Book contents
- Virtue Theoretic Epistemology
- Virtue Theoretic Epistemology
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Contributors
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- Chapter 1 Closed-Mindedness As an Intellectual Vice
- Chapter 2 Epistemic Virtues and Virtues with Epistemic Content
- Chapter 3 Difficulty and Knowledge
- Chapter 4 What Is Epistemic Entitlement?
- Chapter 5 Knowledge-Producing Abilities
- Chapter 6 Virtue Epistemology, Two Kinds of Internalism, and the Intelligibility Problem
- Chapter 7 Knowledge Is Extrinsically Apt Belief
- Chapter 8 Explaining Knowledge
- Chapter 9 Anti-risk Virtue Epistemology
- Chapter 10 Responsibilism within Reason
- Index
- References
Chapter 7 - Knowledge Is Extrinsically Apt Belief
Virtue Epistemology and the Temporal Objection
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 16 July 2020
By
Book contents
- Virtue Theoretic Epistemology
- Virtue Theoretic Epistemology
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Contributors
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- Chapter 1 Closed-Mindedness As an Intellectual Vice
- Chapter 2 Epistemic Virtues and Virtues with Epistemic Content
- Chapter 3 Difficulty and Knowledge
- Chapter 4 What Is Epistemic Entitlement?
- Chapter 5 Knowledge-Producing Abilities
- Chapter 6 Virtue Epistemology, Two Kinds of Internalism, and the Intelligibility Problem
- Chapter 7 Knowledge Is Extrinsically Apt Belief
- Chapter 8 Explaining Knowledge
- Chapter 9 Anti-risk Virtue Epistemology
- Chapter 10 Responsibilism within Reason
- Index
- References
Summary
According to Sosa’s virtue epistemological account, an instance of (animal) knowledge is a belief that instantiates the property of being apt. The purpose of this contribution is, first, to show why this claim is, without further clarification, problematic. Briefly, an instance of knowledge cannot be identified to an apt belief because beliefs are states and aptness is a property that only actions – and no states – can exemplify. Second, I present the metaphysical amendment that the tenants of virtue epistemology can adopt in order to avoid this objection. This conducts me to suggest a new, metaphysically sounder version of the virtue epistemological account of knowledge in which knowledge is extrinsically apt belief.
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- Virtue Theoretic EpistemologyNew Methods and Approaches, pp. 166 - 180Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2020
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