4 - Additional Reasons for Rejecting Retributivism

Summary

We have now seen two distinct arguments against retributive legal punishment: (1) the Skeptical Argument and (2) the Epistemic Argument. In this chapter, I would like to consider additional reasons for rejecting retributivism that are independent of worries over free will and basic desert moral responsibility. I will argue that even if one does not share my skepticism about free will, there still remain good reasons for wanting to reject retributivism. This is because, even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that the requisite capacity for control is in place and agents are morally responsible in the basic desert sense, retributivism still faces a number of powerful philosophical and practical objections. In particular, I will argue that (3) it is philosophically problematic to impart to the state the function of intentionally harming wrongdoers in accordance with desert since it is not at all clear that the state is capable of properly tracking the desert and blameworthiness of individuals in any reliable way.