The Colombian Constitutional Court (Court) ordered the Colombian government to seek the restitution of a set of 122 golden objects of the Quimbaya people in a judgment issued on October 19, 2017 (Judgment). The Judgment addressed significant issues of international law relating to unilateral acts, treaty interpretation, cultural property (particularly that of indigenous peoples), and the settlement of disputes involving claims for restitution of cultural property through diplomacy and mediation.

In the summer of 2017, the UN International Law Commission adopted Draft Article 7 and an associated draft annex for its project on immunity of state officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction. The draft article identifies six “crimes under international law in respect of which immunity ratione materiae shall not apply”: genocide; crimes against humanity; war crimes; crime of apartheid; torture; and enforced disappearance. Given the divergences within the Commission when considering and adopting Draft Article 7 (as evidenced by the plenary debate in 2016 and 2017, the unusual recorded vote on whether to refer the matter to the Commission's drafting committee, and the Commentary), it is difficult to conclude that the Commission is expressing a view that Draft Article 7 reflects lex lata.

With the ever-increasing range of medical technologies at our disposal to mediate the processes of life, from conception to death, comes an ever-increasing number of decision points about human control of fate. And as we debate altering our fate—whether dictated by a deity or by chance—the discussion frequently devolves into a question of whether we may alter not only our own fate, but also that of our children. The advent of genome editing, whether by older methods or the newer, often more easily used methods employing CRISPR, has only made debating the controversial possibility of heritable “germline” editing more urgent. The advent of genome editing, whether by older methods or the newer, often more easily used methods employing CRISPR, has only made debating the controversial possibility of heritable “germline” editing more urgent. On the eve of the Second International Summit on Human Genome Editing, held at the end of November 2018 in Hong Kong, a startling and disturbing story began circulating - a Chinese researcher announced the first births of children whose genomes had been edited at the embryonic stage. The work (assuming the claim can be verified) suffered from myriad problems, beginning with the lack of a compelling medical need, and including inadequate preclinical research, lack of peer review, flawed subject recruitment and consent procedures, and an apparent disregard for both formal and informal rules governing genetic manipulation of embryos. The summit's organizing committee issued a statement, distinguishing this experiment from what would be a responsible translational pathway forward. But not surprisingly, others around the world immediately called for a global, enforceable prohibition on such genetic engineering. On the occasion of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR)’s seventieth anniversary, this essay argues that the current human rights law on germline editing misunderstands both the mechanisms of genetics and the moral basis for human rights, suggesting a more nuanced approach as we move forward and keep pace with new gene-editing technologies.

The entry into application of the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) on May 25, 2018 has raised questions about its impact on data processing by intergovernmental organizations that operate under public international law (referred to here as international organizations or IOs). EU data protection law can have impact beyond EU borders, and the global reach of EU law is a well-recognized phenomenon. The GDPR contains numerous references to IOs but does not state whether it applies to them, and this uncertainty has led to tensions between IOs and the European Commission. The issues surrounding IOs’ processing of personal data show how the GDPR can give rise to unexpected questions under public international law, and illustrate the need for greater engagement between EU law and international law.

Economic sanctions, unilateral and multilateral, have a long pedigree in international relations. From South Africa and Israel, to Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, such measures have, with varying results, been used in diverse contexts to influence the behavior of states. Some would celebrate the use of economic sanctions as a means of punishing “rogue states” for human rights violations or threats to the peace, while others would condemn it as “imperialism” by powerful states against the weak. Leaving aside Chapter VII enforcement action by the UN Security Council, the imposition of unilateral sanctions raises far-reaching questions in respect of the rights and duties of states under international law. A novel issue that has emerged recently is whether, in certain circumstances, such measures could even qualify as crimes against humanity.

Over the past years, the Chinese government (along with other rising powers) has engaged in unprecedented international institution-building, leading to the establishment of, among others, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the BRICS-led New Development Bank (NDB). Providing services similar to existing institutions such as the World Bank, these new institutions profoundly alter the landscape of global governance. The existing literature has mostly debated whether such activism shows that China and others are embracing or confronting today's Western-led order. This discussion fails to capture a more complex reality, and the concept of international institutional bypasses (IIB) may help us gain a better understanding of China's complex institutional entrepreneurship. As will be explained, decisions by China and other countries to simultaneously support reform processes in existing institutions and also create new ones suggests that they seek alternative ways to overcome perceived dysfunctions in the dominant institutions by creating IIBs. Considering the initiatives in these terms allows for a more nuanced picture that transcends the simplistic dichotomy of integration versus rupture.

Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (the BRICS) have emerged as a new hub of power in international relations. They have begun to speak out jointly on a wide range of issues and to explore cooperating collectively. For instance, they strongly urge the Bretton Woods institutions to address their legitimacy deficits by transferring substantial voting power to emerging powers, and suggest that failure to do so will “run the risk of seeing [those institutions] fade into obsolescence.” The investment treaty regime may be another field in which they can exert influence, but the investment treaty policies of BRICS countries are diverging now more than ever. In particular, India and South Africa have taken significant measures, such as terminating investment treaties, that cast doubt on whether the BRICS can play a collective role in reforming such treaties. In this essay, I make two arguments. First, the recent investment treaty policies of some BRICS (India, South Africa, and to some extent Brazil) have shifted from one imbalanced approach that is too protective of foreign investors to another that is too protective of host states and is likely to be rejected by major powers such as the European Union, the United States, and China. Second, the BRICS together have the ability to craft approaches to investment treaties that encourage greater balance in the regime overall, including by remedying some of the defects inherent in the traditional investment treaties.

Indigenous Peoples are emerging as diplomats on the world stage. With states relinquishing some “soft power” space to non-state actors, the role of Indigenous Peoples in international diplomacy and particularly human rights diplomacy is both distinctive and important.

The fallout from the 2010 Kampala Review Conference for the United States has been explained by Harold Koh and Todd Buchwald, who were officially involved in the negotiations at the conference. The concerns they enumerate serve to implicate, inter alia, two issues of broad importance for the international community: the definition of the crime of aggression, and the clear divide between the positions of the permanent members of the UN Security Council and the rest of the Kampala participants with respect to the Councils role in implementing the Rome Statute’s new provisions on the crime of aggression. This Note, which focuses on those two issues, is partly a response to some of their criticisms and partly an independent assessment of the consequences of the Review Conference. It also evaluates the Kampala amendments to the Rome Statute’in particular, Articles 8 bis, 15 bis, and 15 ter—from the perspective of customary law and considers their impact on the role assigned to the Council under the UN Charter.

Digitization has greatly expanded the scope of trade, and with it the scope of trade law. But the regulatory framework, although growing in bilateral and regional fora, is highly dynamic and remains fragmented, increasing the challenges facing digital trade law.

Consistent with President Trump's America First trade agenda, his administration imposed tariffs on steel and aluminum imports in early March of 2018, triggering various responses and challenges. Countries have followed through on early objections to the tariffs through retaliatory tariffs and challenges in the World Trade Organization (WTO), and steel importers have challenged the legality of these tariffs under U.S. domestic law. At the same time, these tariffs have been revised multiple times, either to delay the implementation period for certain countries seeking exemptions or to permanently grant exemptions to countries who reached negotiated arrangements with the United States.

It is very unlikely—if not impossible—that a guerrilla movement would voluntarily agree to demobilize if the cost is that a majority of its members will receive long prison sentences. For this reason, any peace accord between the Colombian government and the Farc (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) Marxist guerilla will not be able to adapt to a strict interpretation of the duty to investigate, judge, and penalize. The challenge in this context is to incentivize demobilization while fulfilling the accountability standards of criminal law.

The determination of the Allied Powers to seize and punish war criminals was implemented several years ago by the corollary decision to ask for their extradition from foreign countries. President Roosevelt announced on October 7, 1942