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Series:   Elements in the Philosophy of Mathematics

Mathematical Pluralism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 March 2024

Graham Priest
Graham Priest
Affiliation:
City University of New York

Summary

Mathematical pluralism is the view that there is an irreducible plurality of pure mathematical structures, each with their own internal logics; and that qua pure mathematical structures they are all equally legitimate. Mathematical pluralism is a relatively new position on the philosophical landscape. This Element provides an introduction to the position.
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Keywords

mathematical pluralismmathematical foundationalismmathematical objectsapplied mathematicsnon-classical logic
Type
Element
Information
Series: Elements in the Philosophy of Mathematics
Online ISBN: 9781009091640
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication: 18 April 2024

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Mathematical Pluralism
  • Graham Priest, City University of New York
  • Online ISBN: 9781009091640
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Mathematical Pluralism
  • Graham Priest, City University of New York
  • Online ISBN: 9781009091640
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Mathematical Pluralism
  • Graham Priest, City University of New York
  • Online ISBN: 9781009091640
Available formats
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