Rational Choice Using Imprecise Probabilities and Utilities

Paul Weirich

doi:10.1017/9781108582209

Series: Elements in Decision Theory and Philosophy

Rational Choice Using Imprecise Probabilities and Utilities

Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 February 2021

Paul Weirich

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Paul Weirich: Affiliation:
University of Missouri, Columbia

Summary

An agent often does not have precise probabilities or utilities to guide resolution of a decision problem. I advance a principle of rationality for making decisions in such cases. To begin, I represent the doxastic and conative state of an agent with a set of pairs of a probability assignment and a utility assignment. Then I support a decision principle that allows any act that maximizes expected utility according to some pair of assignments in the set. Assuming that computation of an option's expected utility uses comprehensive possible outcomes that include the option's risk, no consideration supports a stricter requirement.

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decision theory game theory imprecise probabilities sequences of choices imprecise utilities

Type: Element
Information: Series: Elements in Decision Theory and Philosophy

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108582209 [Opens in a new window]

Online ISBN: 9781108582209

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Print publication: 25 February 2021

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Rational Choice Using Imprecise Probabilities and Utilities

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