Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Editor's preface
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- Part I The semantic tradition
- Part II Vienna, 1925–1935
- 9 Schlick before Vienna
- 10 Philosophers on relativity
- 11 Carnap before Vienna
- 12 Scientific idealism and semantic idealism
- 13 Return of Ludwig Wittgenstein
- 14 A priori knowledge and the constitution of meaning
- 15 The road to syntax
- 16 Syntax and truth
- 17 Semantic conventionalism and the factuality of meaning
- 18 The problem of induction: theories
- 19 The problem of experience: protocols
- Notes
- References
- Index
15 - The road to syntax
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 March 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Editor's preface
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- Part I The semantic tradition
- Part II Vienna, 1925–1935
- 9 Schlick before Vienna
- 10 Philosophers on relativity
- 11 Carnap before Vienna
- 12 Scientific idealism and semantic idealism
- 13 Return of Ludwig Wittgenstein
- 14 A priori knowledge and the constitution of meaning
- 15 The road to syntax
- 16 Syntax and truth
- 17 Semantic conventionalism and the factuality of meaning
- 18 The problem of induction: theories
- 19 The problem of experience: protocols
- Notes
- References
- Index
Summary
I see mainly three phases: 1. 1925–30, in the center: Wittgenstein's Tractatus, next: my Aufbau conception, which simplified everything very much; danger of dogmatism. Refusal of metaphysics through a too strongly simplified scheme. All difficulties appear solved. The dragon was slain. Now things need only to be clarified a little through explanations. 2. The new phase comes out of two additions: 2a. (Mainly since 1929?) physicalism, unity of science; bridges between the branches; the attention goes not only to physics, but further to psychology and sociology. 2b. Syntax mainly since 1931 (my first sketch: Jan. 1930 [sic]; stronger influence through Tarski's lectures in Vienna, February 1930, disregarded by Schlick and Waismann). Gradually it became ever clearer: all of our problems are syntactic problems. Serves to strengthen the thesis of the unity of science. Not: everything is solved, but a set of new jobs to be tackled.
Letter from Carnap to Neurath of 23 December 1933 (ASP)The protocols of the Vienna circle sessions held in 1931 (RC 081-07, ASP) offer an image of conflicting attitudes toward Wittgenstein's thought, from Waismann's unswerving support to Neurath's thoughtless rejection. Carnap took the middle ground of critical interest, convinced that there were insights behind the confused message reaching him but unwilling to let the matter stand where Wittgenstein had left it.
One source of constant puzzlement was Wittgenstein's view that the best philosophy is meaningless and consists of certain strange things called “Erläuterungen” (clarifications).
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- The Semantic Tradition from Kant to CarnapTo the Vienna Station, pp. 272 - 284Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1991