Element contents
Series: Elements in Ethics
Epistemology and Methodology in Ethics
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 May 2020
Summary
This Element introduces several prominent themes in contemporary work on the epistemology and methodology of ethics. Topics addressed include skeptical challenges in ethics, epistemic arguments in metaethics, what (if anything) is epistemically distinctive of the ethical. Also considered are methodological questions in ethics, including questions about which ethical concepts we should investigate, and what our goals should be in ethical inquiry.
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- Information
- Series: Elements in EthicsOnline ISBN: 9781108581493Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication: 11 June 2020
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