Having been drafted by the Constitutional Committee and ratified by the Supreme Council of the Republic, the following Constitution is hereby proclaimed by the President of the Republic as the constitutional law of the Republic of Burundi.

Nineteen fifty-five marked a turning point in Africa’s involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Prior to that year, the views of the few independent African nations had been completely overshadowed by cold war politics. The Bandung Conference, however, symbolized the emergence of a Third World approach to international problems, and African views on the Arab-Israeli conflict became increasingly important. With the winds of change blowing across the African continent, the two major contenders in the Middle Eastern crisis—Egypt and Israel—began to concentrate on wooing African support for their own positions.

The concept of Pan-Africanism has been around for a long time in spite of great historical events. Beginning as the nationalist thought of more or less detribalized Africans in the New World during the era of slavery, Pan-Africanism has survived the impact of such developments as the U.S. Civil War and Reconstruction, the post-Reconstruction era, the rise and fall of the Garvey movement, European colonialism in Africa, the Russian and other socialist revolutions of the twentieth century, and the black freedom movements in Africa, the United States, and the Caribbean since 1945.

After a fifteen year colonial struggle, Angolan nationalists are on the verge of realizing or destroying an independent Angolan state. With the collapse and exit of the old colonial regime, three rival liberation movements have been left to compete for political ascendancy. It may be useful therefore to focus briefly on (1) the genesis and character of this political tripolarity, on (2) the tendency for it to encourage extensive external intervention and on (3) some thoughts concerning what, under the circumstances, might constitute an appropriate American response.

Twenty-eight African states, over sixty percent of the African group at the United Nations, have voted to condemn Zionism as “a form of racism.” Five African countries opposed the resolution and twelve abstained. People of good will do disagree about the merits of particular Israeli policies. The meaning of Zionism is also a matter of serious debate in Jewish and intercultural circles. But to identify Zionism with racism is nothing less than an act of hostility toward the Jewish people. Sadly, the African states contributed as much as any other regional bloc to the perpetration of this act.

In addition to our discussions today of the current situation in Angola, I would like to direct my remarks to the question of what role, if any, the United States should play with regard to Angola, and concretely, how the Congress can assist in the formulation and execution of a responsible American policy toward Angola. We have all learned a number of important lessons from recent revelations about the conduct of American policy in Southeast Asia, about Government coverups such as Watergate, corporate bribery of foreign officials and political parties, and about the illegal and unacceptable activities of the CIA as described in the Rockefeller Commission report and elsewhere. Certainly we can apply some of these lessons to our present consideration of U.S. policy toward Angola; hopefully we will learn the vital facts and ask the necessary questions now, rather than, as has too often been the case, after the fact.

I am pleased at this opportunity to give an account of recent developments in Ethiopia. As Acting Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, I have been deeply engrossed in the subject ever since heavy fighting broke out in the Ethiopian province of Eritrea on January 31. I also have a very personal interest in this subject since I served at one time as Consul in Asmara. Indeed, twenty-five years ago last month I opened our consular post there.

I would like to thank the Subcommittee for inviting me to testify before it on the subject of Angola.

In this presentation I shall make six major points. Briefly, and in summary, they are the following: one, the historical record in Angola, both remote and recent, suggests that there are deep roots to the current political fragmentation and conflict in that country and that, even under good conditions, political unity and stable government will be difficult to establish. Two, the Alvor Agreement, signed on January 15, 1975, between Portugal and the three major Angolan nationalist parties is, on paper, a masterful piece of diplomacy and compromise; its provisions should be studied and enforced.

The events that followed proved this expectation to have been based on weak axioms. The political division of the country-first into three, and later into four regions—resulted in political, economic and social imbalances. Not only did such a structure favor the growth of tribalism with its attendant evils; it aided the emergence of a class sytem of “haves,” “have-mores,” “have-littles,” and “have-nots.”

Over the nine years since the overthrow of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah’s regime in February 1966, Ghana has come under three different governments: that of the National Liberation Council (February 1966 to October 1969), the Progress government (late 1969 to January 1972), and the government of the National Redemption Council (1972– ). Various views have been expressed in journals and magazines where writers have tried to depict the country’s foreign policy under the different regimes. For instance, Ruth First said that the government of the National Liberation Council (NLC) pursued a pro-West policy, and the Times (London) said a day after the coup d’etat of 24 February 1966 that Ghana had “swung back to reliance on the West.” William Gutteridge, however, maintained that the NLC government had restored a degree of neutralism to the country’s foreign policy rather than abandon the policy of nonalignment and neutralism in entirety. He added that the NLC had opted for more modest pan-African policies following Nkrumah’s pan-African excesses. Other people accused the NLC government of supporting the colonialists in Africa by refusing to allow freedom fighters the opportunity to meet and organize from within Ghana.

I appreciate very much this opportunity to present our views on what the United States should do to encourage political progress in Rhodesia.

Since the establishment of the Washington Office on Africa in the fall of 1972, we have devoted much of our efforts to working with sympathetic members of Congress and citizens across the country to improve United States policy toward Rhodesia and specifically to repeal the Byrd Amendment, which three-and-a-half years ago created a statutory violation of this country’s treaty obligation to comply with the United Nations sanctions program. So we are pleased to participate in hearings on southern Africa and especially this one on Rhodesia.

The major legislative attention of Congress in 1974 with respect to Africa focused on aspects of U.S. aid policy and an effort to repeal the Byrd amendment, which permits the importation of strategic materials in contravention of U.N. sanctions.

In the area of U.S. aid policy, the Congress adopted several pieces of legislation with implications for Africa. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-559) requested the President to increase Africa’s share of the Agency for International Development (AID) loans and grants and to provide the developing nations of Africa with an equitable share of United States economic assistance (sec. 49).

The purpose of my statement is to place recent events in perspective and to speculate in broad terms about forthcoming developments as these may affect or be affected by U.S. policy. Other commentators are much better positioned than I to present detailed statistical evidence and to estimate near term developments based on the most recent facts.

Mr. Chairman, Members of the sub-committee, I am grateful for this opportunity to appear before you and to testify about Rhodesia.

Rhodesia is a strategically located colony with great potential. Whether called Rhodesia or Zimbabwe, it has a valuable resource base and could, under favorable circumstances, serve once again as the fulcrum of a prosperous and progressive Southern Africa.