven, and Ziblatt, Daniel. 2018. How Democracies Die. New York: Random House.Google Scholar
Levitsky, Steven, and Way, Lucan A.. 2012. “Beyond Patronage: Violent Struggle, Ruling Party Cohesion, and Authoritarian Durability.” Perspectives on Politics 10 (4): 869–89.Google Scholar
Lust-Okar, Ellen. 2005. Structuring Conflict in the Arab World: Incumbents, Opponents and Institutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Mendy, Marcel. 2001. Wade et le Sopi: La Longue Marche. Versailles: Les Classiques Africains.Google Scholar
Meng, Anne. 2021. “Ruling Parties in Authoritarian Regimes: Rethinking Instituitonal Strength.” British Journal of Political Science 51 (2): 526–40.Google Scholar
Meng, Anne. 2020. Constraining Dictatorship: From Personalized Rule to Institutionalized Regimes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Myerson, Roger B. 2008. “The Autocrat’s Credibility Problem and Foundations of the Constitutional State.” American Political Science Review 102 (1): 125–39.Google Scholar
Mwenda, Andrew M. 2007. “Personalizing Power in Uganda.” Journal of Democracy 18 (3): 23–37.Google Scholar
Ndegwa, Stephen N. 2001. “A Decade of Democracy in Africa.” African and Asian Studies 36 (1): 1–16.Google Scholar
Nohlen, Dieter, Krennerich, Michael, and Thibaut, Bernhard, eds. 1999. Elections in Africa: A Data Handbook. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Nyrup, Jacob, and Bramwell, Stuart. 2020. “Who Governs? A New Global Dataset on Members of Cabinets.” American Political Science Review 114 (4): 1366–74.Google Scholar
O’Gorman, Frank. 1975. The Rise of Party in England: The Rockingham Whigs, 1760-82. London: George Allen & Unwin.Google Scholar
Osaghae, Eghosa. 1999. “Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa: Faltering Prospects, New Hopes.” Journal of Contemporary African Studies 17 (1): 5–28.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Osendo, Con Omore, and Gachucha, Wambui. 2003. “Harambee: Patronage Politics and Disregard for Law.” Adili 50: 1–7.Google Scholar
Oster, Emily. 2017. “Unobservable Selection and Coefficient Stability: Theory and Evidence.” Manuscript. Brown University and NBER.Google Scholar
Oyugi, Walter O. 2006. “Coalition Politics and Coalition Governments in Africa.” Journal of Contemporary African Studies 24 (1): 53–79.Google Scholar
Plumb, J. H. 1961. Sir Robert Walpole: The King’s Minister. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.Google Scholar
Posner, Daniel N. 2004. “Measuring Ethnic Fractionalization in Africa.” American Journal of Political Science 48 (4): 849–63.Google Scholar
Prempeh, Kwasi. 2008. “Presidents Untamed.” Journal of Democracy 19 (2): 109–23.Google Scholar
Riedl, Rachel. 2014. Authoritarian Origins of Democratic Party Systems in Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Scott, James C. 1969. “Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Change.” American Political Science Review 63 (4): 1142–58.Google Scholar
Simpser, Alberto. 2013. Why Governments and Parties Manipulate Elections: Theory, Practice, and Implications. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Weghorst, Keith R., and Bernhard, Michael. 2014. “From Formlessness to Structure? The Institutionalization of Competitive Party Systems in Africa.” Comparative Political Studies 47 (12): 1707–37.Google Scholar
Widner, Jennifer A. 1992. The Rise of a Party-State in Kenya: From “Harambee!” to “Nyayo!” Oakland: University of California Press.Google Scholar
Supplementary material: Link

Arriola et al. Dataset

Dataset

https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/R8TUOQ
Link
Submit a response

Comments

No Comments have been published for this article.