In “Making Sense of Security,” J. Benton Heath pushes the reader to tangle with two unresolved foundational questions about the use of security in international law: who decides questions of security, and on what grounds.1 This essay examines the role of race in both of those questions, identifying structures and mechanisms of racial subordination that must be surfaced to fully make sense of security.2 In particular, it foregrounds the tension between reformist reforms and abolitionist reforms to which Heath makes reference. By rendering visible the historical and contemporary work performed by white supremacy in security, this essay seeks to elucidate and problematize that dilemma. Rather than retaining the exclusionary security frame, a turn to solidarity offers the possibility of a more inclusive approach to international law that creates connection based on our shared humanity.

The postulates of our foreign policy were determined by the ideals of liberty. The dominant motive was the security of the Republic; it was a policy of “live and let live,” with no imperialistic designs or thought of aggression. There was a deep-seated conviction that the opportunities of a hard-won freedom would be threatened by the ambitions of European Powers constantly seeking their own aggrandizement by the forcible imposition of their will upon weaker peoples, and that the peaceful aims of the new nation could be achieved only by keeping clear of the toils of European politics and strife. It was this conviction of the necessity of maintaining an independe it position which led to the declaration of neutrality in 1793 despite the treaty of alliance with France, which had sprung from the exigencies of the Revolutionary struggle. The words of the Farewell Address were more than a solemn admonition of the foremost American patriot—they set forth principles which those who established our foreign policy held to be its corner stone.

This dispute, brought by Ukraine against Russia, provides the first discussion in a World Trade Organization (WTO) Panel or Appellate Body Report of the security exception in Article XXI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT). Unusually for a WTO dispute, the Panel (chaired by former WTO Appellate Body Member Georges Abi-Saab) found that Russia had not acted inconsistently with any of the claimed obligations under the GATT or Russia's Accession Protocol. Central to that conclusion was the Panel's understanding of the GATT security exception and the circumstances surrounding the imposition of the challenged measures, which related to trade in transit by road and rail through Russian territory. The Panel found that, since 2014, an emergency in international relations existed between Russia and Ukraine within the meaning of GATT Article XXI(b)(iii) and that the challenged measures fell within this exception. If the exception had not applied, according to the Panel, Ukraine would have established a prima facie case of violation of the provisions on freedom of transit in GATT Article V:2 and equivalent provisions in Russia's Accession Protocol. The decision, which neither party chose to appeal, has significant implications for other disputes in which the security exception has been invoked.

On May 23, 2021, Belarusian authorities forced a Ryanair flight from Athens, Greece to Vilnius, Lithuania to land in Minsk in response to a false bomb threat and then arrested Roman Protasevich, an exiled journalist onboard the flight. The United States joined much of the international community in condemning the flight's diversion and imposing additional sanctions on Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko's regime, adding to those levied throughout the last year due to Lukashenko's repression of opposition figures and others who have protested the results of the August 2020 Belarusian election.

Criminalization of sexual violence against women in intimate relationships must form a central part of the human rights agenda for achieving gender equality. According to a study by the United Nations Secretary-General, “[t]he most common form of violence experienced by women globally is intimate partner violence” including “a range of sexually, psychologically and physically coercive acts.” The World Health Organization reports that nearly one in four women in some countries may experience sexual violence perpetrated against them by an intimate partner. Other research suggests that approximately 40% of all assaulted women are forced into sex at one time or another by their male partners.

With Judgment No. 21995/2019 (the Judgment), the Italian Court of Cassation (Court of Cassation) once again tackled the limits of sovereign immunity with regard to crimes against humanity (para. 7). The Judgment is part of litigation originating in Greece with the Leivadia Tribunal's 1997 Distomo decision, confirmed in 2000 by the Areopago (Hellenic Supreme Court), which ordered Germany to pay compensation and legal costs of approximately 50 million euros to the relatives of 218 victims of the Distomo massacre committed by the German military in 1944. In this Judgment, the Court of Cassation addressed whether sovereign immunity blocked the seizure of German assets located in Italy as part of that compensation order. The Court of Cassation's decision is noteworthy because it takes the discussion on sovereign immunity from jurisdiction and crimes against humanity one step further by addressing, in particular, the question of compensation and attachment of claims and rights held by the debtor against third parties.

In Trump v. Hawaii, the United States Supreme Court upheld admissions restrictions imposed by the Trump administration on nationals of certain countries for putative security reasons. In so doing, the Court's opinion reaffirmed judicial deference to the president on matters relating to immigration. Although the decision marked a Trump administration victory at the end of a protracted judicial clash, the lower courts are likely to continue operating as a check on aggressively restrictionist policies pursued by the administration on other fronts.

Olympic Games do not happen in a vacuum or a sports bubble. They are embedded in both local and global realities of a social, economic, and environmental nature. Environmental factors, in particular, have impacted the Olympic Movement for several decades. In this context, climate change is a more recent, yet increasingly important, issue on the agenda. This essay examines the Olympic Movement's multi-level climate change policy. Based on the goals established in the Paris Agreement, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) launched the Sports for Climate Action Initiative in 2018. In the context of the Olympics, this Initiative is implemented through the interplay between the IOC and actors at the local, host city level. Consequently, the system is highly dependent on local organizers’ capabilities to meet the Initiative's ambitious targets, as well as on the IOC's willingness and ability to take an active role in steering and supporting host cities in this process.

The Nuremberg principles affirmed by the U.N. General Assembly and formulated by the International Law Commission (ILC) provide that “[t]he fact that a person who committed an act which constitutes a crime under international law acted as Head of State or responsible Government official does not relieve him (sic) from responsibility under international law.” Few would dispute this basic principle. More contested is the question of who has authority to impose consequences on individuals for international crimes committed on behalf of states. This is because, if an individual has acted with actual or apparent state authority, imposing consequences on the individual without her state’s consent runs counter to traditional notions of state sovereignty and noninterference.

Rescuing the “other woman” has been an intractable feature of international and human rights legal interventions. This rescue narrative configures the “other woman,” invariably third world or from the Global South, as left behind in the movement toward progress and modernity. Part of the solution envisages the rescue and incorporation of the “other woman” into liberal rights discourse—the teleological endpoint of emancipation. Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) and postcolonial feminist critiques have exposed the racial and civilizational discourses that shape these rescue missions and the epistemic violence they engender. Using the example of the military invasion and occupation of Afghanistan from 2001–2021, I demonstrate how these discourses persist in contemporary women's human rights agendas and the carceral and securitized logics that they serve. I discuss the need to delink rights from rescue missions and the epistemic shifts required to move the critique in a meaningful and productive direction.

More than forty years after the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws, the American Law Institute (ALI) has begun work on a Third. Forty years is a long time, and the magnitude of the gap since the Second Restatement is itself a reason to think a Third is appropriate. But there are other reasons that it is time for a Third. In this essay, we want to explain why we think American choice of law has progressed to the point that a new Restatement is appropriate, and also, and relatedly, what we hope the Third Restatement can achieve.

These are our views, not those of the Ali, the Advisers to the Third Restatement, or even the other Reporters. It is simply our understanding of the significance of where we are in American conflicts scholarship and practice and where we might hope to go.

The lengthy process culminating in the UN General Assembly's recognition of the right to a healthy environment provides important insights into the nature of today's international human rights regime. In particular, it shows that human rights have moved well beyond the impoverished conceptions of rights that dominated the second part of the last century, that new norms develop in ways that are more complex and flexible than traditional doctrinal accounts would suggest, and that today's process of norm generation involves a wide and diverse array of actors, with states sometimes struggling to keep up.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has brought on unspeakable suffering. It has already injured and killed scores of people. It has displaced millions who now face an uncertain future. It raises the specter of all-out cyber war that threatens to draw other countries into the conflict. It is raging not only on the ground in Ukraine, but also on internet platforms where disinformation has spread. It tests the resilience of international partnerships and alliances. Beyond these immediate implications, the Russian attack on Ukraine also violates the prohibition on aggressive use of force, a foundational principle of the post-World War II international order. Facing these alarming prospects, many are pessimistic about what the war in Ukraine may portend for the future of international law and international relations. Surprisingly, however, some of the bleakest predictions have not yet been realized. Quite the contrary. We argue that there is a lot to be optimistic about when it comes to the role of international law, partnerships and norms in this conflict.

The situation calls for international cooperation, and all the parties at the Bretton Woods Conference understood this. A pool of international reserves that was readily accessible under mutually agreed upon rules by its members would be a “global public good,” providing considerable efficiency over having all countries solely hold their own stock of international reserves. Since balance of payments shocks are typically asynchronous across countries and over time, the principles of pooling and insurance would assure a net gain from the arrangement.

This essay considers the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) at a time at which humans are dramatically changing the planet, prompting scientists to suggest that we are living in a new geological epoch: “the Anthropocene.” The Anthropocene, even if an essentially contested concept, prompts reconsideration of our interhuman socioeconomic relations and our understanding of the human-nature interface, both of which come with significant challenges. This essay suggests that the UDHR offers the space for engaging with these challenges, if we adopt an Anthropocene-relevant reading of its provisions. This essay also argues that such a reading of the UDHR, on its own, is unlikely to lead to the adoption of an Anthropocene-relevant reading of other international instruments, international economic instruments in particular. It points to enhanced regime interaction as a way to address this issue.