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Series:   Elements in Ethics

Hume on the Nature of Morality

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 January 2022

Elizabeth S. Radcliffe
Elizabeth S. Radcliffe
Affiliation:
College of William and Mary, Virginia

Summary

David Hume's moral system involves considerations that seem at odds with one another. He insists on the reality of moral distinctions, while showing that they are founded on the human constitution. He notes the importance to morality of the consequences of actions, while emphasizing that motives are the subjects of moral judgments. He appeals to facts about human psychology as the basis for an argument that morality is founded, not on reason, but on sentiment. Yet, he insists that no “ought” can follow from an “is.” He thinks that our motivation to justice must derive from our nature. Yet, he wonders how to explain why anyone would be motivated to follow rules when doing so does not further their personal interests. As an empiricist, his approach is descriptive, yet morality is prescriptive. This Element addresses these puzzles in Hume's moral theory, with reference to historical and contemporary discussions.
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Keywords

ethicsHumemoralitysentimentalismvirtue
Type
Element
Information
Series: Elements in Ethics
Online ISBN: 9781108587952
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication: 10 February 2022

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