Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Editor's preface
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- Part I The semantic tradition
- Part II Vienna, 1925–1935
- 9 Schlick before Vienna
- 10 Philosophers on relativity
- 11 Carnap before Vienna
- 12 Scientific idealism and semantic idealism
- 13 Return of Ludwig Wittgenstein
- 14 A priori knowledge and the constitution of meaning
- 15 The road to syntax
- 16 Syntax and truth
- 17 Semantic conventionalism and the factuality of meaning
- 18 The problem of induction: theories
- 19 The problem of experience: protocols
- Notes
- References
- Index
11 - Carnap before Vienna
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 March 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Editor's preface
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- Part I The semantic tradition
- Part II Vienna, 1925–1935
- 9 Schlick before Vienna
- 10 Philosophers on relativity
- 11 Carnap before Vienna
- 12 Scientific idealism and semantic idealism
- 13 Return of Ludwig Wittgenstein
- 14 A priori knowledge and the constitution of meaning
- 15 The road to syntax
- 16 Syntax and truth
- 17 Semantic conventionalism and the factuality of meaning
- 18 The problem of induction: theories
- 19 The problem of experience: protocols
- Notes
- References
- Index
Summary
… only I imagined that this science [i.e. physics] should be preceded by still another one, in which it would first be demonstrated and explained that we pass many experiential judgments, and under which circumstances we are justified in doing so. For I already felt as a boy that most of the judgments we call experiences are not known by us directly, but only inferred from certain others, and frequently I became lost in reflections about out of which premises we might actually derive such consequences. You may indeed smile at the uselessness of such an inquiry; yet I confess that I still today believe that there should be such a science, only I no longer think it must be pursued in advance by anyone who wants to study physics.
Bolzano, LebensbeschreibungThe exact sciences frequently work with concepts (which are occasionally even their principal concepts) of which they cannot say exactly what they mean; and on the other hand: the traditional methods of philosophy are not of much help here.
Carnap, Circular letter, 7 April 1920 (ASP)When in his later years, recollecting his intellectual development, Carnap listed the major influences on his thought, the names he gave were those of Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein. But in 1920 he sent a very different list of names to Dingier. Kant, Riemann, Helmholtz, Mach, Avenarius, Poincaré, Natorp, Ostwald, Einstein, and Weyl were, he said, the people he was studying (Carnap's draft of a letter to Dingier, 20 September 1920, RC 028-12-11, ASP).
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- Information
- The Semantic Tradition from Kant to CarnapTo the Vienna Station, pp. 207 - 222Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1991