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De Facto and De Jure Recognition : Is There a Difference?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 March 2017

Charles L. Cochran
Charles L. Cochran*
Affiliation:
U. S. Naval Academy
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Extract

The last decade has witnessed considerable evolution in the practice of recognition of new governments that have come to power by irregular means. Many of these changes appear to have gone almost unnoticed by many scholars in the field.

Of particular significance is the denial by Miss Marjorie Whiteman, Assistant Legal Adviser to the Department of State, in Volume II of her work, of a difference in the character of recognition, i.e., de facto or de jure recognition. Miss Whiteman lends her authority to this position when she states in Volume II of her Digest:

While the terms “de facto recognition” and “de jure recognition” are frequently employed, the expressions “recognition of a de facto government,” situation, etc., are preferable. The character of the object recognized may be recognized as “de facto” in existence or control. In prevailing practice, when the United States extends recognition, it is recognition per se not “de facto” recognition.

Type
Notes and Comments
Information
American Journal of International Law , Volume 62 , Issue 2 , April 1968 , pp. 457 - 460
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of International Law 1968

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References

1 2 Whiteman, Digest of International Law 3 (1963).

2 Ibid.

3 O'Brien, William and Goebel, Ulf, “TJ.S. Eecognition Policy Toward the New Nations,“ 3 Yearbook of World Polity 111 (1965).Google Scholar

4 Letter to the writer from Miss Whiteman, dated April 6, 1966.

5 See, in this regard, 1 Whiteman, Digest 917-930 (1963).

6 In an interview with the writer, March, 1966.

7 19 Dept. of State Bulletin 582 (1948).

8 Ibid. 723.

9 2 Whiteman, Digest 169.

10 Letter to the writer, dated April 6, 1966. Nevertheless, the courts have speculated over a possible legal difference between de facto and de jure recognition in: Luther v. Sagor (1921), 3 K.B. 532; and in Murarka et al. v. Bachrack Bros., Inc., 215 F. 2d 547 (2d Cir., 1954), 49 A.J.I.L. 254 (1955).

11 For example, see: W. W. Bishop, Jr., International Law Cases and Materials 249 (2nd ed., 1962); J. L. Brierly, The Law of Nations 146-150 (6th ed., edited by Sir Humphrey Waldock, 1963); Ti-Chiang Chen, The International Law of Recognition 277-289 (ed. by L. C. Green, 1951); Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law 397-398 (2nd ed., rev. and edited by Robert Tucker, 1967).

12 See Fenwick, C. G., ‘‘ The Recognition of De Facto Governments: Is there a Basis for Inter-American Collective Action?” 58 A.J.I.L. 109–113, esp. 112 (1964)Google Scholar; also by the same author, see “Recognition De Facto—In Reverse Gear,” ibid. 965-967; also Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law 338-345 (1947).

13 Lauterpacht, op. cit. 345-346

14 “28 A.JXL. 99 (1934).

15 Lauterpacht, op. cit. 38.